SR 05-11-2021 8A 101-001-06-02 / 701-001
City Council Report
City Council Meeting: May 11, 2021
Agenda Item: 8.A
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To: Mayor and City Council
From: George Cardona, Interim City Attorney, City Attorney's Office, Municipal Law
Subject: OIR Group Independent After-Action Report and Evaluation Regarding
Events Leading To, During, and Following May 31, 2020
Recommended Actions
Staff recommends that the City Council:
(1) Receive OIR Group’s Independent After-Action Report and Evaluation Regarding
the Events Leading To, During, and Following May 31, 2020 (the “Report”);
(2) Direct the Santa Monica Police Department (“SMPD”) to prepare a response to
the Report indicating the degree to which SMPD accepts each of the
recommendations made and setting out a plan for implementation; and
(3) Direct staff to develop a plan, including oversight by the Public Safety Reform
and Oversight Commission, for independent evaluation and public reporting on
the status of SMPD’s implementation of the recommendations.
Discussion
On May 31, 2020, in response to the killing of George Floyd in Minneapolis, Minnesota,
protestors gathered in Santa Monica, California. On the afternoon of May 31, 2020,
while protests were ongoing, individuals engaged in looting and violence that resulted in
significant damage to stores, restaurants, and vehicles in and around Santa Monica’s
downtown area and along its commercial boulevards.
A number of Santa Monica residents criticized the preparation for and handling of the
protest, looting, and violence that occurred on May 31, 2020 by the Santa Monica Police
Department (SMPD). That criticism extended to statements made by various City
representatives to the media and the community on May 31 and subsequently and to
actions taken by the City in the days following May 31.
In response to Council direction, after a formal procurement process, OIR Group was
selected to prepare an independent after-action report and evaluation of the events
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leading to, during, and following May 31, 2020. OIR Group began its work in late
October 2020. After review of a large volume of materials (including emails, texts, audio
recordings, and body-cam and other video footage), interviews of a wide range of
participants in and observers of the events at issue (including City residents, business
owners, Council members, SMPD officers, and other City employees and officials), two
public listening sessions, and targeted listening sessions with the Board of Directors of
Downtown Santa Monica, Inc., and the Black Agenda, OIR Group has now completed
its report (Attachment A), which is presented for Council review and comment. OIR
Group will present the Report and be available to answer Council questions concerning
the Report and its recommendations at the May 11, 2021 Council meeting.
The Report contains a series of 44 recommendations, the last two of which are:
43. The City should request that SMPD prepare a response to this report
indicating the degree to which it accepts each of the recommendations
made and setting out a plan for implementation.
44. The City should develop a plan for independent evaluation and public
reporting on the status of SMPD’s implementation of the
recommendations.
Staff recommends that Council direct staff to comply with these recommendations, and
that, in accordance with guidance in the Report, the plan for independent evaluation and
public reporting on the status of SMPD’s implementation of the recommendations
include oversight by the newly formed Public Safety Reform and Oversight Commission.
Prior Council Actions
On June 9, 2020, the City Council directed SMPD to conduct an after-action review of
the events of May 31, 2020, to be reviewed by a third-party entity. (Attachment B)
On June 23, 2020, the City Council modified its direction; Council directed SMPD to
conduct an after-action review of the events leading to, during, and following May 31
and directed the Interim City Attorney to solicit and retain an individual or entity with the
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required professional expertise and independence to review the after-action review
conducted by the SMPD, conduct such independent investigation as it deemed
appropriate, and provide the City Council with a public written report, to be presented to
the City Council at a public meeting, setting out their independent determinations
regarding the events leading to, during, and following May 31 (Attachment C). As
discussed in the OIR Group Report, SMPD decided to engage an outside consulting
group to assist in preparing an internal after-action report regarding the police response
on May 31. The Chief retained a group headed by a colleague, and a draft report was
prepared, which OIR Group has reviewed. As OIR Group has noted, the consultant was
limited in access to sources of information within SMPD, and editorial control over the
draft report and decisions about what information would be included and which critiques
would survive the editing process were lodged with the Office of the Chief.
On August 25, 2020, after SMPD advised that given the scope of the materials to be
reviewed it would be unable to complete its after-action review within the anticipated
time frame, the City Council modified its direction. Council directed the City Attorney’s
Office to retain an outside expert to prepare an independent after-action report and
evaluation regarding the events leading to, during, and following May 31 and directed
staff to provide that expert with ongoing access to all information relating to those
events compiled to date by SMPD as well as any additional such information gathered
by SMPD or from other sources. Council also directed that the individual or entity
retained should be required to provide regular updates on progress. (Attachment D)
On October 8, 2020, after a formal procurement process, OIR Group was selected to
prepare the independent after-action report and evaluation (Attachment E). OIR Group
began work in late October 2020. In accordance with Council direction, OIR Group
provided regular updates, which were posted on the City’s website at:
https://www.santamonica.gov/May31afteraction. Recordings of the two public listening
sessions conducted by OIR Group are also available at this link.
Financial Impacts and Budget Actions
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Implementation of certain of OIR Group’s recommendations may result in costs, but
those are unknown at this time.
Prepared By: George Cardona, Interim City Attorney
Approved
Forwarded to Council
Attachments:
A. EXB-20200609-Item13C
B. EXC-20200623-Item13A
C. EXD-20200825-Item13C
D. EXE-20201009-InfoItem
E. EXA-OIR Group Report
F. Written Comment
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13.C
June 9, 2020
Council Meeting: June 9, 2020 Santa Monica, California
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CITY CLERK’S OFFICE - MEMORANDUM
To: Mayor and City Council
From: Denise Anderson-Warren, City Clerk, Records & Elections Services
Department
Date: June 9, 2020
13.C Request of Councilmember Himmelrich that the Santa Monica Police
Department conduct an after action review of the events of May 31st to be
reviewed by the Office of Independent Review.
8.A.a
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13.A
June 23, 2020
Council Meeting: June 23, 2020 Santa Monica, California
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CITY CLERK’S OFFICE - MEMORANDUM
To: Mayor and City Council
From: Denise Anderson-Warren, City Clerk, Records & Elections Services
Department
Date: June 23, 2020
13.A Request of Councilmember Himmelrich that (1) the Santa Monica Police
Department conduct an after action review of the events leading to, during,
and following May 31; and (2) the Interim City Attorney solicit and retain an
individual or entity with the required professional expertise and
independence to review the after-action review conducted by the Santa
Monica Police Department, conduct such independent investigation as it
deems appropriate, and provide the City Council with a public written
report, to be presented to the City Council at a public meeting, setting out
their independent determinations regarding the events leading to, during,
and following May 31.
8.A.b
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13.C
August 25, 2020
Council Meeting: August 25, 2020 Santa Monica, California
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CITY CLERK’S OFFICE - MEMORANDUM
To: Mayor and City Council
From: Denise Anderson-Warren, City Clerk, Records & Elections Services
Department
Date: August 25, 2020
13.C Request of Mayor Pro Tem O’Day and Councilmembers McCowan and
Himmelrich that staff promptly retain an outside expert to compile the after-
action report regarding Santa Monica Police Department activities relating
to events before, after, and on May 31, 2020 and that staff provide that
expert ongoing access to all information relating to these events compiled
to date by the Santa Monica Police Department as well as any additional
such information gathered by the Santa Monica Police Department or from
other sources.
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CITY OF SANTA MONICA CITY COUNCIL MINUTES AUGUST 25, 2020 A regular meeting of the Santa Monica City Council was called to order by Mayor McKeown at 5:30 p.m., on
Tuesday, August 25 , 2020, via teleconference pursuant to the Governor’s Executive Order N-29-20 at https://primetime.bluejeans.com/a2m/live-event/jjrpqhfs. Roll Call: Present: Mayor Kevin McKeown Mayor Pro Tem Terry O’Day
Councilmember Gleam Davis Councilmember Sue Himmelrich Councilmember Ana M. Jara Councilmember Kristen McCowan Councilmember Ted Winterer
Also Present: Interim City Manager Lane Dilg Interim City Attorney George Cardona City Clerk Denise Anderson-Warren CLOSED SESSIONS Member of the public Matt Neco commented on closed sessions. On order of the Mayor, the City Council recessed at 5:36 p.m., to consider closed sessions and returned at 7:00 p.m., with all members present, to
report the following:
1.A. Conference with Legal Counsel – Existing Litigation – Litigation has been initiated formally pursuant to Government Code Section 54956.9(d)(1): Kendrick C. Azubuike v. City of Santa Monica,
et al., United States District Court, Central District, Case No. 19-CV-08536-DMG The Interim City Attorney advised this matter was heard with no reportable action taken.
1.B. Conference with Legal Counsel – Anticipated Litigation – Request to enter into a lawsuit as a party, pursuant to Government Code Section 54956.9: Common Cause, et al. v. Donald J. Trump, et al., United States District Court for the District of Columbia, Case No.
20-cv-02024-CRC. The Interim City Attorney advised this is a lawsuit filed by Common Cause challenges an Executive memorandum directing the Census Bureau to
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exclude undocumented individuals living in the United States from the census count, when population data is delivered to Congress to determine congressional apportionment, the lawsuit alleges this violates constitutional
requirements for the census. The Plaintiffs in the lawsuit are being represented Pro bono, at no cost. Given the significance of the issue to California and derivatively to California cities, in terms of representation and allocation of resources for the next decade, the City Attorney recommends that the City accept an invitation to join the lawsuit as a
plaintiff. Motion by Councilmember Winterer, seconded by Councilmember Jara, to have the City accept to join the lawsuit. The motion was approved by the following vote:
AYES: Councilmembers Jara, Winterer, Davis, Himmelrich, McCowan, Mayor Pro Tem O’Day, Mayor McKeown NOES: None ABSENT: None 1.C. Conference with Legal Counsel – Existing Litigation – Litigation has been Initiated Formally Pursuant to Gov. Code Section 54956.9 (d) (1): David Moss v. City of Santa Monica, Los Angeles Superior Court, Case No. BC712581 The Interim City Attorney advised the Plaintiff filed this lawsuit alleging that he suffered a concussion and continuing symptoms, after hitting his head on a City parkway tree that had not been appropriately trimmed. The
City does not admit the allegations made in the lawsuit, but to avoid the
expense and burden of further litigation, the City Attorney recommends settlement in the amount of $36,250. Motion by Councilmember Jara, seconded by Councilmember Davis, to
approve Settlement No. 11080 (CCS) in the amount of $36,250. The
motion was approved by the following vote: AYES: Councilmembers McCowan, Himmelrich, Davis, Winterer, Jara, Mayor Pro Tem O’Day, Mayor McKeown
NOES: None
ABSENT: None 1.D. Conference with Labor Negotiators: Government Code Section 54957.6 – Agency Designated Representatives: Chief People Officer
Lori Gentles and Senior Human Resources Analyst Ericka Reinke. Bargaining Units: Administrative Team Associates, California Teamsters Local 911, Confidential Unrepresented Employees Pay Plan, Executive Pay Plan, Municipal Employees Association,
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Management Team Associates, Public Attorneys Legal Support Staff Union, Public Attorneys Union, Santa Monica Fire Executive Management Association, Santa Monica Firefighters Local 1109 IAFF, Santa Monica Police Officers Association, Supervisory Team Associates, International Association of Sheet Metal, Air, Rail, and Transportation Workers, Transportation Division Local 1785 (SMART TD).
The Interim City Attorney advised this matter was heard with no reportable action taken. 1.E. Conference with Legal Counsel – Existing Litigation – Litigation has been initiated formally pursuant to Government Code Section 54956.9(d)(1): Pico Neighborhood Association and Maria Loya v. City of Santa Monica, Los Angeles Superior Court, Case No. BC 616804, Second District Court of Appeal, Case No. B295935, California Supreme Court, Case No. TBD.
The Interim City Attorney advised this matter was heard with no reportable action taken. SPECIAL AGENDA ITEMS: 2.A. Commendation & City Manager Report: Most Loved Santa Monica Businesses of 2020, was presented. CONSENT CALENDAR: All items were considered and approved in one motion unless removed by a Councilmember for discussion.
There were no members of the public present to comment on Consent
Calendar items. At the request of Councilmember Jara, Item 3.A. was removed from the Consent Calendar.
Motion by Councilmember Jara, seconded by Councilmember McCowan, to approve the Consent Calendar except for Item 3.A, reading resolutions by title only and waiving further reading thereof. The motion was approved by the following vote:
AYES: Councilmembers Jara, Winterer, Davis, Himmelrich, McCowan, Mayor Pro Tem O’Day, Mayor McKeown NOES: None ABSENT: None
PLAYGROUND PARTNERSHIP 3.B. Authorization of Second Modification to Playground Partnership Supplemental Use Agreement with SMMUSD, was approved.
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Recommended Action Staff recommends that the City Council authorize the City Manager to
negotiate and execute a second modification to agreement 9589, the Playground Partnership Supplemental Use Agreement of the Master Facilities Use Agreement with the Santa Monica-Malibu Unified School District (SMMUSD), to reflect operational changes to the program to continue community access to recreational spaces at six elementary
schools. PAYROLL SYSTEM 3.C. Approval of Modifications to Agreements with Kronos, the City's Payroll System, was approved. Recommended Action Staff recommends that the City Council: 1. Authorize the City Manager to negotiate and execute a sixth modification to Sales Agreement and Software License Agreement #8417 (CCS) in the amount of $34,228 (including 15% in
contingency) with Kronos, Inc., a Massachusetts-based company, for upgrade services, training, and hardware for Kronos, the City’s electronic timekeeping system. This recommended award is made as an exception to the competitive bidding process pursuant to Section 2.24.250 (b) Exceptions to the Competitive Process, as
competition does not reasonably exist because only one vendor possesses the unique ability or capability to meet the particular requirements of the solicitation, such as when a good or service is copyrighted, patented or otherwise only available form one license
holder, including, for example, proprietary goods of original
equipment manufacturers and/or their authorized exclusive distributors. This would result in an 18-year amended agreement with a new total amount not to exceed $642,912 with future year funding contingent on Council budget approval; and
2. Authorize the City Manager to negotiate and execute a fifth
modification to Software Maintenance and Support Agreement #8434 (CCS) in the amount of $49,680 (including 15% in contingency) over three-years with Kronos, Inc., for Software as a Service (SaaS) licenses. This recommended award is made as an
exception to the competitive bidding process pursuant to Section
2.24.250 (b) Exceptions to the Competitive Process, as competition does not reasonably exist because only one vendor possesses the unique ability or capability to meet the particular requirements of the solicitation, such as when a good or service is copyrighted,
patented or otherwise only available form one license holder,
including, for example, proprietary goods of original equipment manufacturers and/or their authorized exclusive distributors. This would result in an 18-year amended agreement with a new total
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amount not to exceed $1,900,125 with future year funding contingent on Council budget approval. MUNICIPAL FUND TRANSFER 3.D. Adoption of Resolution No. 11281 (CCS) to entitled “A RESOLUTION OF THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF SANTA MONICA TO RECEIVE THE ANNUAL TRANSFER OF FUNDS FROM THE LOS ANGELES COUNTY FLOOD CONTROL DISTRICT FOR THE SAFE, CLEAN WATER PROGRAM (MEASURE W)”, was
adopted. Recommended Action Staff recommends that the City Council adopt attached Resolution No. 11281 (CCS) to accept the annual municipal fund transfer of Safe, Clean
Water (Measure W) funds from the County of Los Angeles Flood Control District and authorize the City Manager to execute an agreement to receive the funds. USED OIL PAYMENT PROGRAM 3.E. Adoption of Resolution No. 11282 (CCS) entitled “A
RESOLUTION OF THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF SANTA MONICA AUTHORIZING THE CITY MANAGER TO SUBMIT AND EXECUTE USED OIL PAYMENT PROGRAM APPLICATIONS AND RELATED AUTHORIZATIONS TO THE DEPARTMENT OF RESOURCES RECYCLING AND RECOVERY (CalRecycle)”, was
adopted. Recommended Action Staff recommends that the City Council adopt attached Resolution No.
11282 (CCS) authorizing the City Manager to submit and execute
applications, agreements, and annual reports for the CalRecycle Used Oil Payment Program. PARKING METERS 3.F. Award of Contractual Services to IPS Group, Inc. for Parking
Meter Acquisition, was approved.
Recommended Action Staff recommends that City Council: 1. Authorize the City Manager to negotiate and execute Contract No.
11079 (CCS) with IPS Group, Inc., a California based company, for
the purchase and installation of the on-street parking access and revenue control meter system, credit card merchant account and payment gateway services, web based management system, and optional annual equipment warranties. This recommended award is
made as an exception to the competitive bidding process pursuant to
SMMC Section 2.24.250 (c) and is for a total amount not to exceed $17.0 million for five years, with two additional one year renewal options in the amount of $5.6 million, on the same terms and
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conditions for a total amount not to exceed $22.6 million over seven years, with future year funding contingent on Council budget approval. AUDIT 3.G. Approval of First Modification to Moss Adams LLC Contractual Agreement, was approved. Recommended Action
Staff recommends that the City Council authorize the City Manager to negotiate and execute a first modification to agreement #10929 with Moss Adams LLP, a Washington-based company, for internal auditing services for the City Manager’s Office. The modification would increase the first year amount by $91,000 for a new amended total not to exceed $241,000,
and decrease the second and third year amounts by $75,000 for amended totals not to exceed $75,000, thereby decreasing the overall contract amount by $59,000, for an amended total of $691,000, with future year funding contingent on Council budget approval. PARKING SERVICES 3.H. Approval of First Modification to Contractual Services Agreement with SP Plus Corporation for Consolidated Parking Management Services, was approved. Recommended Action
Staff recommends that the City Council: 1. Authorize the City Manager to negotiate and execute a first modification to contract #10201 (CCS) with SP Plus Corporation for consolidated parking management services for the Community
Development Department. The recommended modification is made
as an exception to the competitive process pursuant to SMMC Section 2.24.250 (g) to ensure continuity of operations and revenue collection processes, and would extend the current agreement for up to three years for a new total amount not to exceed $68.7 million
over a ten year period, with future year funding contingent on
Council budget approval. CITY COUNCIL MEETING SCHEDULE 3.I. Cancellation of Regular City Council Meeting Scheduled for September 22, 2020, and Scheduling of a Special Meeting for
September 29, 2020, was approved.
Recommended Action Staff recommends that the City Council vote to: 1) Cancel the Regular meeting scheduled for September 22, 2019, due
to a lack of a quorum; and,
2) Schedule a Special meeting for September 29, 2020. BIG BLUE BUS 3.A. Award Purchase Order for Driver Safety Barriers Aboard Big
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Blue Bus Revenue Vehicles to Allow Resumption of Front-Door Boarding and Fare Collection, was approved. Recommended Action Staff recommends that City Council: 1. Authorize the Procurement Manager to issue a purchase order with Gillig LLC to provide ArowGuard driver security barriers for the Big Blue Bus Department. This recommended award is made as an
exception to the competitive bidding process pursuant to Section 2.24.250(b) and is for a total amount not to exceed $987,129 including a 5% contingency with future year funding contingent on Council budget approval. 2. Authorize budget changes as outlined in the Financial Impacts &
Budget Actions section of this report. Councilmember Jara pulled this item to ask if the protector barriers are easy to move by drivers if the bus has an accident.
Motion by Councilmember Jara, seconded by Mayor Pro Tem O’Day, to approve the recommended action. The motion was approved by the following vote: AYES: Councilmembers McCowan, Himmelrich, Davis, Winterer, Jara,
Mayor Pro Tem O’Day, Mayor McKeown NOES: None ABSENT: None
ORDINANCES: ZONING 7.A. Introduction and First Reading of an Ordinance to Amend For Consistency with State Law Provisions the Text of the City's Zoning Ordinance Related to Accessory Dwelling Units and Junior Accessory Dwelling Units, Density Bonuses for Certain One Hundred Percent Affordable Housing Projects, and Large Family Daycares, and Update
on State law provisions Affecting the City's Housing Policies and Project Approval Procedures, was presented. Recommended Action Staff recommends that the City Council:
1) Introduce for first reading the attached ordinance to amend, for
consistency with State law provisions, the text of the City’s Zoning Ordinance related to accessory dwelling units and junior accessory dwelling units, density bonuses for certain one hundred percent affordable housing projects, and large family daycares.
Members of the public Leslie Lambert, Shawn Landres, Dave Rand, and Michael Soloff spoke generally in support to the recommended action. Questions asked and answered of staff included: when the Accessory
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Dwelling Unit discussion was presented previously, was there a parcel exemption; why put the restriction that the second floor should not be larger than the first floor; if the ADU is larger than the first floor, wouldn’t
there still be setback restrictions; can the city have different standards in different areas; under SB330, what would be considered a comparable unit, and is it based on prices and amenities; what do we do now that ADU’s are allowed in multi-family properties, and should any restrictions be placed on the extra units; how does it work with multi-family properties, in terms of
how many ADUs and JADUs are allowable; any consideration of putting forth model ordinances from other cities; consideration of using density bonuses; any consideration of upper outdoor spaces and allowing 1200 ft ADUs in multi-family, regardless of bedroom size; does Council need to decide how to define a replacement unit tonight, either deed restriction or
rent control unit; if a developer comes in between now and the November election, who makes the decision about the replacement unit, is it the developer or does it default to deed restriction; do the second story outdoor spaces cause encroachment on neighbors; and, can the ordinance stipulate a second story can only be bigger than the first on an alley.
Considerable discussion ensued on topics including, but not limited to: upper outdoor spaces allowable, depending on which side of the house it is located; have different size second story allowable; allow larger second story ADUs only on the alley; and, allowing ADUs to extend into alleys,
making sure that does not impede trash trucks from safely getting through the alley. Motion by Councilmember Himmelrich, seconded by Councilmember Jara,
to change the ordinance to allow a larger second floor on an ADU to the
rear half of the lot, if located X feet from the property line on an alley. Councilmember Winterer, proposed a friendly amendment to amend the language to allow a second story greater than the first story in ADUs,
where the ADU is being constructed on an existing, legal, non-conforming
structure, within the setback requirements. The Interim City Attorney suggested the following language: The flooring of the second story of an ADU or JADU could not exceed the
flooring of the first story, unless the ADU or JADU was within X feet of
the rear parcel line, and that parcel line is adjacent to a public right of way or alley. After further questions and comments, the Interim City Attorney
recommended the following changes to meet the desire of Council as a
solution: To remove the limitation, and just let the second floors be bound by the
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setback rules, and the fact that you will not be able to overlap into a public right of way or into your neighbor’s yard, and you have to comply with the setback rules, so that any overhang would then be into your own property.
That would be to remove Section J (6) of the ordinance. This change was considered friendly by the maker and seconder. The language and direction was approved by consensus of Council.
Motion by Councilmember Winterer, seconded by Mayor Pro Tem O’Day, to approve the Planning Commissions recommendation to introduce and hold first reading of the ordinance reading by title only and waiving further reading thereof with the addition to include the language proposed by the Interim City Attorney regarding removing the limitations on the second
story square footage of an ADU and also incorporating an exemption for street or alley adjacent ADUs from upper story outdoor space restrictions. Motion by Councilmember McCowan, seconded by Mayor Pro Tem O’Day, to restrict parking permits for the parcel, as opposed to allowing an
extra parking permit for the ADU. The motion was pulled to be addressed later with direction to staff. The Interim City Attorney read into the record the modifications to the ordinance includes the following:
Pg 166 subsection F, on that page the last line, would be accept to set forth in Subsection G, the one would be stricken, that was a typo Pg 172 section I.1.b.2, the first sentence would be modified to read an ADU that is established by converting floor area of a legal existing
accessory structure expand the footprint of the existing accessory structure,
if the additional enlargement… Pg 174 Strike Section J(6) remove limitation on second floor size Pg 175 Add Section G.1.A.3 (inadvertently omitted), in Section .2.A.i, reference to single-family would change to single unit
Pg 176 Section L.2.A.3, phrase Junior Dwelling would be replaced with
JADU Pg 177 Section N.4.1. add at the end of the section, Upper story outdoor spaces shall not be located on the side elevation closest to a side parcel line, unless that side parcel line is adjacent to a public right of way or alley.
The motion, with amendments was approved by the following vote: AYES: Councilmembers Jara, Winterer, Davis, Himmelrich, McCowan, Mayor Pro Tem O’Day, Mayor McKeown
NOES: None
ABSENT: None Motion by Councilmember Winterer, seconded by Councilmember Jara, to
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give direction to staff to come back with a more complete option on the commercial density bonus models that were presented to Council, and to explore voluntary affordable deed restriction for ADUs and limits on
preferential permit parking for ADUs on a per parcel instead of a per unit basis. The motion was approved by the following vote: AYES: Councilmembers McCowan, Himmelrich, Davis, Winterer, Jara, Mayor Pro Tem O’Day, Mayor McKeown
NOES: None ABSENT: None LEASING RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY 7.B. Introduction and First Reading of an Ordinance to Add Chapter 6.22 to the Santa Monica Municipal Code to Related to Requirements for Leasing Residential Properties and Adoption of Resolution No. 11283 (CCS) entitled “A RESOLUTION OF THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF SANTA MONICA AMENDING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CITATION SCHEDULE OF FINES FOR CERTAIN VIOLATIONS OF THE SANTA MONICA MUNICIPAL CODE
RELATED TO RESIDENTIAL LEASING REQUIREMENTS”, was presented. Recommended Action Staff recommends that the City Council: (1) Introduce for First Reading an
Ordinance to add Chapter 6.22 to the Santa Monica Municipal Code related to regulations for leasing residential property; and (2) adopt a Resolution establishing fines for violations of the Ordinance.
Members of the public Jonah Braslauf, Jennifer Kennedy, Danielle Wilson,
Denise Barton, Michael Soloff, Shawn Landres, Sonia Sulton, and Denny Zane spoke to the recommended action. Questions asked and answered of staff included: if providing non-
furnishing units is a requirement, aren’t there companies that can provide
those services; how can we make sure that permanent supportive housing cover anyone in a city program that require furnishings, including the homeless population; does the permanent residency definition include college students; whatever is decided is it applicable to Accessory dwelling
units and Junior accessory dwelling units; do JADUs require an exterior
entrance; and, what was the thought for setting an applicability date that is different from the date of the ordinance. Motion by Councilmember Davis, seconded by Mayor McKeown, to
introduce and hold first reading of the ordinance reading by title only and
waiving further reading thereof, with amendments to add the four pillars: Lease only to natural persons; rent/lease only non-furnished units; require a minimum of a one-year lease, and the renter must be a natural person, and
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their permanent residence. Councilmember Winterer, proposed a friendly amendment to consider a
once a year exemption for homeowners. The motion was not considered friendly by the maker. Mayor McKeown proposed a friendly amendment applicability date 30 days after the adoption of the ordinance, instead of the November 1st
applicability date. The motion was considered friendly by the maker. Mayor Pro Tem O’Day proposed a friendly amendment to alter the permanent residency requirement to require a student ID as one of the requirements. The motion was not considered friendly by the maker.
Councilmember Winterer proposed a friendly amendment to change the proof of residency from 30 days to 60 days, and The motion was considered friendly by the maker.
The Interim City Attorney requested to remove the property tax bill requirement as documentation, and to change the language for the November 1st date in the applicability to read the as of the effective date of this ordinance. The maker and seconder considered this as a friendly amendment.
The motion was approved, with amendments by the following vote: AYES: Councilmembers McCowan, Himmelrich, Davis, Winterer, Jara,
Mayor Pro Tem O’Day, Mayor McKeown
NOES: None ABSENT: None Motion by Councilmember Winterer, seconded by Councilmember Jara, to
adopt Resolution No. 11283 (CCS) establishing fines for violations of the
Ordinance adding Chapter 6.22 to the Santa Monica Municipal Code related to regulations for leasing residential property. The motion was approved by the following vote:
AYES: Councilmembers Jara, Winterer, Davis, Himmelrich,
McCowan, Mayor Pro Tem O’Day, Mayor McKeown NOES: None ABSENT: None
Motion by Councilmember Winterer, seconded by Councilmember Jara, to
direct staff to investigate and return to Council as soon as possible, with possible modifications to the ordinance for undocumented residents with other proofs of residency. The motion was approved by the following vote:
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AYES: Councilmembers McCowan, Himmelrich, Davis, Winterer, Jara, Mayor Pro Tem O’Day, Mayor McKeown
NOES: None ABSENT: None AFFORDABLE HOUSING Mayor Pro Tem O’Day Excused at 10:37 p.m.
7.C. Introduction and Adoption of Emergency Interim Zoning Ordinance No. 2645 (CCS) entitled “AN EMERGENCY INTERIM
ZONING ORDINANCE OF THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF SANTA MONICA TO EXTEND EMERGENCY INTERIM ZONINGORDINANCE 2633 AMENDING SANTA MONICA MUNICIPAL CODE CHAPTER 9.39 AND SECTION 9.40.020 TO INCREASE THRESHOLDS FOR REVIEW OF ONE HUNDRED
PERCENT AFFORDABLE HOUSING PROJECTS AND HOUSING PROJECTS SUBJECT TO THE HOUSING ACCOUNTABILITY ACT BY ADMINISTRATIVE APPROVAL”, was presented. Recommended Action
Staff recommends that the City Council introduce and adopt an emergency Interim Zoning Ordinance to amend and extend interim regulations authorizing 100% affordable housing projects and Tier 2 housing projects subject to the Housing Accountability Act to be reviewed through an Administrative Approval process.
Members of the public Roderick Hall, Leonora Camner, Eva Warnier, Mark Yetter, and Denise Barton spoke to the recommended action.
Questions asked and answered of staff included, could the amendments to
the leasing property ordinance be added to this ordinance tonight. Motion by Councilmember Winterer, seconded by Councilmember Jara, to introduce and adopt emergency Interim Zoning Ordinance No. 2645 (CCS)
reading by title only and waiving further reading thereof, and add the one-
year minimum lease requirement. The motion was approved by the following vote: AYES: Councilmembers McCowan, Himmelrich, Davis, Winterer, Jara,
Mayor McKeown
NOES: None ABSENT: Mayor Pro Tem O’Day DOWNTOWN
COMMUNITY PLAN
Mayor Pro Tem O’Day
7.D. Adoption of Resolution No. 11284 (CCS) entitled “A
RESOLUTION OF THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF SANTA
MONICA AMENDING THE DOWNTOWN COMMUNITY PLAN TO REVISE THE DEFINITION OF HOUSING PROJECT AND TO ALLOW TIER 3 HOUSING PROJECTS GREATER THAN 90,000
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returned at 10:45 p.m. SQUARE FEET TO BE PROCESSED BY DEVELOPMENT REVIEW PERMIT”, was presented. Recommended Actions (A) Staff recommends that the City Council adopt a Resolution to amend the Downtown Community Plan (“DCP”) to: 1. Revise the definition of “housing project” 2. Authorize Tier 3 housing projects greater than 90,000 square feet to
be approved by Development Review Permit; 3. Make clerical amendments to Chapter 2A.4 DCP Entitlement and Tier System. (B) Staff also recommends that the City Council introduce for first reading an Ordinance amending Section 9.10.070 of the Zoning Ordinance to
establish project requirements for Tier 3 housing projects greater than 90,000 square feet located within the DCP Area. Members of the public Leslie Lambert, Carl Hansen, Shawn Landres, Paula Larmore, Denny Zane, Michael Soloff, Jennifer Kennedy, and, Matthews
Stevens spoke to the recommended action. Questions asked and answered of staff included: are the community benefits the same for Tier 2 and Tier 3 in this ordinance; is there any discussion to increasing the community benefits in Tier 3; why is the
neighborhood serving retail and commercial on the street level being removed; as you go up Tier 3, don’t you have to provide more affordable housing; if a Tier 2 project is done to the maximum, would it be a 25% requirement; if we don’t want to go back to requiring neighborhood serving
commercial, is there a way to create more flexibility for commercial space;
if commercial space was allowed above the first floor, is there any thought to have more open-air options; what is the difference between neighborhood serving and street activation; why is the maximum being increased from 25% to exceed 33% of the total building square footage for
mixed-use projects; if the commercial is being moved from the bottom
floor, it may make sense to not make it a requirement to not allow commercial to go above the second floor; does staff need direction on the design review process, now that these will no longer go before the ARB; does it make sense to shift from 25% to 33% for mixed-use projects; is
there some way to see if this works before we make it permanent; and, what
happens if this doesn’t work. Considerable discussion ensued on topics including, but not limited to, concerns to change the definition of Housing projects for Downtown.
Motion by Mayor Pro Tem O’Day, seconded by Councilmember Jara, to adopt Resolution No. 11284 (CCS), amending the Downtown Community Plan to revise the definition of Housing Project; to allow Tier 3 Housing
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Projects greater than 90,000 square feet to be processed by Development Review Permit, and make clerical amendments to Chapter 2A.4 DCP Entitlement and Tier System, with amendments to keep the 25%
commercial threshold, keep the neighborhood commercial serving definition, and allow uses beyond the ground floor for commercial. Councilmember Davis, proposed a friendly amendment to limit the non-residential uses to the second floor. The motion was considered friendly by
the maker and seconder. The motion, with amendments was approved by the following vote: AYES: Councilmembers Jara, Winterer, Davis, Himmelrich,
McCowan, Mayor Pro Tem O’Day, Mayor McKeown NOES: None ABSENT: None Motion by Mayor McKeown, seconded by Councilmember Winterer, to
introduce and hold first reading of the ordinance reading by title only and waiving further reading thereof. The motion was approved by the following vote: AYES: Councilmembers McCowan, Himmelrich, Davis, Winterer,
Jara, Mayor Pro Tem O’Day, Mayor McKeown NOES: None ABSENT: None
STAFF ADMINISTRATIVE ITEMS: BELMAR PROJECT/CIVIC FIELD
NAMING/PARK DESIGNATION
8.A. Approval of Phase Two of the Belmar History + Art Project and Civic Field Naming and Introduction and First Reading of an Ordinance Designating New Park, was presented. Recommended Action
Staff recommends that the City Council:
1. Direct staff to proceed with Phase Two of the Belmar History + Art project, focused on the Bay Street Beach and other areas of historical and cultural importance; 2. Select an official name for the multipurpose sports field in the Civic
Center; and
3. Introduce for a first reading an ordinance (Attachment I) that would amend the Municipal Code to designate the new park. Member of the public Maryann LaGuardia, in support of the recommended
action.
Questions asked and answered of staff included: why Belmar Park instead
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of Historical Belmar Park; when was the naming survey completed; and, has there been any other areas in the city that have been designated as historic and of cultural importance.
Motion by Councilmember McCowan, seconded by Mayor Pro Tem O’Day, to give direction to staff to proceed with Phase Two of the Belmar History + Art project, focused on the Bay Street Beach and other areas of historical and cultural importance, and select Historic Belmar Park as the
official name for the multipurpose sports field in the Civic Center. The motion was approved by the following vote: AYES: Councilmembers Jara, Winterer, Davis, Himmelrich, McCowan, Mayor Pro Tem O’Day, Mayor McKeown
NOES: None ABSENT: None Motion by Councilmember Winterer, seconded by Mayor Pro Tem O’Day, to introduce and hold first reading of the ordinance reading by title only and
waiving further reading thereof, with amendment to add Historic to the name with the park named Historic Belmar Park. The motion was approved by the following vote: AYES: Councilmembers Jara, Winterer, Davis, Himmelrich, McCowan,
Mayor Pro Tem O’Day, Mayor McKeown NOES: None ABSENT: None
COUNCILMEMBER DISCUSSION ITEMS: LEAGUE OF CALIFORNIA CITIES
13.A. Designation of voting delegate and alternate for the League of California Cities 2020 Annual Conference scheduled for October 7 - 9, 2020, was presented. There were no members of the public present to speak.
Councilmember Winterer, seconded by Mayor McKeown, to appoint Councilmember Jara as the delegate and Councilmember McCowan as the alternate. The motion was approved by the following vote:
AYES: Councilmembers Jara, Winterer, Davis, Himmelrich, McCowan,
Mayor Pro Tem O’Day, Mayor McKeown NOES: None ABSENT: None
PROPOSITIONS 15 AND 16 13.B. Request of Mayor McKeown and Councilmembers Jara and Winterer that the Council authorize endorsement by the City of Santa Monica of state Propositions 15, which would increase funding for K-12 public schools, community colleges, and local governments by
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requiring that commercial and industrial real property be taxed based on current market value; and state Proposition 16, which would repeal Proposition 209 passed in 1996, thereby removing the ban on affirmative action in public employment, public education, and public contracting for persons on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin, was presented. Member of the public Matt Neco, spoke on the recommended action.
Motion by Mayor McKeown, seconded by Councilmember Jara, to adopt the recommendation. The motion was approved by the following vote: AYES: Councilmembers McCowan, Himmelrich, Davis, Winterer, Jara,
Mayor Pro Tem O’Day, Mayor McKeown NOES: None ABSENT: None SANTA MONICA POLICE DEPARTMENT
Mayor McKeown excused at
1:12 a.m.
13.C. Request of Mayor Pro Tem O’Day and Councilmembers McCowan and Himmelrich that staff promptly retain an outside expert to compile the after-action report regarding Santa Monica Police Department activities relating to events before, after, and on May 31, 2020 and that staff provide that expert ongoing access to all information relating to these events compiled to date by the Santa Monica Police Department as well as any additional such information gathered by the Santa Monica Police Department or from other sources, was presented.
Members of the public Denise Barton, John Meddlin, David Feyhe, Burt
Champagne, Bardauex Lopez, Jonathan Foster, and Matt Neco spoke on the recommended action. Considerable discussion ensued on topics including, but not limited to: is
there a way to get this done faster; how long will it take to return the results
and the analysis; Council and the public would like to receive regular updates; and, concerns that the cost is going to be more than the City Attorney’s threshold for spending.
Motion by Councilmember Winterer, seconded by Councilmember Jara, to
direct the City Attorney to go through the RFP process as quickly as possible to bring in an outside expert group who will gather facts , with PD to do an analysis and evaluation, and put together an after-action report that not only includes facts but potentially analysis as well. That could then be
reviewed and a determination could be made whether a further independent
investigation is necessary. The motion was approved by the following vote: AYES: Councilmembers Jara, Winterer, Davis, Himmelrich,
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Mayor McKeown returned at 1:19 a.m.
McCowan, Mayor Pro Tem O’Day NOES: None ABSENT: Mayor McKeown
Motion by Councilmember Himmelrich, seconded by Councilmember Jara, to direct staff to bring back regular reports on the status at each Council meeting or Information Item going forward on the after-action and analysis until the report is done. The Interim City Manager suggested providing
that information on a website to make that information available to members of the public. The motion was approved by the following vote:
AYES: Councilmembers McCowan, Himmelrich, Davis, Winterer, Jara, Mayor Pro Tem O’Day, Mayor McKeown NOES: None ABSENT: None PUBLIC INPUT:
Members of the public Jonathan Foster, Denise Barton, Craig Miller, and commented on various local issues. ADJOURNMENT On order of the Mayor, the City Council meeting adjourned at 1:27 a.m.
ATTEST: APPROVED:
Denise Anderson-Warren Kevin McKeown City Clerk Mayor
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October 9, 2020
To: Mayor and City Council
From: George S. Cardona, Interim City Attorney
Subject: Selection of OIR Group to Prepare Independent After-Action
Report and Evaluation Regarding Events Leading To, During,
and Following May 31, 2020
Summary
On May 31, 2020, in response to the killing of George Floyd in Minneapolis, Minnesota,
protestors gathered in Santa Monica, California. On the afternoon of May 31, 2020,
while the protest was ongoing, individuals engaged in looting and violence that resulted
in significant damage to stores, restaurants, and vehicles in and around Santa Monica’s
downtown area and along its commercial boulevards.
A number of Santa Monica residents have criticized the preparation for and handling of
the protest, looting, and violence that occurred on May 31, 2020 by the Santa Monica
Police Department (SMPD). That criticism has extended to statements made by various
City representatives to the media and the community on May 31 and subsequently and
to actions taken by the City in the days following May 31.
On June 9, 2020, the City Council directed SMPD to conduct an after-action review of
the events of May 31, 2020, to be reviewed by a third-party entity. Thereafter, on
August 25, 2020, the City Council tasked the City Attorney’s Office with soliciting and
retaining an individual or entity with the required professional expertise to prepare an
independent after-action report and evaluation regarding the events leading to, during,
and following May 31, 2020.
A formal procurement process was completed on October 8, 2020 and resulted in the
selection of OIR Group to prepare the independent after-action report and evaluation.
Information Item
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2
OIR Group brings approximately two decades of experience and expertise in oversight
of law enforcement practices and activities, including preparation of after-action reports.
As one example, OIR Group was given lead responsibility by the City of Los Angeles’
Office of Inspector General to investigate the controversial, large-scale use of force by
LAPD officers during the 2001 May Day incident in MacArthur Park. References from
cities that have retained OIR Group have spoken highly of their work, commenting in
particular on their thoroughness, fairness, integrity, and judgment, and noting their
willingness to be critical of police and City actions if the facts warrant. OIR Group was
also the low bidder, and has committed to a “do not exceed” expenditure of $75,000 for
the completion of the project, which will include virtual listening sessions with Santa
Monica residents and business owners to ensure that they receive a full picture of the
events at issue as well as a public presentation to City Council of the final report.
The City will negotiate and execute an agreement with OIR Group, and OIR Group will
then begin work with the goal of having a final written report and evaluation within 180
days.
Discussion
On June 9, 2020, the City Council directed SMPD to conduct an after-action review of
the events of May 31, 2020, to be reviewed by a third-party entity. On June 23, 2020,
the City Council modified its direction; Council directed SMPD to conduct an after-action
review of the events leading to, during, and following May 31 and directed the Interim
City Attorney to solicit and retain an individual or entity with the required professional
expertise and independence to review the after-action review conducted by the SMPD,
conduct such independent investigation as it deemed appropriate, and provide the City
Council with a public written report, to be presented to the City Council at a public
meeting, setting out their independent determinations regarding the events leading to,
during, and following May 31. In response, on June 30, 2020, the City Attorney’s Office
issued a solicitation for proposals, seeking an entity to conduct an independent
investigation on an expedited timeline after being provided with an after-action review
prepared by SMPD. After receiving three proposals by the specified deadline of July
13, 2020, the City Attorney’s Office reviewed the proposals and was prepared to make a
selection.
8.A.d
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3
Thereafter, SMPD advised that given the scope of the materials to be reviewed, it would
be unable to complete an after-action review within the anticipated time frame of two to
two and one-half months. As a result, on August 25, 2020, the City Council modified its
direction. Council directed the City Attorney’s Office to retain an outside expert to
prepare an independent after-action report and evaluation regarding the events leading
to, during, and following May 31 and directed staff to provide that expert with ongoing
access to all information relating to those events compiled to date by SMPD as well as
any additional such information gathered by SMPD or from other sources. Council also
directed that the individual or entity retained should be required to provide regular
updates on progress.
Given the revised direction and anticipated potential cost, the City Attorney’s Office
worked with procurement staff to post a formal solicitation. On September 9, 2020, the
solicitation was posted. The solicitation sought applications from interested firms to
prepare an independent after-action report and evaluation regarding the events leading
to, during, and following May 31, and described the scope of work as follows:
The independent after-action report and evaluation should include: (1) a written
narrative of facts regarding those events as determined by the selected firm
based on its independent review; and (2) an independent evaluation of, and
recommendations regarding, the City’s response to those events, including in
particular the response by the SMPD, SMPD Chief, Interim City Manager, and
City Council. The firm selected will be responsible for presenting the
independent after-action report and evaluation to the City Council, including
answering questions regarding the report and evaluation at a public meeting of
the City Council.
The firm selected will be provided with initial materials gathered by the SMPD
and other City Departments, including in particular the Fire Department and
Emergency Operations Center. Additional materials gathered by the SMPD and
other City Departments will be provided on an ongoing basis. The firm selected,
however, will be responsible for making independent determinations and
8.A.d
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4
providing independent direction regarding document gathering and interviews
and for conducting interviews of City staff and others as it determines
appropriate. The firm selected will also be responsible for developing and
implementing procedures to provide community members and local businesses
an opportunity to provide documents and information and their views regarding
the City’s response. Staff from the City Attorney’s Office will be available to
assist in the gathering of documents and scheduling of interviews in response to
the selected firm’s directions. Based on its independent review, the firm selected
will then prepare an independent after-action report and evaluation regarding the
events leading to, during, and following May 31, and the City’s response to those
events.
The selected firm will be asked to complete its independent after-action report
and evaluation on an expedited timeline with the goal of having a final written
report and evaluation within 180 days. The selected firm may, however, extend
this time frame if it determines that additional time is necessary for it to complete
a thorough independent report and evaluation. The selected firm will be required
to provide bi-weekly updates regarding progress on the gathering of information
and the preparation of the report and evaluation.
The solicitation closed on September 24, 2020. The City received five proposals.
Between September 24 and October 1, 2020, the proposals were reviewed and scored
by five evaluators, one of whom was the Interim City Attorney, based on the following
criteria from Santa Monica Municipal Code Section 2.24.190 relevant to this solicitation:
(a) The training, credentials, expertise, and experience of the firm and its
proposed team.
(b) The demonstrated competence, ability, capacity, and skill of the firm and
its proposed team to provide the services requested within the time frame
specified and without delay (including its ability to provide required
paperwork on a timely basis).
(c) The price which the firm proposes to charge, including whether the price is
fair.
(d) The character, integrity, reputation, and judgment of the firm and its
proposed team (including information obtained from references).
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5
Based on the scoring of the vendors, the evaluation process recommended OIR Group.
This recommendation was posted on October 1, 2020. The protest period for the other
vendors to challenge the recommendation ended October 8, 2020 at 11:59 pm. No
protest was received. As a result, OIR Group has been selected and the City will
negotiate and execute an agreement with OIR Group to provide the independent after-
action report and evaluation.
Bidder Recommendation
Best Qualified Person/Firm OIR Group
Evaluation Criteria
Training/credentials/experience; competence/ability/capacity/skill to
timely provide services; price; character/integrity/reputation/judgment.
Municipal Code SMMC 2.24.190
RFPs Received
OIR Group Citygate Associates, LLC JL Group, LLC
Lawrence S. Middleton,
Attorney at Law
Renne Public Law Group
RFP Data
Posted On Posted On
Advertised In
(City Charter & SMMC)
Vendors
Downloaded
Date Publicly
Opened
9/9/2020 City's Online
Bidding Site Santa Monica Daily Press 18 9/24/2020
Justification to Award
Based on the relevant criteria in SMMC 2.24.190, staff recommends OIR Group as the
best qualified person or firm to prepare an independent after-action report and
evaluation regarding the events leading to, during, and following May 31 based on:
OIR Group’s approximately two decades of experience and expertise in oversight of
law enforcement practices and activities, including preparation of after-action reports;
references from cities that have retained OIR Group speaking highly of their work,
commenting in particular on their thoroughness, fairness, integrity, and judgment, and
noting their willingness to be critical of police and City actions if the facts warrant; and
low cost, committing to a “do not exceed” expenditure of $75,000 for the completion of
the project, which will include virtual listening sessions with Santa Monica residents
and business owners to ensure that they receive a full picture of the events at issue as
well as a public presentation to City Council of the final report.
///
///
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6
Financial Impacts and Budget Actions
Staff will be awarding to OIR Group a contract for professional services to be paid from
the CAO budget.
Contract/Agreement/Purchase Order Request
FY 2020-21
Budget
Request Amount
Department/CIP Account # Total Contract
Amount
$75,000 01120001.536550 $75,000
Prepared By: George S. Cardona, Interim City Attorney
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Packet Pg. 103 Attachment: EXE-20201009-InfoItem (4560 : May 31 After Action Report)
Michael Gennaco
Stephen Connolly
Teresa Magula
Julie Ruhlin
City of Santa Monica
INDEPENDENT AFTER ACTION AND
EVALUATION REGARDING THE
EVENTS LEADING TO, DURING, AND
FOLLOWING MAY 31, 2020
May 4, 2021
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323-821-0586
7142 Trask Avenue | Playa del Rey, CA
90293
OIRGroup.com
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Table of Contents
Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 1
Overview and Summary of Findings ............................................................................. 4
Methodology ..................................................................................................................... 9
Interviews with SMPD Sources .................................................................................... 9
SMPD Documentary & Digital Evidence ..................................................................... 10
Evaluation of Body-Worn Camera Footage ............................................................ 11
Additional Documentary Evidence .............................................................................. 11
Outreach to City Council & Other City Officials .......................................................... 12
Community Input ........................................................................................................ 12
SMPD Internal Draft After-Action Report .................................................................... 15
SMPD in Spring 2020: Internal Challenges .................................................................... 17
Late May 2020: Silos, Information Gaps, and a Halting Response ............................... 20
A Growing National Movement: May 25 to May 29 ..................................................... 20
May 30: The Day Before ............................................................................................ 21
Saturday Night: Underestimation, Under-Staffing, and a Missing Plan ..................... 23
Intelligence Issues ...................................................................................................... 26
May 31: Summary of Key Events ................................................................................... 30
Morning Preparations and Communications: Last-Minute Lapses ............................ 30
Late Morning to Early Afternoon ................................................................................. 33
The Afternoon: Overtaken by Events ......................................................................... 41
Evening of May 31: Turning the Tide .......................................................................... 48
June 1 and Following Weeks ...................................................................................... 49
Timeline .......................................................................................................................... 50
Assessment & Analysis: Day of May 31 ......................................................................... 54
Mass Arrests: Slow to Develop, Flawed in Execution ................................................ 54
Officer Preparedness & Resources ........................................................................ 54
Transportation and Associated Delays ................................................................... 55
Field Jail .................................................................................................................. 56
Booking, Processing, and Citations ........................................................................ 57
Corrective Action ..................................................................................................... 59
Subsequent Criminal Investigations ........................................................................ 60
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Less Lethal Deployment ............................................................................................. 62
Force Deployment Counts ...................................................................................... 62
Force Deployment Analysis .................................................................................... 64
Force Deployment: Individual Questions or Concerns ............................................ 68
Issues of “Command and Control” .............................................................................. 77
The Incident Command System .............................................................................. 78
Deployment & Training Issues .................................................................................... 80
Intra-Agency Cooperation: Other City Stakeholders .................................................. 83
Mutual Aid: Communication and Command Challenges ............................................ 87
Regional Partners ................................................................................................... 87
National Guard ........................................................................................................ 88
Response to Protest Activity: Learning from Others ............................................... 91
Dispatch Issues .......................................................................................................... 92
Curfews: Restoring Order and Sparking Controversy ............................................... 94
Assessment & Analysis: Post-Protest ............................................................................ 96
Communication with the Public in the Aftermath ........................................................ 96
Use of Force Review Process .................................................................................... 99
Officer Morale and Wellness .................................................................................... 105
Implementation of OIR Recommendations ............................................................... 107
After the Unrest: Progress for SMPD and the City .................................................. 108
Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 110
APPENDIX A: Recommendations .............................................................................. 111
APPENDIX B: Less Lethal Munitions Defined ............................................................. 116
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1 | Page
Introduction
The murder of George Floyd in Minneapolis, Minnesota happened on May 25, 2020. As
captured by cell phone video that circulated internationally, the tragedy of Mr. Floyd’s
anguished final minutes – against the backdrop of Officer Derek Chauvin’s indifference
as he placed his knee for several minutes on the neck of Mr. Floyd – set off a reaction
across America that was unprecedented in its scope and intensity. The momentum of it
grew steadily and spread to jurisdictions all over the United States.
In retrospect, it is easier to recognize the conditions that fueled the wave of protest.
The country was restless, mourning, and deeply uncertain after 10 weeks of the COVID-
19 pandemic. The death of Breonna Taylor in Louisville had reignited frustration over
police violence and its disproportionate impacts on Black Americans. And the
egregious nature of the Floyd case, while all too predictable in the view of many,
pushed millions more into a significant reconsideration of race and policing in the United
States.
The ensuing reaction took many forms. Policing issues once again moved to the
forefront of the political conversation at the federal, state, and local levels. In some
instances, outrage and anger over Mr. Floyd’s death devolved into destruction; by
Thursday night, May 28, protesters had broken into a Minneapolis Police precinct
station and set it on fire. But the phenomenon also manifested itself most clearly in a
widespread series of public demonstrations that were inspired by the Black Lives Matter
movement and committed to reform.
The City of Santa Monica is no stranger to community activism and grassroots reform
efforts. Demonstrations of various kinds, and in support of various causes, are a
regular part of the landscape, and interest in policing issues included a dedicated group
of residents that had been meeting with the Police Department’s leadership for several
years.
While the days immediately following May 25 had been quiet locally (with much of the
official civic attention dedicated to the imminent easing of pandemic restrictions),
longtime residents and a range of City officials tracked the national narrative with
interest and wondered about its local implications. By and large, though, as the
weekend approached, initial expectations were that any protests that did occur in Santa
Monica would track the City’s history: they would be orderly, constructive, safe, and
facilitated as needed by the Police Department (“SMPD” or “the Department”).
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What happened instead was something very different. From early afternoon until well
after dark on May 31, the City found itself reeling in its efforts to deal with a range of
challenges. And by the morning of June 1, 2020, a whole series of community
expectations and assumptions had been upended by hours of unrest that several of the
affected parties described to us as being “completely out of control.”
The forces that converged on the City on May 31, fueling each other and pushing public
safety officials beyond their capacity to manage them, are roughly divisible into three.
These are the large (and largely peaceful) protest marches that settled into a
confrontation with police on Ocean Avenue, the much smaller factions of unlawful
protesters who were engaged in scattered acts of vandalism or other aggression, and
the proliferation of looting activity – some opportunistic, some decidedly organized –
that broke out in multiple locations. Cumulatively, the variety and scale of these proved
to be overwhelming to the Police Department and the other law enforcement agencies
that had come to provide mutual aid.
Before order was restored, SMPD declared an unlawful assembly and dispersed
protesters with chemical munitions, businesses across whole swaths of the city were
looted and damaged, and the Fire Department responded to 21 fire calls – at times in
the midst of reported assaults and active attempts to disrupt their efforts. Hundreds of
people were arrested later in the day for curfew violations and subjected to problematic,
makeshift conditions of mass detention; meanwhile frustrated observers (in person and
on live television) spent the afternoon watching looters brazenly raid businesses without
apparent consequence.
The scale of disruption in Santa Monica on May 31 is difficult to measure or quantify,
but one statistic that reflects the day comes from the City’s “Public Safety
Communications” (911 Dispatch) center. On an average day, the dispatch team
handles approximately 300 or 350 calls. On May 31, it was 12 times that many, with
some individual hours reaching a call volume of 600.
It is true, and important to note, that no lives were lost in Santa Monica as a
consequence of the May 31 unrest. But the vandalism and property damage, the losses
to business, the divisive handling of protesters, and the undermining of confidence in
people’s basic security were collectively substantial. And each of these was deeply and
understandably troubling to the people who live and work in the City.
By the morning of June 1, the work of addressing the impacts of May 31 had begun.
This started with a large-scale and literal cleanup effort for which many people
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volunteered. City officials sought – with limited success – to accentuate positive
aspects of the response, most notably the preservation of life, and to reassure the
public about the Department’s ability to address the crowd management needs that
were ongoing as the demonstrations continued.
But even as June progressed in relatively controlled fashion, questions and criticisms
about May 31 persisted – all against the backdrop of a heated national dialogue about
policing in general and the experience of local communities in particular. The City took
a number of responsive steps. One of these was the creation of a 15 member “Public
Safety Reform Advisory Committee”; its mandate was to solicit community input and
engage in other information-gathering with an eye toward recommended changes to
SMPD policy and City budget priorities. That group began its work in July and
submitted proposals to the City several months later, including a recommendation for
permanent independent oversight over City policing.
Another response was the call for an “independent after action report and evaluation
regarding the events leading up to, during, and following May 31, 2020.” The goal was
to address questions and concerns about what specifically transpired on that day, as
well as to provide an evaluation and recommendations with regard to the various
dimensions of the City’s actions at that time.
This Report is the product of that request. It was prepared by OIR Group, a team of
police practices experts. Its members have worked in the field of civilian oversight of law
enforcement for nearly 20 years, serving in a range of capacities for jurisdictions
throughout California and in other states. 1 Specializing in audits of law enforcement
internal accountability systems (such as misconduct and use of force investigations and
critical incident reviews), OIR Group has also assessed and investigated individual
incidents (including officer-involved shootings) involving several different agencies.
Most recently, we have evaluated the police response to last summer’s protest activity
in Iowa City (IA), and are currently assessing public safety’s response in Kalamazoo
(MI), and the California cities of Santa Rosa and San Jose.
1 We appreciate the important perspectives and valuable input provided by Sergeant Jody
Stiger, a police tactical expert, who currently serves as aide to the Inspector General for the Los
Angeles Police Department and who was a key member of our review team for this project.
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Led by Michael Gennaco, a former federal prosecutor and nationally recognized
authority on police oversight, OIR Group has issued numerous public reports that can
be found on our website: www.OIRGroup.com.
Overview and Summary of Findings
With May 31’s unrest as its centerpiece, this Report covers several different aspects of
the City’s response, particularly regarding the performance of SMPD. It starts with an
overview of internal dynamics within the Department in the months leading up to the
end of May and discusses some of the factors that negatively influenced operational
effectiveness. These included lost opportunities for coordination with assets within the
City, such as Public Works, the Office of Emergency Management, and the City’s
business community.
The Report then takes a close look at the Department’s intelligence-gathering and
decision-making as the George Floyd protest movement grew and began to manifest
itself locally – particularly in Beverly Hills on the afternoon and evening of May 30. And
it assesses the lack of cohesion that undermined the thoroughness and adequacy of
SMPD preparations on that Saturday night and into the first part of Sunday morning.
Turning to the day itself, the Report details the severe limitations of the Department’s
original plan, and the disarray that quickly resulted from fragmented leadership and
inadequate resources. It then portrays the deterioration of conditions as the afternoon
devolved, with the large protest on Ocean Avenue lapsing into a prolonged standoff as
looting and vandalism sprung up in locations throughout the downtown area. It
evaluates the challenges with coordination of mutual aid (including the delayed arrival of
National Guard personnel) and the various uses of force that SMPD deployed in
furtherance of its enforcement objectives – which the Department was oddly slow to
document and evaluate internally. And it explains the different tactical shifts and
external factors that allowed the Department to regain control – even as it arrested
hundreds of people without the requisite infrastructure for effectively handling their time
in custody.
The Report also includes a section about different components of the Department and
City response in the aftermath of May 31’s demoralizing outcomes. In the short run, this
included a revised and greatly enhanced operations plan for securing the City as protest
activity continued June 1 and beyond. The Report also discusses the communications
issues that compounded frustration among some City stakeholders in the ensuing days
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– and caused observers inside and outside the Department to say that flawed
messaging to the public was as corrosive to trust as were the beleaguered hours of May
31 themselves.
Our key findings, with attendant recommendations throughout the Report, include the
following:
• The Department’s internal dynamics, particularly at the command level, were
strained in early 2020 in ways that negatively influenced the response to May 31.
• Some of the internal tensions were focused on budgetary matters, based in part
on the Chief’s efforts to address SMPD’s longtime reliance on overtime as a
means of ensuring adequate staffing.
• Turnover at the highest levels of the organization resulted in a leadership team
whose members lacked tenure at their respective positions and were out of sync
with the Chief.
• The Department’s approach to “planning and intelligence” had been restructured
in the months leading up to May 31 in ways that belied a significant commitment
to their importance.
• The Department was slow to anticipate the burgeoning potential for protest
and/or unrest in the City as the reaction to George Floyd’s death grew across the
U.S.
• The events in Beverly Hills on May 30, which several SMPD officers and
supervisors had experienced firsthand in a mutual aid capacity, raised concern
among some SMPD members, but not in a unified or sufficiently influential way.
• The fact of the Chief being out of the City until the late morning of May 31, in
conjunction with ambiguous delegation and lack of managerial cohesion,
undermined the quality of decision-making and adequacy of preparation on the
night of May 30.
• Incomplete and conflicting information about the size and scale of likely activity
on May 31, and lack of a structured way to effectively use and share information
contributed to the SMPD under-reaction.
• The level of planning, resources, and leadership on the morning of May 31 was
deficient in light of the known or knowable circumstances.
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• It was a mistake for the Chief to send two captains (including the putative
“Incident Commander”) into the field that day to meet with protesters instead of
maintaining clear, centralized lines of decision-making.
• By the time the Department began to recognize and contend with its serious
shortfall in staffing, harmful delays in getting additional help were inevitable.
• Confusion over the identity of the Incident Commander and the location of
SMPD’s decision-making center (or “command post”) hampered the efficient,
effective deployment of resources.
• The standoff with protesters on Ocean Avenue was addressed with tear gas and
other less lethal tools under circumstances that were internally confused and/or
confusing to members of the public.
• The use of traditional large-scale deployment at Ocean Avenue came at the cost
of deploying resources to other areas of the City.
• The Department was in reactive mode for hours that afternoon, incapable of
addressing the volume and range of unlawful behavior that began to proliferate.
• The mutual aid from other law enforcement agencies, while not without its own
frustrating elements, combined with other changes in circumstances on the
ground (including the ability to arrest individuals for violation of the curfew
imposed by the City) to assist in SMPD’s efforts to regain some control.
• The Department found success in moving away from larger scale deployments
and directing smaller teams toward specific problem areas.
• The move toward large-scale arrests, mostly for curfew violations, was another
factor in re-establishing control – but one that had its own attendant problems in
terms of transportation, care, and custody.
• The Department regrouped considerably in its approach to staffing and planning
beginning on June 1, and these shifts helped contribute to improved performance
over the several days that protest activity continued.
• The Chief and other City officials struggled to find the right balance between
acknowledging shortcomings and providing reassurance in the aftermath of May
31, particularly as criticism grew.
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• The Department’s internal reckoning with the events of May 31 was plagued by
some of the same trust and cohesion issues that had preceded that day.
Lastly, the Report delineates the adjustments that have occurred in SMPD and with
other City partners in the time since the protests abated in mid-June. Apart from the
departure of the Chief herself in October, these changes include a newly structured
intelligence unit within the Department, new training and tactical reinforcement based on
“lessons learned” from May 31, and an expanded “Mobile Field Force” unit within SMPD
that has several more officers as well as enhanced equipment, and new philosophies
for crowd engagement. Importantly, heightened integration with other City departments
has also contributed to greater levels of preparedness.
SMPD and the City have already proven the merits of those reforms in the “living
laboratory” of current events. They point to Election Day in November 2020 and
Inauguration Day in January 2021 – both of which unfolded without incident – as
examples of their new approaches to preparation and coordination. Moreover, they
recognize that the potential for unrest continues to exist in a time of intense polarization
and unresolved equity concerns, and their professed emphasis on preparation seems
genuine.
Time and new challenges will, of course, be the best measure of the Department’s
readiness. But there is value from our perspective to what they have done, and the
Recommendations in this Report will ideally supplement and reinforce those positive
developments. Certainly, the Department seems to be approaching any future tests in
the right frame of mind: with humility about its performance on May 31, with a genuine
interest in determining what went wrong and how to adjust, and with confidence in the
commitment and abilities of its personnel.
Two additional thoughts at the outset of this Report provide important additional
framework:
First, it is only fair to put SMPD’s shortcomings on May 31 in context. Law enforcement
agencies all over the country, including in other Los Angeles County locations, found
themselves overmatched by the size, scale, and complexity of the unrest that followed
George Floyd’s death. Apart from the inherent difficulty in serving as both the facilitator
and the subject of passionate protest, many police agencies found themselves lacking
in the experience, resources, and strategies to balance First Amendment rights against
unpredictable safety and security concerns. Looting and property damage, as well as
concerns about heavy-handed police action and mistreatment of demonstrators, were
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widespread phenomena in those weeks. And agencies with considerably more
resources and relevant experience than SMPD also found themselves struggling to
respond effectively to the challenges of the moment. It is, then, worth remembering that
the Department’s lapses in preparation and organization, while responsible for the
worsening of a bad situation, were far from being the entire cause of the harms the City
suffered.
Second, we take a moment to mention that the numerous representatives of SMPD
whom we met seemed genuinely pained by the experience of May 31. There were
different reasons for this, including the unparalleled intensity of the day, the vehemence
with which they were excoriated by protesters, and the frustrations over internal
confusion that had undermined their efforts. But a common theme was their regret over
having “failed” the City and having lost the confidence of a community that they care
about. And for the Department’s leaders, there is concern that the dedication of line
officers under extraordinary circumstances in that period has been overshadowed – in
part because of deficiencies in preparation at the management level for which the rank-
and-file personnel bear no fault.
The candid acknowledgements that Department members offered to us were in service
of what they hope will be a constructive, if difficult, public conversation. We appreciate
their insights and share in that goal.
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Methodology
The City framed the scope of work for this project to ensure that a range of perspectives
would be included in the development of findings and recommendations. Because the
actions of the Police Department were, of course, the central focus of this assessment,
SMPD was a major source of raw information across different categories, which we
delineate below. But we also benefitted from the insights of others who were connected
to the events of May 31 as responders, participants, City officials, business owners,
and/or concerned residents of Santa Monica. For understandable reasons, people
experienced (and reacted to) that day in distinctive ways, though there was also
considerable overlap in the concerns that were expressed and the questions that
persisted.
When it came to understanding community sentiments, the more valuable sources of
input were the two virtual Listening Sessions that were sponsored by the City and which
we hosted on November 17, 2020 and January 19, 2021.2 We also talked to the
leadership of Downtown Santa Monica, a group of business leaders and Black Agenda,
a newly formed group sponsored by the City to further dialogue among City residents of
color. Importantly, this public outreach also prompted a significant amount of additional
correspondence. People sent along written narratives as well as videos, photographs,
and relevant social media postings. We also talked by phone to residents who
requested follow up.
See the “Community Input” section of this Report, below, for further details on these
valuable sources of information and perspective.
Interviews with SMPD Sources
The Santa Monica Police Department cooperated fully with our requests for information
of various kinds. Foremost among these was a series of interviews with Department
members, including current and former leadership of the Department.
2 Recordings of the public Listening Sessions may be viewed on the City of Santa Monica’s
YouTube channel at the following links:
November 17, 2020: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_ny9ntDdr-E
January 19, 2021: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mo1tY0x3vFI
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In all, we met with 15 different SMPD representatives.
We reiterate our appreciation here for each of their perspectives and willingness to
participate in this review.
SMPD Documentary & Digital Evidence
At our request, SMPD provided an extensive amount of relevant documentary evidence
related to the day of and the days leading up to and immediately following May 31. The
documents included:
• Emails and text messages exchanged between involved personnel, both
contemporaneous to the civil unrest (e.g., exchanged on May 30 and 31) and in
the subsequent days
• “Call for Service Detail Reports” for May 31
• Internal memorandum related to the events of May 31, including timelines, a
Tactical Debrief summary, and Incident Review Board summary
• Deployment rosters for May 31
• Training Reports
• Statistics related to May 31, specifically, arrests, citations, Crime Reports, and
damages
• An internal “After-Action” PowerPoint presentation prepared by the Chief’s office,
which included a timeline of events and clips from radio broadcast and media
footage
• A PowerPoint presentation of intelligence gathering efforts by day and time, as
well as screenshots from social media sources
• Operational materials, including Operation Plans, related to other City events
from May 30 to June 6
• All relevant Department policies regarding uses of force, tactics, and First
Amendment assemblies
• Use of Force Reports submitted by SMPD officers detailing their uses of force on
May 31 and the reports submitted by some mutual aid partners related to uses of
force
OIR Group team members also collected digital evidence from public sources, including
both traditional and social media platforms, to better inform our review. OIR Group
discovered digital evidence in personal and organizational Facebook and Instagram
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pages and Twitter feeds, and we reviewed streaming video footage from local media
sources.
OIR Group also reviewed Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) evidence, including written
logs and radio broadcast communications, from May 31 into the early hours of June 1.
We used this detailed evidence, plus body-worn camera and media video, to construct
the detailed timeline included in this Report.
Evaluation of Body-Worn Camera Footage
Central to our understanding of what happened were the body-worn camera videos
provided by SMPD. We reviewed several hours of footage from officers deployed to
various locations of interest throughout the City, focusing on critical moments of SMPD
observations and decision-making.
As part of our evaluation of the incident, OIR Group requested the body-worn camera
footage of specific officers, but SMPD responded that they did not have footage for
nearly half of the specific officers that we requested. Command staff shared that body-
worn camera activation was an issue overall on May 31 as many officers did not
activate their cameras, in contravention of Department policy. In a rapidly unfolding
crowd control situation involving potential force deployment, or when engaged in
enforcement of “chaotic” looting or aggressive rioters, an officer’s body-worn camera
footage can be invaluable for both recalling the incident (for example, to report force)
and documentation for an After Action Report.
It is disappointing that many SMPD officers did not activate their body-worn cameras
during their response to protest (and other activity) on May 31. A reminder from SMPD
leadership during the morning briefing that stressed the importance of activating body-
worn cameras might have improved these numbers. It is equally disappointing that
SMPD took no apparent corrective action with regard to those officers who failed to
meet Departmental expectations with regard to activation of their body-worn cameras.
We urge that SMPD do so, even at this late juncture.
We address the issue of officers’ body-worn camera activation and present
recommendations regarding this topic later in this Report.
Additional Documentary Evidence
As part of our evaluation, the City Attorney’s office also provided all records related to
civil litigation, complaints and other related lawsuits. The City Manager’s Office also
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provided all materials that were made public or examined as a result of Public Records
Requests.
Outreach to City Council & Other City Officials
As part of our outreach, we also invited all current or recent City Council members to
share their experiences and perspectives with us; each had helpful insight into the
events of May 31 and its aftermath. We also reached out to other City officials who
were particularly relevant to our inquiry and we appreciated the perceptions and
viewpoints each had to offer.
Community Input
A key element of our assignment was to engage with the Santa Monica community and
listen to voices from all perspectives, to gain insight into both the events of May 31 and
the reaction to those events from various segments of the community.
There were several different aspects to our engagement effort.
We conducted two public listening sessions open to all participants.3 Numerous public
speakers shared their views and observations in sessions that were live streamed on
the City’s CityTV 16 YouTube channel and recorded. Some participated in our virtual
polls (see Chart below). City personnel provided invaluable technical support and other
facilitation for these efforts.
3 Due to COVID-19 protocols, this and all other public engagement efforts were conducted
virtually – either through the City’s BlueJeans application, Zoom, or telephone.
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Results of Virtual Poll, Nov. 17, 2020 Listening Session
We also conducted two additional, more targeted listening sessions with the Board of
Directors of Downtown Santa Monica, Inc., and Black Agenda, a City-sponsored
program focused on racial equity issues in Santa Monica. Members of each group had
their own distinctive perspectives on May 31 and the aftermath which were important to
our understanding of the day’s events and various responses from the police and City.
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The listening sessions prompted further outreach and engagement. We received nearly
100 email messages from people wanting to express their views, some of which were
about the police response to the events of May 31, and some which were broader
commentaries on the performance of SMPD and City leadership in various contexts.
Many people shared photographs and videos with us, depicting their experiences and
observations on May 31.
We also participated in direct conversations with over 20 individuals connected to the
City and events of May 31 in various ways (apart from the numerous interviews of
SMPD personnel and others who played official roles in the events that we reference
elsewhere in this report). These external stakeholders included longtime Santa Monica
residents, those with connections to different activist organizations, members of the
downtown Santa Monica business community, individuals who attended the protests
over the summer, and some who watched the events unfold over their television
screens.
People talked to us about their concerns about the SMPD police response on May 31,
but also about broader issues of race and policing, homelessness, and matters of City
governance. One frequently expressed view was that the City and Department
leadership’s response in the aftermath of May 31 increased the community’s distrust
and anger about the events because it did not empathetically acknowledge the extent of
the damage to businesses nor sufficiently accept responsibility for the Department’s
shortcomings. Through these conversations, we gained insight into SMPD history, the
status of police community relations, and recent reform efforts that was important to our
broader understanding.
The views expressed to us throughout these various engagement efforts were diverse
and wide-ranging. While nearly everyone expressed some level of disappointment
about the police response to the summer’s events, there certainly was no “consensus”
view about what went wrong or why, who was to blame, or how to correct things. Those
who believe looters and violent protesters bear all responsibility were matched by those
who found fault with police overreaction or underreaction, and those who blame City
leadership for the Department’s failure to act. For every person who told us they
believe that City Council is too beholden to police, there was another who said City
leadership does not adequately support the Department.
For all their distinctive experiences and opinions, though, all of those who reached out
to us clearly shared a deep commitment to the City and a hope that the information they
provided would assist in our efforts to provide a comprehensive, constructive report. All
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of this public input framed our detailed review of the events of the past summer and
reinforced the impact of the City and Department’s responses. The information
provided helped us create a more complete picture of May 31 as it was experienced by
people who felt adversely effected, including protesters who thought the police tactics
were unjustified, residents and business owners who found themselves perplexed at
unchecked vandalism and looting, and observers who were trying to understand the
Department’s decision-making as the day progressed.
We are grateful to all of those who shared their experiences, views, and insights, and
we hope this Report matches their expectations for a complete, thorough review of the
events surrounding May 31.
SMPD Internal Draft After-Action Report
We also reviewed the Department’s initial draft After-Action Report as part of our
review. This internal report of the police response on May 31 was prepared with the
assistance of an outside consulting group engaged by SMPD that was headed by a
colleague of the then-Chief.
As it turned out, the information provided to the consulting group for review was
apparently channeled through the then Chief and one SMPD lieutenant. As a result, the
consultant had limited access to sources of information within the Department. More
significantly, editorial control over the draft report and decisions about what information
would be included and which critiques would survive the editing process were lodged
within the Office of the Chief.
As significantly as the substantive issues in the original scope and design of the project
was the lack of transparency to City residents about the process. It was concerning that
details surrounding the retention of a consultant to assist with the Department’s after-
action report only became known as a result of a media report. This lack of
transparency in the aftermath of May 31 understandably increased the community’s
skepticism of SMPD’s response to events of that day.
In the future, if SMPD engages outside assistance to review significant events, the City
and the Department should carefully and deliberately consider the scope and terms of
that engagement, as well as how information about the retention will be communicated
to the public.
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Particularly following a highly-charged event such as this, the Department’s credibility
and standing with the community requires openness and clearly-established
expectations for dialogue and reform.
RECOMMENDATION 1
When engaging outside assistance to review significant events, SMPD
and the City should carefully and deliberately consider the scope and
terms of that review and should be open and transparent about the
engagement.
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SMPD in Spring 2020: Internal Challenges
When Santa Monica, like the rest of the U.S., began to confront the many implications
of the COVID-19 pandemic in mid-March of 2020, the Chief had been the head of the
Police Department for nearly two years. Positive things had happened during her
tenure – most notably, a significant statistical decrease in the City’s crime rate across
certain key categories. And we spoke to several City officials who described her as
collaborative and engaged in ways that they appreciated. There were also individuals
within the Department that connected well with her and endorsed her priorities and
leadership style.
In spite of these attributes, though, an important element of effectiveness had yet to
come together under the Chief: namely, the development of a strong and cohesive
leadership team at the highest levels of the organization.
Undoubtedly, different factors contributed to this, and individual perceptions of the same
events can be as subjective as they are sincere. We also did not speak directly to the
members of the executive team who left the organization after the Chief’s arrival and
within months of each other, leaving simultaneous vacancies in 2019 at the rank of
Deputy Chief and three Captains – four of the five highest positions below the Chief in
the agency’s organizational structure. Regardless of the reasons why this occurred,
though, the impacts were inherently de-stabilizing. Several decades’ worth of collective
experience and leadership had left in relatively short order. And while adjusting to
turnover is a familiar necessity in law enforcement, this was an extreme example of the
phenomenon.
Moreover, the Chief’s approach to strengthening the SMPD command level became a
subject of further internal consternation. She took the step of creating a new position,
that of “Assistant Chief,” and filling it with a former colleague of hers from a prior
agency. Current Department members who spoke to us about this move had some
common reactions to it. For one, they expressed regard for this individual’s
qualifications and experience, and considered his presence to be a potential asset to
the agency – at least in the short term. They also acknowledged the legitimacy of the
Chief’s inclination to turn to a known and trusted entity in establishing her
administration. But, as the Assistant Chief’s time with the agency continued beyond
people’s original understanding of his role, concerns arose that the Chief’s reliance on
this individual was coming at the expense of cultivating relationships, defining roles, and
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appropriately delegating among the Department’s existing cadre of higher-ranking
supervisors.
This perception was compounded by the Chief’s inaction regarding the promotion
process for the vacated spots at the Captain level. These delays eventually resulted in
formal prompting from the officers’ labor association, and the process did eventually
begin. Three new captains were promoted in early 2020. Then, in April, the Assistant
Chief was re-assigned to the City Manager’s Officer to serve as a public safety liaison
for the City’s Emergency Operations Center, which had been activated in March in
response to the pandemic and its various health and infrastructure challenges.
This was progress, but strains still existed, and Department’s new leadership had yet to
feel fully integrated into the Chief’s vision by the time the pandemic created its own
disruptions. One of the major friction points related to budget issues – particularly with
regard to staffing and overtime.
Several longtime members of SMPD shared the same fundamental description of the
Department’s traditional financial profile. In so many words, they called it an agency
that has historically been short on staff but able to rely on City funding as needed. Its
220 sworn officers for a population of 90,000 is adequate (or even ample) for many
circumstances – but that ratio looks radically different when Santa Monica’s profile as a
major tourist and visitor destination is taken into consideration. Department personnel
cited the summer “Twilight Concert Series” as a good example: when tens of
thousands are congregating for an outdoor event, normal shift staffing of 10 or 15 patrol
officers clearly fell short of appropriate security. Accordingly, SMPD would press
officers into service on a (more costly) overtime basis, and the City would also turn to
outside agencies (notably the LA County Sheriff’s Department) for additional assistance.
As it was described to us, SMPD also developed the habit of using overtime money to
staff programs – such as the Department’s Mounted Unit, the Explorers, and DARE –
that the City supported but that were not delineated in the base budget.
This past practice was not without its critics or downsides. Rank and file officers can
come to resent being forced into overtime slots, for example, and SMPD
representatives acknowledged to us that there was “room for improvement” and
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reconsideration in its spending practices.4 However, as the Chief began to take a
stringent interest in budget matters, finding a happy medium proved difficult. Several
people spoke of the genuine tension that arose from line item disputes over small
amounts of approved overtime, or disagreements about parameters for “sufficient”
staffing of particular assignments. The Department’s new leadership did not feel
particularly trusted or heard, and this dynamic was exacerbated by the pandemic –
when budgets, and concerns about huge impending revenue shortfalls, became even
more constrained throughout City government.
City officials outside the Department, and with whom we spoke, were consistent in
rejecting the idea that the Chief had received direction about the need for draconian
reductions. They pointed out that, even as the pandemic’s dire financial consequences
were becoming clear, SMPD received a significantly lower proportional cut than other
City departments. And they flatly rejected the notion that City government explicitly or
implicitly encouraged a financial approach that sacrificed public safety as a means of
coping with losses.
It is, of course, conceivable that these assertions are true and that the Chief’s re-
evaluation of longstanding SMPD practices – prior to and apart from the pandemic –
was at least partly a reflection of outside influence. Either way, though, the internal
tensions over budget and resource allocation, in conjunction with the command staff’s
inexperience and uncertainty, created a precarious foundation for contending with the
multi-faceted demands that emerged on May 31. And the focus on staffing was realized
during communications in the lead up to May 31, when the Chief and her leadership
team debated the number and start time of deployment of additional officers for the
impending protests.
4 We heard interesting examples from the Department’s recent (but pre-2020) history of very
large-scale “ramping up” of capacity in anticipation of specific events – including a potential
clash between activists and counter-protesters that fizzled, thereby obviating the need for the
more than 200 officers from multiple agencies who had staged. There are, of course, two sides
to this coin: that it is better to be over-prepared than not prepared enough, but that the expense
incurred by such a massive (and here, ultimately unnecessary) response is a commitment of
resources from within a finite pool of City dollars.
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Late May 2020: Silos, Information Gaps,
and a Halting Response
A Growing National Movement: May 25 to May 29
As the last week of May progressed from Memorial Day – when George Floyd was
murdered – toward the weekend, the circumstances of Mr. Floyd’s death were slowly
but steadily galvanizing widespread attention and outrage across the country.
Minneapolis was, of course, the epicenter of the initial protest activity, which by
Thursday night had culminated in the burning of a Police Department precinct station as
television cameras covered the destruction in real time. The momentum of reaction to
the Floyd incident and the larger issues of policing and racism in America would only
build from there, and significant unrest had reached downtown Los Angeles by Friday.
While officials in Santa Monica were following the news like Americans everywhere, the
City’s main preoccupation with current events that week related to the impending
loosening of pandemic-driven restrictions on “non-essential” commercial businesses,
bars and restaurants, and public activities. This included a potential re-opening of the
Pier for the first time in several weeks.
Looking back on their recollections of that Friday, people from SMPD (as well as other
City officials) described their own mindsets – and levels of concern about possible
issues within Santa Monica – in ways that covered a continuum. Some acknowledged
no real recognition of potential issues, while others were thinking that an official
response to Mr. Floyd’s death was warranted5 without connecting it to unrest locally.
And some wondered about local demonstrations – and possible attendant problems.
No one, however, claimed to us that their speculation or “issue-spotting” rose to
anywhere near the level of unrest that ultimately materialized on May 31.
Meanwhile, the Chief had left the area on Thursday for a planned trip to northern
California, one that was originally meant to keep her out of town for several days. It is
unclear, and a matter of some disagreement, as to whether she had designated one of
her Captains to serve as “Acting Chief” for decision-making purposes in her absence –
5 Late Friday, SMPD posted a statement about Mr. Floyd’s death that acknowledged the strong
emotions it had engendered and the Department’s commitment to “strict, unequivocal standards
of conduct.”
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a common protocol for such occurrences.6 At the very least, the scope and nature of
that designation was far from well-established; one Captain later professed to be
unaware until the weekend that the Chief had left town at all.
Obviously, the impact of the Chief’s being away from the City is difficult to quantify and
is unfortunate rather than blameworthy. All police executives are of course entitled to
personal travel, and the Chief was in touch and engaged on Saturday as concerning
circumstances became more defined. Still, it is difficult not to assume that this factor
added to the disjointed, halting nature of the Department’s preparations. That the Chief
recognized this on some level is perhaps reflected in her initial lack of clear
acknowledgement to City officials or the general public, some of whom later said they
were uncertain for days as to when she had left Santa Monica and what time on Sunday
she had returned. And other City officials were more direct in their criticism of what they
believed to be the Chief’s apparent lack of candor to them on this issue.
RECOMMENDATION 2
The Chief of Police should make clear to the Department and City
leadership when they will be out of town and clearly designate an Acting
Chief in her or his absence.
May 30: The Day Before
By Saturday, the local scene had clearly intensified, and individuals both inside and
outside SMPD began to focus on Santa Monica as a potential site for protest activity –
or more problematic unrest. There was anti-police graffiti found at different locations in
the City on Saturday, and Public Works immediately responded to remove it.
Meanwhile, a representative from “Downtown Santa Monica”7 had reached out to SMPD
by email at mid-day, offering the assistance of that organization’s “Ambassadors”8 and
6 We note a sea change on this issue since the change of leadership at the Department. When
the current Chief was out on personal leave recently, it was clear to all that she was away and
who was serving as Acting Chief.
7 This non-profit organization is run by a Board of Directors and, in coordination with the City,
engages in several initiatives to support and promote local business in Santa Monica.
8 The Ambassadors program has several components; in sum, these uniformed employees
support the quality of visitor experience in the downtown area by serving as sources of
information, assistance, and security.
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expressing concerns about the local implications of national developments. She was
thanked but not given further direction or feedback.
While indications – and individual apprehensions – about potential large crowd activity
were emerging, it is true that the overall picture was still far from definitive. But if social
media postings were scattered and somewhat inconclusive, the events in neighboring
Beverly Hills – which began in earnest on Saturday afternoon – were a much more
noteworthy bellwether.9
By early afternoon on Saturday, a protest march had reached Beverly Hills and
attracted a crowd that was estimated at 1500 people. Law enforcement was of the
belief that the marchers were heading to Rodeo Drive and that some had the intent to
engage in looting or vandalism. Accordingly, the SMPD Watch Commander authorized
a cadre of one sergeant and five officers to provide mutual aid at 1:30 PM. They were
later joined by some 20 other SMPD officers of different ranks as the situation there
began to intensify, with many members of the large crowd clashing with police. A
significant amount of looting activity occurred in the early evening, as well as vandalism
that including the burning of multiple police vehicles. Beverly Hills City officials declared
a curfew for 8:00 PM, and enforcement activity persisted for hours as the police
responded to crowd aggression with tear gas and other less lethal munitions.10
We spoke with SMPD supervisors who were personally involved in this response in
Beverly Hills as part of a mutual aid request by Beverly Hills PD. It was clear to them,
as the hours passed and they assisted in various capacities and locations, that the
scale and complexity of the unrest – including looting, property damage, and the status
of law enforcement as a focus of aggressive enmity – were well beyond their past
experience. They also considered it in terms of possible implications for Santa Monica
in the days to follow. But by the time they had returned to the City, well after midnight,
their ability to influence SMPD’s plans for the next day was somewhat limited; they were
9 Below, we cover in more detail the issue of SMPD’s “intelligence-gathering” efforts in relation
to this incident.
10 As further discussed elsewhere, Santa Monica also followed the lead of its neighboring cities
and declared a curfew for 8:00 PM on Saturday evening. Additionally, a manager from the
City’s Office of Emergency Management who was involved in this process also contacted
SMPD officials late Saturday to offer various resources for Sunday – including barricades and
the possible uses of “Big Blue Bus” vehicles for crowd management. These are two further
indications that clearly suggest the extent to which SMPD’s overall alert level should have been
higher.
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not asked about their experience and insight by those police officials in Santa Monica
planning for the next day. This was yet another example of the absence of a clear,
coordinated, and proactive vision for the gathering and processing of intelligence.
Meanwhile, the Department’s own preparations for what might transpire on Sunday had
taken their tentative shape by approximately 10:00 PM on Saturday night. They were
the result of a few different developments at the executive level. By now, further but
undefined information had begun to circulate on social media regarding a protest being
set for May 31 at noon in Santa Monica. The organizers were not known entities, and
participation levels – or even if the march was going to happen at all – were still
ambiguous.
The Chief had participated in a conference call with the Department’s captains at 4:30
PM, at which point she was apprised of the situation to the limited extent it was
understood. Two captains later committed to going to the station in person on Saturday
evening to assist with planning as needed. This was the point at which several
significant missteps were made that worked to the ultimate disadvantage of the
Department’s preparedness for the next day’s events.
Saturday Night: Underestimation, Under-Staffing, and a
Missing Plan
The first and overarching problem was the collective under-reaction to the various signs
suggesting that a much more comprehensive law enforcement presence than usual
would be needed to prepare the City for the range of possibilities it could realistically
face. Part of this problem was the sluggishness and limitations of the Department’s
existing mechanisms for tracking social media and other sources of information – an
issue that we cover in more detail below. But apart from this, the available updates,
observations, and direct experiences of individual SMPD members on Friday and
Saturday still did not coalesce into a coherent, agreed-upon assessment that
comprehensive and pro-active preparations were warranted.
This took different forms. Significantly and unfortunately, coordination with City partners
such as Public Works11 and the Office of Emergency Management did not happen in a
11 We are aware of other jurisdictions who effectively used the resources of their Public Works
Department for assistance in crowd control and successfully prevented looters’ access to “high
value” targets such as shopping malls.
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meaningful way. Nor did outreach to potential mutual aid resources. And SMPD’s
internal staffing plan for Sunday, while expanded from the usual number of officers, was
well short of a full-scale, “all hands” activation.12
By the time the captains were both at the Public Safety building on Saturday evening,
they had determined that the identified noontime protest and overall levels of tension
and uncertainty warranted the addition of personnel and spoke with the Chief about it.
As reported to us, one of the participants says that the hope was to get approval for as
many as 100 extra officers – almost half of the entire Department roster. However, the
Chief eventually authorized them to bring in a supplemental force of only 20 with some
extra sergeants for supervision – and to have them report at 11:00 AM in response to
the potential protest that was scheduled for noon. A sergeant scrambled to contact
people on short notice and was able to put a roster together.
This limited boost to normal staffing was the second of the shortcomings in these final
hours before Sunday. To be sure, it is important to remember that hindsight is always
clearer, that signs were mixed, and information was imperfect. At the same time,
though, it seems relevant to frame this approach in comparison to the Department’s
past inclination to treat overtime as an expected cost of the City’s model, and to provide
generous staffing to ensure readiness as circumstances might require. Similarly, the
lack of well-established lines of trust and communication at the executive level also
contributed to this outcome.
When the captains finally left for the evening on Saturday, they did so in the knowledge
that the other two captains would be on hand Sunday morning to provide in-person
leadership for whatever arose. What they did not do, though, was ensure that even the
rudiments of an “operations plan” were in place. Nor did they clearly designate a
particular individual to be the “incident commander” who would be entrusted with
coordinating the overall deployment of resources and authorizing specific responsive
actions as needed. This was the third lapse in appropriate preparedness.
While formats and levels of detail vary depending on the complexity of the objective in
question, it is a routine practice for law enforcement to specifically delineate the intent
behind a given operation and the roles that assigned individuals are expected to fill.
This pre-planning and internal communication help ensure that contingencies have
been considered and that all participants are aware of their expected contributions
12 Again, the former Chief, in her early public pronouncements was less than clear on this issue.
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within the larger mission. The effectiveness of this begins with the clear designation of
the person in charge, so that all subordinates know where to turn and so that
information and decision-making flows smoothly.
We spoke to the involved captains about this gap in the arrangements. Each had his
own perspective about the importance – or even feasibility – of a particular operations
plan for Sunday the 31st, given the many variables that remained undefined.13 While
both acknowledged on some level that the omission was a mistake, one explained his
belief that an adequate plan could be composed in plenty of time early Sunday, and that
it made sense to leave the responsibility in the hands of people who would actually be
participating. An additional point worth considering in this regard is that the
responsibility for creating such a document does not usually rest with captain-level
management; that a sergeant or lieutenant was not assigned the role reflects the
piecemeal and haphazard nature of the evolving preparations.14
Similarly, the failure to clearly designate an “incident commander” is consistent with the
larger mindset that Sunday’s prospective events had not risen to a level where
traditional incident command was warranted. Although the “Saturday evening captains”
had one of the “Sunday morning captains” in mind for this role, that person was not
aware of this potential responsibility until her arrival on Sunday, at which point she was
left to adapt quickly and without the infrastructure of a detailed plan. In a span of
13 To reiterate, the command was not even sure that the protest referenced on social media was
actually going to occur; nor was there conclusive indication that prospective looters were
targeting Santa Monica in particular. On the other hand, there had been relevant postings about
threatened unrest that the Crime Analyst circulated as early as Thursday – to the point where
SMPD had assigned officers to the Promenade shopping area as extra security. Specifically,
the assigned Crime Analyst circulated messages from Twitter calling for looting, such as the
following: user @Mr.Rawtehnic stated, “If LA Start Looting And Rioting Please Take It To Santa
Monica Beverly Hills Hollywood Etc.. Don’t Mess Up Our Community.. Make Them Have to
Rebuild They Shit”; user @thepizzadevil stated, “You swear, it’s going to be peaceful, the
promenade will get hit.”
14 In an email that went out to sergeant-level supervisors at 10:18 PM on Saturday evening, the
on-duty Watch Commander (a lieutenant) provided a useful overview as to the name and
number of the newly assigned officers for Sunday and the basic known parameters of the
anticipated protest march. Without a specific reference to an “incident commander,” he stated
that two Captains would be there “in the late morning” on Sunday to provide “executive
oversite.” A specific supervisor was designated as the “point Sergeant” for the planned march
at noon.
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minutes, the captain attempted to cobble together an “operations plan”; its brevity and
limited scope were far from an adequate match for the circumstances.
Standard operations plans also require submission of the plan up the chain of command
and since, in this case, the “plan” was written by a Captain, it should have been
reviewed and approved by the Chief. However, because the Chief was out of town and
no Acting Chief had been officially designated, what constituted the operations plan in
this case was not reviewed by anyone beyond the Captain who wrote it.
Establishing an incident commander is, again, a fundamental step with which the
agency was well-accustomed. Here, the hesitancy and ambiguity that persisted into
Sunday shows the impact both of mixed information and uncertain leadership within
SMPD. Both of these problems were further manifested in the processes of SMPD’s
intelligence gathering and planning as they existed in the period prior to and during the
early days of the George Floyd protest movement.
RECOMMENDATION 3
SMPD should develop written protocols to ensure that an operations plan
is developed in advance of all potential crowd control situations,
establishing expectations for the depth and inclusion as well as a chain of
command approval mechanism.
RECOMMENDATION 4
SMPD should develop written protocols to ensure timely and thoughtful
designation of an incident commander for special operations.
Intelligence Issues
As the City recovered from the upheaval of May 31, an underlying question emerged in
the reaction of residents, business owners, elected officials and other interested
observers as they sought to understand and to make their own judgements about
SMPD’s performance. In effect, it was this: What had the Department known prior to
the hours on Sunday when unrest levels vastly exceeded the capacity to control it?
The question was particularly vexing to individuals with whom we spoke in preparing
this Report. They mentioned the developing protests and related tensions being on
their own respective “radar screens” to varying degrees as early as May 28 – and said
they had reached out to the Department accordingly. That the Department had
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seemingly not heeded their warning efforts was particularly discouraging as they
watched events unfold and unravel over their television screens on May 31.
In her own efforts to address these issues in the aftermath of May 31, the Chief
repeatedly stated that SMPD had no advance intelligence as to what might occur in
Santa Monica, indicating instead that both the protests and the looting were a surprise
to an understandably unprepared Department. She explained that SMPD Command
only had information about one planned protest via social media – and that this protest
was rumored to be canceled. As for the other indications of potential problem activity
that existed on social media, the Chief insisted that this information had not been
shared with Command. The Chief also pointed to how, when the Department received
intelligence regarding possible violence on the 3rd Street Promenade on May 30, she
deployed officers to the location and prevented any incident; the clear implication was
that she would have taken further action if equipped with appropriate knowledge.
The reality seems to have been more complex. It is true there was a lack of definitive
information about what might transpire in Santa Monica or other communities as the
protests gained momentum, and it is likely the Chief herself had not been briefed on
particularized concerns. However, there was in fact relevant information that was made
available to parts of the chain of command, but it remained siloed or insufficiently
regarded – a symptom of flaws in SMPD internal communications and structures.
One issue was that SMPD did not have any resources dedicated to intelligence-
gathering, such as data-mining social media, and no clear system for sharing important
intelligence, especially as events unfolded from May 28 to 31.
Prior to May 31, SMPD did not have a formal intelligence analyst or team set up to
monitor and mine social media and other Internet sources. In April 2020, with unrest
growing nationwide, a sergeant was given the assignment to create an Ad Hoc
Intelligence Unit to search for and brief command staff on any issues that might impact
Santa Monica. This individual replaced the previous “Planning and Intelligence”
sergeant, but apparently without effectuating a formal handoff or otherwise embracing
the role in the midst of his other assigned duties. Additionally, the new intelligence
sergeant had extremely limited experience with social media platforms; it seemed to
some in the agency to be a re-organization based more on providing this individual with
a suitable workload than matching duties to established skills. The sergeant in turn
assigned the job of social media “data mining” to a Crime Analyst who had other full-
time duties and similar limited background in social media intelligence.
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The Crime Analyst took on this extra assignment and, with little experience and time,
began to search social media outlets that she was familiar with, including Facebook and
Twitter. She began sharing information via email and text message with her
commanding Sergeant about possible protest activity and threats of looting as early as
May 28. Again, though, in part because of the press of other job demands,15 the
sergeant in charge of intelligence did little with this information – if he saw it at all.
Meanwhile, the Crime Analyst continued to share intel of possible protest activities and
looting targets in the City up to and during the unrest on May 31.
Command seemingly either dismissed or ignored this intelligence except the
aforementioned threat to the 3rd Street Promenade on May 30. One Lieutenant who
had attended a regional briefing at the Los Angeles Hall of Justice stated that the area
intelligence pointed to threats in Burbank and Glendale, not Santa Monica. Captains
stated that message(s) claiming that riots were moving from downtown and West Los
Angeles into Santa Monica were unsubstantiated. The Crime Analyst sensed a
disconnect between her own monitoring of the information and the command staff’s
seeming confidence that threat levels were low.
The Analyst received little to no communication from command staff until May 30, when
rioting occurred in neighboring Beverly Hills. From this point forward, the Analyst was
instructed to “share everything,” but was not given a clear platform for how to do so. As
she found data, including a flyer for a planned protest at Ocean Avenue and Montana,
the names of possible protest organizers and specific looting targets in Santa Monica,
she shared it via email, text message, and/or telephonically with various members of the
command staff.
On the early morning of May 31, the Crime Analyst found and shared a post that the
largest protest had been cancelled and, later, that the protest had seemingly gained
traction. The former information was briefly reassuring, but reaction to the latter
remained tentative. As the morning proceeded, the Crime Analyst uncovered more
posts and tweets regarding potential violence in Santa Monica that had been posted as
early at 1:00 PM on May 30.16
15 The sergeant was deployed in a mutual aid capacity for several hours in Beverly Hills on the
30th, for example, placing the Department’s intelligence coordinator out of pocket.
16 For example, the Crime Analyst discovered a tweet shared on May 30 that stated: “Thinking
of going to the march tomorrow in Santa Monica. I wonder how violent it’ll get? I’m down for a
riot! Things could get extra messy though because of people being locked in for so long.”
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On May 31 around 10:15 AM, the Chief received an email from
a reporter with an attachment of a highly-viewed social media
post regarding planned looting in Santa Monica. (A screenshot
of the social media post is included here.) The reporter’s email
advised the Chief that his son had seen a number of posts
similar to the one shared in the attachment. The Chief
forwarded the email to a Santa Monica captain asking if there
was any “intel” on the posting and asking whether the
intelligence sergeant should come in and liaise to compile
intelligence reports. But by this point, the captain was assigned
elsewhere, and the Department was already well behind the
curve in terms of planning. There is no apparent response to
this email nor any apparent outreach to the reporter’s son to
learn about other posts.
Meanwhile, the Analyst continued to monitor events online
throughout the day, but the command staff had become too
preoccupied with real-time challenges to actively respond.
To its credit, SMPD worked in the aftermath of May 31 to
strengthen its systems for the gathering, dissemination, and utilization of potentially
actionable information from a variety of sources. It has now established a dedicated
intelligence unit, made up of two Sergeants, one Intelligence Analyst, and an
Information Technology resource. This Intelligence Unit is now committed to data
mining for possible threats and activity and collaborating with local Departments and
national sources such as the FBI.
RECOMMENDATION 5
SMPD should ensure that critical personnel, including those tasked with
intelligence gathering and other crucial functions, remain in the City prior
to a major incident and are not sent out as part of a mutual aid response
or otherwise assigned supplementary duties.
RECOMMENDATION 6
SMPD should establish a dedicated listserv with “read receipt”
functionality for command to receive intelligence briefings in a formal and
timely manner and confirm receipt of such information.
Screenshot of social media
post/email attachment
forwarded by Chief on
Sunday morning.
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May 31: Summary of Key Events
Morning Preparations and Communications: Last-Minute
Lapses
The longtime “tactical commander” of the SMPD SWAT unit was a lieutenant who spent
several hours in Beverly Hills on Saturday, and arrived back in Santa Monica well after
midnight on the morning of May 31. In his mind, and given his experience in the field in
Beverly Hills, it seemed clear that the City was very likely to be challenged on Sunday.
One of his thoughts was that the Big Blue Bus garage should serve as the “rally point,”
or staging area, for the coordination of any mutual aid resources and the centralized
deployment of personnel as needed. But, to his surprise, the Department had yet to
reach that level of concern and attendant preparation. He went home and – within
hours – turned back around, arriving at approximately noon to find that conditions were
worsening while SMPD remained behind the curve in its operational posture.
The SWAT lieutenant was not alone in thinking ahead – or in feeling concerned about
readiness. One of the sergeants who had stayed late to assist the Watch Commander
in summoning the cadre of extra personnel for overtime shifts decided to return to work
at 6:30 AM to assist as needed. Another lieutenant, who had been tracking
developments around the County quite closely for days and with growing apprehension,
described himself as “stunned” when he arrived that morning and realized that no
operations plan had been established. And the lieutenant who had been the previous
day’s Watch Commander was off from work, but nonetheless began making phone calls
to contacts in the City in the early morning in search of additional information.17
At 6:57 AM, a fourth lieutenant sent an email to one of the two captains who were
designated to report to duty. This email was a brief but extremely incisive document
that highlighted an “ever-growing to-do list that we should touch base on.” It set defined
clear, simple objectives that touched on officer safety and headquarters security, and
highlighted “protection of community,” “protection of City’s critical assets,” and
“protection of property/prevention of looting” as overarching goals. The email then listed
a combination of questions and suggestions for ensuring readiness and making use of
17 One of the things he learned – and passed on to several colleagues in an email at 9:04 AM –
was that a commercial management company had taken the initiative to begin putting up private
fencing in an effort to block entrances to the Santa Monica Place mall.
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available personnel, and recommended “roving patrols” for three key areas in the City.
While short on detail, the email was very much the potential foundation for a thoughtful,
coherent, and attainable operations plan.
Unfortunately, though, it was nearly 9:30 AM before the other captain, who had just
been casually appointed as the “incident commander,” saw the email for the first time
and began considering how to actualize it. The City had seemed calm during her initial
driving trips through it that morning, and she was still operating on the assumption that a
possible protest march at noon was the major, if not sole, concern.
The “briefing” that eventually took place at approximately 11:20 AM was far from
comprehensive, clear, or confidence-inducing.18 As described to us later by an
attendee, the focus was solely on the protest march and lacked the layers or
acknowledgment of contingencies that would normally be expected. No one was given
direct responsibility for handling certain aspects of the response, and assignments of
available officers were characterized as “haphazard.” One sergeant of a special
assignment team was working in her office and didn’t even realize that her cadre of
officers had been appropriated from their usual roles.
Other supervisors in attendance sought to pick up some of the slack. One lieutenant
reached out to the Assistant Chief who was no longer directly assigned to the
Department, though his work as liaison for the Emergency Operations Center was
relevant to the day’s potential needs. This same lieutenant reached out to the City’s
communications center to ensure that a specially trained “tactical dispatcher” would be
summoned to work. And other sergeant-level personnel met quickly among themselves
to discuss options and fallback plans.
As for the Chief, she had secured a flight on a state-owned plane from northern
California on Sunday morning, and arrived at the Public Safety Facility from the airport
at approximately 11:30 AM. Earlier, she had, of course, been in communication with
Department leadership. And she sent an email to the City’s elected officials just before
7:00 AM that provided updates and described an engaged, prepared SMPD. She cited
the mutual aid resources that the Department had contributed to both Beverly Hills and
18 In an interview to the media, the Chief, by implication, suggested that she had been in
attendance at the briefing. As this narrative indicates, she had apparently not yet arrived back
in the City when the briefing was given.
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Culver City, and described enforcement activity that her own agency had taken that she
credited with dispersing potential issues in Santa Monica on Saturday.19
One of the Chief’s first actions upon reaching headquarters was to send the two
captains – including the supposedly designated “incident commander” – into the field
with the idea of identifying and connecting with protest organizers. While this was a
potentially worthy idea in the substantive sense, given that such efforts at outreach can
yield worthwhile information and collaboration, it was misguided here for a few reasons.
First, it was very late in the proceedings, and a misreading of the extent to which the
protest activity was coherent and susceptible to effective interaction of this kind. But
more significantly, it was a serious misallocation of executive-level personnel. To send
two captains – including the person who was supposedly managing the entire SMPD
response – into the field together was unorthodox to the point where many participants,
including the captains themselves, remain baffled by the decision months later.
The captains arrived at Ocean Avenue, at which point they were quickly surrounded by
protesters. The crowd was large, energetic, and well past the point of designating
organizers to meet with police representatives for planning purposes. Instead, the two
SMPD executives were quickly consumed by the direct enforcement challenges that
were all around them.
It would be hours before either returned to the Public Safety Facility. In their absence,
and to his credit, one of the lieutenants turned himself into the de facto incident
commander by beginning to get on the radio and coordinate specific deployments as
noontime approached and the pace of challenges accelerated. He established himself
in the Department Operations Center (“DOC”), where he had access to technology and
media of various kinds. He was joined there by the Chief and, later, the acting City
Manager as SMPD started reacting to the day’s events in earnest.
19 The email also made reference to two Santa Monica businesses that had experienced
vandalism and/or attempted looting on Saturday – in what seemed to be a significant precursor
to Sunday’s developments.
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Late Morning to Early Afternoon: Protest Activity
Converges on Ocean Avenue as Other Unrest Begins
While the Department continued to struggle with its enhanced but still limited
resources20 and disjointed vision for deployment and incident management, the activity
level in the street began to rise in earnest. As early as 10:15 AM, a sergeant responded
to a gathering of 20 residents who had come together for a peaceful, uneventful
demonstration that dispersed on its own.
Another group came together at about 11:00 AM for a march on Wilshire Boulevard
toward Palisades Park that proved to be more substantial. The organizer of this
gathering had contacted SMPD earlier that morning to say that he expected about 50
people and that they planned to remain on the sidewalk. But the march gathered
additional people as it progressed in the direction of Ocean Avenue, and by noon
numbered 200 to 300 – many of whom were in the roadway.
An additional march – the one that had come closest to being a focal point for SMPD on
Saturday evening – was designed to originate at the intersection of Montana Avenue
and Ocean Avenue at 12:00 PM. This march, which was connected to an individual
who called herself “Jennifer G.” on social media, had been publicized on flyers and via
social media starting May 30, or possibly earlier. In spite of the social media posts that
left the Department with uncertainty as to whether the march was even occurring, a
large crowd began to gather and march westbound on Montana Avenue to Ocean
Avenue at approximately 12:00 PM.
In an interview, a march participant reported that this march was largely peaceful as it
traveled westbound on Montana, included families with children, and that the crowd
grew larger as individuals organically seemed to join the group. She reported that the
march did sometimes spill from the sidewalk into the roadway.
When the march began to approach Ocean Avenue, this participant observed several
individuals on bicycles suddenly join the front of the protest line. Turning southbound
from Montana, she then observed a line of SMPD officers standing on Ocean Avenue.
At this point, she observed the new group of males begin to engage with the officers in
20 Department records indicate that SMPD had 70 sworn (out of 176 total available) and 40
civilian personnel on duty at 11:00 AM on May 31. Typical patrol staffing on a Sunday would
have been 8-12 officers.
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an adversarial way. She noted that several participants turned away to travel
eastbound back up Montana Avenue; she, too, left the march eastbound on Montana
Avenue for fear that it might devolve into a clash.
This split into sub-groups – with differing motivations and levels of unified organization –
typified the shifting circumstances that characterized the demonstration activity in and
just north of Ocean Avenue for the next several hours. The large numbers of people
who remained on Ocean Avenue were themselves a mix of peaceful (if often animated)
supporters of the Black Lives Matter movement with more aggressive individuals whose
focus was confrontation with law enforcement. Meanwhile, portions of the crowd moved
north, away from the ocean, for different reasons and in different directions: some out
of concern for potential unrest, some to pursue other activity away from the
concentration of police, and some to circle around and eventually return to Ocean
Avenue at a new vantage point – which later became the scene of a standoff with
staged officers.
The map below shows an approximate visual of the activity in the early to mid-afternoon
hours of May 31.
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At 12:05 PM, officers manning the SMPD aerial drone, SKY1, reported that they now
observed a crowd of 200-300 people traveling southbound on Ocean Avenue from
Wilshire Boulevard as the two “parallel” marches converged on Ocean Avenue. SKY1
reported that people were marching in Palisades Park and in the roadway, blocking
traffic and the bicycle lane on Ocean Avenue as they marched southbound toward the
Pier.21
Back at the Department’s Operations Center (“DOC”) in the Public Safety Facility, the
lieutenant who had taken impromptu responsibility for coordinating the SMPD response
began to make deployment decisions. At approximately 12:10 PM, he instructed units to
respond to the Santa Monica Pier ramp, located at the intersection of Ocean Avenue
and Colorado Boulevard, to support the squad that had already been routinely deployed
to the closed Pier to block the entrance, or “Pier Ramp.” He also directed motorcycle
(or “motor”) units to deploy one block north of the march on Ocean Avenue to stop any
oncoming southbound traffic from traveling on Ocean Avenue and deployed a Mobile
Field Force squad to assist the motor units.
As the crowd swelled, it prevented all traffic flow along Ocean Avenue and surrounded a
marked police vehicle that was responding to the area. At 12:15 PM, the Metro Line
stopped all service into Santa Monica. At 12:20 PM, the Chief initiated a “Tactical Alert”
for the entire Department.22 Doing so was the formal way to announce that SMPD was
21 Around this time, the SKY1 aerial drone stopped transmitting live feed footage to the EOC.
Typically, SKY1 footage can be directly viewed on large monitors in the DOC via a live feed.
The officers who were controlling SKY1 verbally reported what they were seeing via the radio
and, to get at least some visual, DOC monitors played live feeds from news media helicopters
(which SMPD was, obviously, not controlling).
To their credit, the officers manning the SKY1 drone did their best to articulate what they were
seeing on the ground, especially as it pertained to the activity on Ocean and Colorado and
looting of larger locations, such as the Vans Store and Santa Monica Place Mall. But the time
lag and lack of direct footage hampered Command’s ability understand conditions on the
ground.
This mechanical failure was cited to us by several members of the City’s response as a
significant disadvantage that compromised deployment decisions: because the “big picture”
perspective was missing, it was even more difficult to ascertain where and how to prioritize the
various problems SMPD needed to address. This magnified the problem dynamics that
planning deficiencies had already created.
22 “Tactical Alert” is an announcement of the anticipated redistribution of on-duty officers to
achieve personnel levels necessary for controlling an emergency, and typically the preliminary
step taken to mobilize personnel to an incident of significance.
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now engaged in a “major police incident” – the situation developing on Ocean Avenue –
and prioritizing response to this emergent situation over other, usual policing duties (on-
going investigations, for example, or ordinary traffic enforcement activities). Had the
Chief anticipated the potential levels of unrest and damage that would occur, she could
have initiated Tactical Alert earlier, which may have increased deployment and
preparation levels earlier that day.
The crowd marched southbound on Ocean Avenue until the leaders reached Ocean
Avenue and Colorado Boulevard, the Pier Ramp, and converged. At 12:23 PM, all
responding police units were advised to avoid Ocean Avenue as a route of travel. By
now, at 12:25 PM, SMPD estimated the crowd had grown to approximately 500 people.
For approximately 15 minutes, the crowd stood and chanted.
Around this time, the lieutenant at the DOC requested Air Support from neighboring
Hawthorne Police Department. He was advised that Air Support would arrive at 1:00
PM.
At 12:40 PM, SMPD activated their SWAT units. A SWAT team was deployed to assist
the Pier Unit23 in securing the Pier Ramp.24
23 The Pier Unit refers to the officers assigned to the Pier entrance to enforce the COVID-19-
related closure in effect since March 2020.
24 The allocation of resources at this location became a discussion point in the aftermath of the
day. Officers who were there felt significantly under-resourced as they tried to gauge the
crowd’s intentions and level of hostility. They used bicycle racks as improvised barricades at
the Pier’s entrance and worried about the limited munitions with which they were equipped.
Conversely, there was later criticism of the Department for committing so much of its energy
and attention to “protecting” the Pier – while acts of vandalism and looting began to proliferate
throughout other parts of the City, often with late or minimal police response. There were
questions as to whether and to what extent the damaging of the Pier was a priority for whatever
participants were inclined toward vandalism, and whether the risk outweighed cost in terms of
vulnerability in other parts of the City.
This assessment is, of course, speculative and to some extent unsatisfying for both critics and
defenders of the decision-making. Officials who spoke with us described the Pier as an iconic
symbol of the City that warranted the Department’s attention. It was also a focal point in the first
geographic location to intensify as the large protest groups finally converged. And the fact that
the Pier was not “overrun” or damaged on May 31 is, in hindsight, equally easy to attribute to
both law enforcement’s commitment and the absence of a serious threat. While we cover
deployment decisions more generally below, we do not have the definitive sense that the
number of officers at the Pier in these hours constituted a major miscalculation by SMPD.
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At 12:45 PM, a “splinter group” of protesters seemingly turned around and began to
travel northbound in the Ocean Avenue bike lane toward the “California Incline,” or the
intersection of California and Ocean Avenues; this group was estimated to be anywhere
from 50 to 300 participants. Upon seeing this direction change, the de facto Incident
Commander instructed that officers stop eastbound traffic up California Avenue from the
Pacific Coast Highway to protect protesters. SMPD units responded for traffic control.
Around this time, the lieutenant who was coordinating SMPD’s activities from the DOC
made the day’s first request for mutual aid – to the Culver City Police Department.
At approximately 1:00 PM, a SMPD motor unit and a Culver City PD team responded to
Alley 1 and Ocean Avenue and formed a west-facing skirmish line blocking the Alley 1
entrance. Another squad deployed a west-facing skirmish line across Montana Avenue
at 2nd Street. Units reported that the crowd in this area of Ocean Avenue was
“peaceful.” At some point, because the crowd was peaceful, the Incident Commander
re-deployed these units to locations in downtown Santa Monica as Mobile Field Force
units to secure other intersections.
But as the other section of the crowd moved southbound and grew, so too did its
intensity. By 1:00 PM, nearly all of Ocean Avenue, from California Avenue to Colorado
Boulevard, was full of protesters. And at one point, protesters were reported to be
verbally berating officers at the Pier.
At 1:14 PM, the coordinating lieutenant activated an “Area A response,” which formally
requested mutual aid from all local, neighboring law enforcement agencies, requesting
that all mutual aid partners from the area respond to Santa Monica.25
Meanwhile, the protest activity had physically divided. One element, referred to as a
“more aggressive” splinter group and estimated to be 250-300 persons, was observed
marching from the main Ocean Avenue protest eastbound up Santa Monica Boulevard,
moving to 4th Street. Some of these protesters were said to be striking at civilian
vehicles with fists and throwing objects at police vehicles. Officers reported this crowd
25 According to a SMPD timeline, the IC requested mutual aid from neighboring Departments at
approximately 12:50 PM, prior to Area A activation. At that time, Manhattan Beach and Torrance
Police Departments responded that they could not fulfill the request for aid. Redondo Beach
reported that it dispatched one Sergeant and five Officers to Santa Monica. Beverly Hills
responded that it deployed one Sergeant and three Officers.
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was an “aggravated group” while others reported that some of the group was agitating
the crowd and “antagonizing police officers.”
Noting this crowd movement, the lieutenant deployed a Santa Monica College Police
Department unit to 3rd Street and Arizona and requested that SMPD SWAT units put up
pedestrian gates to secure the 3rd Street Promenade.26 The Incident Commander also
deployed motor units to secure 2nd Street and Broadway.
But this splinter group of protesters seemed to be one step ahead of incident command.
The protesters moved southbound on 2nd Street toward Colorado, where a group of
approximately 200 protested in front of the Public Safety Facility and City Hall. The
DOC lieutenant redeployed the motor unit to City Hall in response, and did the same
with the SWAT team that had been securing the 3rd Street Promenade.
However, by the time additional units arrived to City Hall, only approximately 25
protesters remained at that location; the marchers had moved westbound on Main
Street to Olympic Boulevard. That group, now reported to be 200-500 protesters, then
moved west on Olympic and turned northbound on Ocean Avenue.
The remaining element at Ocean Avenue was reported to be more peaceful than the
crowd that had splintered off. At this point, a captain in the field determined that some
of this element could march eastbound on Montana Avenue to 2nd Street. This group
was allowed to move eastbound on Montana Avenue, reportedly past the skirmish line
at Montana and 2nd Street.27
As a function of these separate movement patterns, different combinations of protest
groups surrounded the Pier Unit and SWAT team’s skirmish line at Colorado and
Ocean. Some remained north of the Pier Ramp on Ocean Avenue while others were
moving northbound toward the Pier Ramp from Olympic. And the line of officers was in
the middle.
26 The SWAT team leader reported that his team did not have access to solid barriers to secure
the Promenade. Instead, his team used orange cones and yellow tape. We discuss this failed
barrier in Intra-Agency Cooperation, later in this Report.
27 In an effort to prevent those protesters from doubling back to Ocean Avenue, the Incident
Commander requested that officers respond to and form a skirmish line at Lincoln and Montana;
but no officers responded to that location.
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As protest activity was intensifying in the early afternoon on Ocean Avenue and beyond,
criminal activity began to break out elsewhere in the City. At 1:34 PM, the officers
manning SKY1 reported that a group of approximately 50 people broke into and were
looting the Vans store, located at 4th Street and Broadway Avenue, the first documented
looting to occur in the City on May 31. The coordinating lieutenant then redeployed the
SWAT team from City Hall to the Vans store.
Soon thereafter, at 1:45 PM, dispatch received reports of looters at the now-unsecured
Santa Monica Place Mall (recall that motor units originally at this location were moved to
respond to the City Hall protest). The lieutenant requested that more units respond to
Arizona Avenue, Santa Monica Boulevard, and Broadway in an attempt to regain some
semblance of control over looters; but few, if any, units were available. Shortly before
2:00 PM, a SWAT team and a Patrol Squad were deployed to 2nd Street and Broadway
and a Culver City team was sent to 4th Street and Broadway to secure the Mall.
Around this time, additional off-duty SMPD personnel began to arrive to the Public
Safety Facility and deploy to the field. By 2:00 PM, the Department reported, staffing
levels were 120 sworn and 40 civilian personnel.
Reports of additional mass looting came in rapid sequence starting with the 2:00 PM
report of looting at Bloomingdales, located at 4th Street and Colorado. A SWAT team
was deployed to, and cleared, the location. But as quickly as a unit arrived at a
location, another was hit. Both of the SMPD captains who had left the Public Safety
Facility before noon (at the Chief’s direction), and thereby contributed to the breakdown
in centralized command that the lieutenant was scrambling to fill back at the DOC,
responded to the Mall in response to an “officer needs assistance” call. They were
occupied there for hours, engaged in what was essentially “line level” enforcement and
supervision while draining the situation of higher-level leadership.
The need for responses to both protesters and looting activity quickly exhausted the
Department’s available resources and command’s capabilities. The intensity of both
protest and looting was ever-increasing. Requests for Hawthorne PD’s Air Support
were reported to be delayed because of that Department’s own needs.28 And, to make
matters worse, there was a period in which responding mutual aid units did not know
where to report for deployment.
28 We discuss this and other deficiencies in mutual aid response later in this Report.
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This was another breakdown in the cohesion and clarity of the command decision-
making. The initial staging area for mutual aid was determined by later-arriving tactical
leadership to be flawed in its location and exposure. But moving it to the Big Blue Bus
garage area, where a field “command post” was established in the early afternoon,
created transitional issues. There was a confusing bifurcation in leadership that took a
couple of hours to resolve. The DOC had emerged as the de facto command post in
the late morning; that was where the Chief was located, and where the lieutenant had
stepped into the breach that was created when the two captains were caught up in the
protests. But the other lieutenant, assembling resources at the Big Blue Bus garage
and with little direction from the DOC, simply began sending cadres of officers to
needed locations. What was gained in direct efficiency was lost in the confusion as to
the overall picture of available personnel and their assignments.29
At 2:09 PM, the City of Santa Monica declared that a City-wide curfew would go into
effect at 4:00 PM. At 2:10 PM, the Incident Commander requested that the California
Highway Patrol (CHP) close all freeway off ramps into Santa Monica and that the Big
Blue Bus shut down all bus service west of Lincoln Boulevard.
The Afternoon: Overtaken by Events
The convergence of large protest groups on both sides of the Pier Ramp, several
protest “splinter groups” marching through City streets, and seemingly “sudden” influx of
looters30 overwhelmed the Department.
Reports of looting continued to flood dispatch in rapid sequence: looting at the Santa
Monica Place Mall, the Vans store (for a second time) and a jewelry store on Broadway,
the REI store at 402 Santa Monica Blvd., the Vons at 710 Broadway, and CVS at 500
Wilshire Blvd. Units were dispatched to some locations. But responding to a new
location often meant that those units were leaving their previous location unguarded,
and the volume of looting activity exceeded the capacity to respond.
Around this time, a unit at 4th and Broadway called for backup to combat looting. When
the Incident Commander asked what was needed, the officer replied, “whatever we can
get.” The Incident Commander responded that they had no units, and then asked
29 We discuss broader issues of “command and control” in more detail below.
30 As discussed above, SMPD’s gathering, internal circulation, and effective utilization of
available intelligence was problematic in this regard.
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Dispatch if there were any units available to deploy to looting locations. Dispatch
replied, “I’m trying.” The officers manning SKY1 reported that, at that point, over 100
looters had overtaken the Santa Monica Place Mall.
Meanwhile, mutual aid units from other agencies were arriving to the City but did not
know where to go or how to communicate, failures that we discuss in greater detail later
in this report.
At the same time, the DOC received reports of heightened tensions from protesters at
the Pier. A SWAT unit on Ocean Avenue reported that they observed that new
protesters were being dropped off on the corner of Wilshire Boulevard and Ocean
Avenue. Protesters on Ocean Avenue north of the Pier Ramp again moved southbound
toward the Pier Ramp. At 2:14 PM, SMPD units at the Pier Ramp reported that
members of the crowd were throwing bottles at them.31
In response to reports of violence from the Pier Ramp, the DOC lieutenant requested
that additional SWAT teams and their armored vehicle, the Bearcat, respond to the Pier.
Motor units were redeployed from City Hall to the Pier, where they quickly joined the
Pier Unit behind the barricade blocking the Pier entrance. Traffic Security Officers were
deployed to stop northbound traffic on Colorado Boulevard. The Traffic Security
Officers set up Jersey barriers32 spanning across Ocean Avenue south of Colorado to
slow down traffic.
At 2:17 PM, the DOC lieutenant requested that the SWAT team on scene form a south-
facing skirmish line at the 1500 block of Ocean Avenue to push the crowd southbound
on Ocean Avenue. The team lead responded that they needed more units to effectively
span the street and push the crowd. Around this time, the Incident Commander
suggested a plan to disperse the protest activity: once additional resources arrived at
the location, SMPD would declare an unlawful assembly and issue a dispersal order.
Whoever remained, stated the Incident Commander, would be arrested. The SWAT
31 Around this time, a unit far north of the Pier on Ocean Avenue reported that they were holding
the north end of Ocean Avenue with a north-facing skirmish line. This unit reported that the
crowd was “peaceful so far.” This was a microcosm of a larger series of challenges when it
came to the protesters – how to engage with peaceful demonstrators while responding to other
factions engaged in unlawful or assaultive behavior, all against a backdrop of considerable
demands in other locations.
32 A Jersey Barrier is a temporary and mobile sloped concrete or plastic barricade,
approximately 30 inches tall and 10 -30 feet long, typically used to block or direct traffic.
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leader responded that it would take many more resources to effect arrests. The arrest
plan was seemingly abandoned.
At 2:18 PM, the Chief requested that National Guard personnel respond to Santa
Monica, a request that, due to bureaucracy and deployment issues that we discuss in
detail later in this Report, took nearly seven hours to fulfill.
By 2:30 PM, units at the Pier reported that the protesters at the Pier were “getting some
traction,” stating that the crowd was growing and overtaking them, and that they would
“lose this.” The crowd was reported to be 300-350 protesters.
Not having effective aerial visual, the Incident Commander requested LAPD air support,
and an LAPD helicopter responded at 2:31 PM.
Meanwhile, despite CHP closures of the Interstate-10 freeway offramps at 2:36 PM, the
looting continued. Looting was reported throughout downtown and continued in the
Santa Monica Place Mall. The lieutenant redeployed the motorcycle units from the Pier
to the Mall and requested that an LAPD unit and Redondo Beach PD units respond to
secure the Mall. Around 2:40 PM, other units were reassigned from one location to
another to respond to looting. As occurred earlier that afternoon, when officers
responded to new locations, they left other locations unsecured.
By 3:00 PM, downtown Santa Monica was also chaotic. Looting continued at locations
such as The Gap on the 3rd Street Promenade. Dispatch received calls of shots fired
from the public at 4th and Broadway and a structure fire at the Shoe Palace at 210
Santa Monica Blvd., both of which were later determined to be inaccurate, but which
contributed to the flurry of reassignments and confusion.
At this same time, the officers manning SKY1 reported that a group of approximately
100 protesters was marching westbound on Colorado approaching 2nd Street. Now,
three sides of the Pier Ramp were surrounded by protest activity.
By now, the SWAT team with the Bearcat and Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department
personnel had responded to the 1500 block of Ocean Avenue. These officers formed
two skirmish lines at Ocean Avenue: one, a formal line, south-facing at 1500 Ocean
Avenue. The second was a less structured north-facing group of officers in the vicinity
of Broadway and Ocean Avenue behind (or in front of) parked police vehicles; they were
meant to protect the vehicles and the flank of the main skirmish line from additional
protesters.
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The SWAT team leader, along with the SWAT officers who made up the south-facing
line reported, together, that they formed a plan to issue a dispersal order, wait five
minutes, and deploy chemical munitions to disperse the crowd in a southern direction.
They had determined that deployment of chemical munitions (specifically, types of tear
gas that we describe in detail in Appendix B) would be an effective tool to disperse what
they believed to be a crowd that was threatening the Pier.33 A SWAT team leader
communicated this plan to the lieutenant at the DOC, who verbally approved the plan
via the radio.34 The lieutenant stated that the line officers must give a five minute
“waiting period” between the dispersal order and deployment of tear gas.
At 3:09 PM, SMPD declared Ocean and Colorado to be an unlawful assembly and
issued two dispersal orders from the Bearcat’s loudspeaker system. As discussed in
detail later in this report, the dispersal order did not inform people of the impending use
of chemical munitions:
This is a police officer of the City of Santa Monica. This is hereby an
unlawful assembly. In the name of the people of the State of California, I
command all those present at Ocean and Colorado to immediately
disperse. If you do not do so, you will be arrested under section 409 of
the United States Penal Code, which prohibits remaining at an unlawful
assembly. The following routes are available: south on Ocean Avenue
only.
You have [one] minute to leave the area.
After SMPD announced the dispersal order, some protesters left Ocean Avenue, but the
majority remained. Some challenged the dispersal order, stating that the protest was
33 As discussed above (see footnote 24), SMPD was, perhaps, overly concerned about
protecting the Pier, to the extent that reports of the crowd “overtaking” the officers at the Pier
created a sense of urgency over dispersing this element that might harm the iconic landmark.
The lieutenant in the DOC repeated via the radio in several instances that the units must
prevent protesters from getting on the Pier. Officers blocking the Pier Ramp made reports of
taking rocks and bottles from the crowd and of the crowd size swelling. We discuss if tear gas
was the appropriate methodology for effectuating crowd dispersal in greater detail later in this
Report.
34 There are some reports that the decision to use tear gas at this point was not unanimously
accepted among the command staff.
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being peaceful and questioning why protesters were being instructed to walk into
oncoming traffic on Ocean Avenue.
Around this time, several LAPD units were deployed to join the skirmish lines at the
Pier.
At 3:16 PM, SWAT team officers on the south-facing skirmish line threw two “tear gas”
grenades35 southbound onto an open area in front of the crowd of protesters facing
north on Ocean Avenue. According to an officer, one grenade was ineffective and did
not disperse the intended chemical munitions. Immediately, the officers reported that
some members of the crowd began throwing water bottles and/or rocks at the officers.
One SWAT officer deployed a third, and then a fourth, tear gas grenade. Another
SWAT officer deployed impact rounds using a 37mm launcher at specific individuals
who appeared to be throwing rocks at the skirmish line. A third SWAT officer deployed
rounds of Pepperball at the ground around the deployed grenades to prevent individuals
in the crowd from picking up and tossing the gas grenades back at the line of officers.
Around this time, there was concern that responding mutual aid partners located at 2nd
and Colorado did not have gas masks, and officers were instructed to not deploy
additional chemical munitions.
Following deployment of less lethal and chemical munitions, the majority of the crowd to
the south of the skirmish line dispersed, mostly moving southbound on Ocean Avenue
toward Colorado as instructed by the dispersal order. There were, however, reports
from officers via the radio of numerous other individuals from this location who headed
east toward downtown and contributed to the vandalism and agitation that was
occurring in other parts of the City.
At this same time, officers in the north-facing group began to negotiate with protest
leaders who were standing north of the line. In one scene that went viral, one officer
removed his gas mask and hugged a protester. This officer, without consulting with the
command and in contradiction to the dispersal order, then told protesters that they could
stay on Ocean Avenue if they moved into Palisades Park. These protesters cheered
and mostly moved into the park. While the gesture was welcome in many circles, and
while it exemplifies the difficult balance between positive community relations and
35 Tear gas grenades are chemical gas delivery systems utilized by some law enforcement in a
crowd control context. We define all less lethal munitions used by SMPD on May 31 in
Appendix B: Less Lethal Defined.
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coherent enforcement in a crowd management context, perhaps its greatest
significance in this context is as a reflection of the disjunction that continued to define
aspects of the SMPD response.
Around 3:20 PM, the south-facing skirmish line began to push southbound on Ocean
Avenue until the line was perpendicular to the Pier Ramp. There, officers reported that
they observed some of the crowd reassemble at Moomat Ahiko Way, approximately 150
feet from the skirmish line. The movements of a notably aggressive “splinter group” had
had also brought many of them back to that general vicinity.
The crowd was, for the most part, standing behind the Jersey barriers that the Traffic
Security Officers had placed earlier for traffic control. However, officers observed some
individuals enter a vacant building at 1616 Ocean Ave. These individuals, they
reported, were using the building and construction materials to “fortify” their attack
against officers. These and others sporadically threw glass, bottles or other objects at
the officers, and created their own improvised barricades in the street. The “peaceful
protest” had now morphed into more of an unambiguous confrontation between the
police and individuals who were openly resistant.
In response to this new tactic from the crowd, officers deployed various less-lethal
munitions at intervals, from hand-thrown tear gas canisters toward the crowd in general
to targeted impact munitions at individuals that they believed to be aggressive.
Individuals attempted to throw back gas canisters or cover them with traffic cones;
officers targeted them with Pepperball rounds.
Around 4:20 PM, the command instructed officers to enforce the City’s curfew. After
issuing another series of dispersal orders, this time under the auspices of the curfew
ordinance, officers deployed a light-sound diversionary device, or “flashbang” and one
slow-burning smoke canister in the direction of the crowd. Moments after, a projectile
was thrown at the officers, and the officers deployed two additional smoke rounds
toward the crowd. While some protesters dispersed, most remained. Officers
continued to deploy irritant gas and targeted impact munitions.
The skirmish line moved southbound again, this time reaching the Jersey barriers, some
of which were knocked over, at Moomat Ahiko Way. A squad of officers entered
Tongva Park, on the east side of Ocean Avenue, to gain “high ground” on the remaining
protesters. From here, these officers deployed additional chemical and targeted
munitions. The officers held the skirmish line.
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Meanwhile, looting and vandalism had increased throughout downtown Santa Monica
despite the City’s curfew. A group of looters was observed traveling up and down Santa
Monica Boulevard, and dispatch received several looting calls at locations along Santa
Monica Boulevard. Units at various locations reported that individuals were lighting
fireworks and, in some locations, throwing them at officers.
While the command reported that the National Guard was en route, there was still no
estimated time of arrival.
Around 4:45 PM, a large group was reported to be marching eastbound on Olympic
Boulevard toward the Public Safety Facility. Two teams of officers who had reported to
this location for duty deployed to the front of the Public Safety Facility equipped with
less lethal tools. The Incident Commander discussed the possibility of using chemical
munitions to disperse this crowd. According to one of these officers, the protesters
seemed to be deterred by the officers’ presence, but it is also possible that chemical
munitions were deployed to effectuate the clearing of the crowd.36
The marching group spread into downtown. At least some of this group moved to the
vicinity of 11th Street and Broadway Avenue. The LAPD helicopter observed that
members of this group had lit a vehicle on fire. The SMPD Fire Department responded
and were assaulted in performing their duties. Two Strike Force teams deployed from
City Hall to the intersection of 11th and Broadway to assist Fire Department personnel.
Upon their arrival, the officers deployed targeted less lethal munitions, including
Pepperball rounds, to disperse the aggressive individuals. Command discussed the
possibility of containing and arresting agitators but officers on the ground reported that
they did not have sufficient resources to affect arrests. Some officers executed targeted
takedowns of individuals as they cleared the street.
At the same time, some of the crowd had joined the existing, more aggressive looting
crowd in the vicinity of 4th Street and Santa Monica Boulevard. Officers responded to
the intersection to a call of shots fired. A member of the crowd threw an explosive
device at officers, which, an officer reported, detonated at the feet of an officer.
Additional officers arrived to secure the scene from looters and rioters.
36 This gap in definitive information about the use of a high-profile force option is itself a
reflection of two things: unprecedented activity levels, to be sure, but also the lack of a firm
organizational grasp of all events during – or even after –the May 31 operations and potential
shortcomings in force reporting.
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It became abundantly clear that a more strategic and systematic plan was needed to
secure City streets.
Evening of May 31: Turning the Tide
By 6:00 PM, SMPD began to execute a more coordinated plan to contain the City. Now
with more mutual aid resources and nearly full deployment,37 and with much of the
activity on Ocean and Colorado contained, SMPD deployed “Rapid Response Teams”
to systematically clear the streets. Some teams were deployed to specific looting calls.
Other teams employed skirmish lines to push people east out of downtown starting in
the vicinity of 4th Street and Santa Monica Boulevard. Mutual aid partners from both
Los Angeles and Santa Barbara County Sheriffs and LAPD assisted by blocking
intersections and alleyways to prevent people from doubling back into downtown.
The plan in these early evening hours was to systematically push and contain
individuals into intersections to effect mass arrests. From approximately 6:30 to 8:00
PM (and into later evening hours), SMPD units arrested groups of 35 to 50 people at a
time at various locations throughout downtown. This in itself became problematic, as
we discuss in detail later in the Report, but served to contain some of the chaos. Some
remaining individuals continued to attack officers by throwing rocks at units, though
most of these individuals fled.
In these evening hours, City residents informed us that some people engaged in the
activity in downtown Santa Monica entered residential neighborhoods as the police
pushed them away from downtown.
At 8:16 PM, the National Guard arrived to the Command Post. At approximately
8:55pm, they were deployed to the Mall, City Hall, Public Safety Facility, and the Pier to
support and relieve units. While some sporadic looting and arrests continued well into
the early morning hours of June 1, the City had largely re-established control.
37 By 6:00 PM, Department records show staffing levels of 160 sworn and 40 civilian personnel.
In total, when accounting for officers on IOD or other leave or on other duty assignments, SMPD
had 176 sworn police employees available for duty on May 31.
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June 1 and Following Weeks
By the early morning hours of June 1, the City had endured the worst of the unrest.
Such intensity levels – and problems – would not be replicated in the days that followed.
However, the protests and attendant challenges were far from done, and SMPD
remained on tactical alert well into the month of June. On June 1, as the City worked
through a huge cleanup effort and prepared for further demonstrations, SMPD was
prepared. A detailed, printed “operations plan” designated assignments for the large
numbers of additional personnel who were back on duty, put specific people in
identifiable roles with defined responsibilities, and covered a range of contingencies with
clarity.
The toll, however, was considerable. In the weeks following May 31, SMPD’s Criminal
Investigation Division compiled a crime report of May 31 to “take stock” of the damage
to the City. They reported 178 counts of non-residential looting and over $75,000 in
damages from vandalism to vehicles alone. Table 1 lists the incidents reported by
crime category.
TABLE 1: Incidents by Crime Category from May 31, 2020
Crime Category Count
Non-residential Looting 178
Residential Burglaries 2
Robbery 9
Aggravated Assault 17
Theft from Vehicle 2
Grand Theft Auto 9
Arson 12
Damaged Police Vehicles 18
Assault with a Deadly Weapon against a Police Officer 10
Vandalism 49
Criminal Investigation detectives reviewed and analyzed the reports identifying a total of
120 actives cases with workable leads. The cases were disseminated amongst the
Detectives of the Criminal Investigation Division and the Special Investigations Unit and
as discussed later in this Report, resulted in 34 search warrants and 22 felony arrests.
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Timeline
Part of our Scope of Work for this evaluation was to create a detailed timeline of the
events of May 31. We prepared the following timeline using the documentary and
digital evidence sources listed in our Methodology section as well as information
gathered in our numerous interviews.
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06:30
Various Command Staff
arrive to PSF
07:00
Lt writes email with
suggested Ops Plan
09:30
Captain arrives to PSF
10:15
March: Pearl St.
11:20
SMPD Briefing 11:30
March: 20th & Wilshire
12:00
March: Ocean &
Montana
12:05
Protests converge on
Ocean 12:10
Units deployed to Pier
Ramp
12:15
Metro Line Stop 12:20
Tactical Alert activated12:25
Protests to Pier Ramp 12:30
Air Support requested
(Hawthorne)
12:40
SWAT activated City-
wide 12:45
Protest to CA Incline12:45
Call Mutual Aid
13:14
Area A activated
13:20
Protest E/B Santa
Monica Blvd.13:20
Units to Promenade
13:20
Protest E/B Montana
from Ocean 13:30
Protest City Hall 13:34
Looting: Vans 13:45
Protest W/B Olympic,
N/B Ocean
13:45
Looting: SM Place Mall 14:00
Units to Mall
14:00
Looting: various 14:09
City-wide Curfew
6:14 AM
11:02 AM
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14:10
Request for CHP
freeway closure
BBB suspended14:14
Pier Ramp rocks and
bottles
14:15
Increased looting calls 14:16
Jersey barriers on
Ocean Ave
14:17
Skirmish line on Ocean
14:18
National Guard
requested 14:30
Protest Pier Ramp
escalating
14:31
LAPD Air10 responds14:36
CHP closes all 10 off-
ramps
15:00
SWAT/ Bearcat to Pier
Ramp 15:09
Unlawful assembly
declared 15:16
Less lethal munitions
deployed15:20
Skirmish line S/B Ocean
15:40
Less lethal munitions
deployed
16:20
Curfew enforcement;
less lethal deployed
16:45
Protest City Hall
16:47
Agitators: 11th and
Broadway; less lethal
deployed
1:59 PM
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18:00
Transition to Rapid
Response Teams
18:30
Looting and systematic
arrests
20:16
National Guard arrived
to Command Post
20:55
National Guard
deployed
5:44 PM
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Assessment & Analysis: Day of May 31
Mass Arrests: Slow to Develop, Flawed in Execution
SMPD and its mutual aid partners made approximately 298 arrests on May 31.38
Transporting, booking, and safely and humanely detaining that many individuals would
have been challenging for the Department under even the best of circumstances, with
adequate preparation and planning. As it was, though, the Department had never
arrested so many people in a given day, and was regrettably underprepared to process
them. It had no policy governing mass bookings, no written guidance for establishing a
field jail, no formal agreements with transportation providers, and its officers were not
equipped with mass arrest kits containing supplies necessary for detaining large groups
of individuals.
As those who would assume command for the day were heading into the briefing on
Sunday morning, they realized they had no meaningful strategy for mass bookings and
detentions. They scrambled to come up with a makeshift plan, which included three
main challenges – establishing a mobile field jail (which they decided to locate at the
Santa Monica Airport), arranging for transportation from the field to the jail site, and
managing citations, booking, and associated paperwork. While Department leaders are
careful to acknowledge that the individual efforts of the various involved personnel were
saddled with a very difficult set of circumstances, one person we spoke with creditably
described the entire situation as a “debacle.”
To the Department’s credit, it recognized many of its systemic failures on May 31 and
has already addressed many of the concerns that we identified in our evaluation. In this
section we detail several areas of concern and SMPD’s proposed, or, in some cases,
already implemented, solutions.
Officer Preparedness & Resources
The effort to effectuate large-scale arrests suffered from a similar lack of preparation
and planning as other areas of operation addressed in this report. There was, for
38 Officers made an additional 70 arrests on June 1, some of which were in the early morning
hours.
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example, confusion about how to identify arrestees, and document the charges for
which arrests were made. Officers can be heard on body-worn camera recordings
looking for additional flex cuffs to restrain people and turning to mutual aid partners who
came better equipped.39
The confusion and lack of resources also impacted operational command decisions.
Some Department executives had wanted to address the spiraling conditions on the
streets with arrests much earlier in the day, but here again the lack of resources limited
options and undermined effectiveness. There were long stretches in which, lacking the
ability to “corral” problematic individuals (those throwing bottles and rocks, for example)
and remove them from the scene through arrest, SMPD essentially pushed agitators
from one part of the City to another. Similarly, looters who were chased away from one
store moved freely on to another because officers didn’t have the capacity to make
arrests.
Command team members may have recognized what was happening, but the
Department was overwhelmed and incapable of nimbly adjusting to the situation. At
one point, radio transmissions indicate that one acting incident commander wanted
officers to arrest rioters, but the line command vetoed that decision because their
capacity to take people into custody was already over-taxed.
Transportation and Associated Delays
As officers did arrest individuals at various locations around the City,40 they restricted
the detainees’ hands behind their backs with flex cuffs and instructed them to sit on
curbs. Body-worn camera footage shows officers at some locations confused about
what to do next. With resources stretched thin across the County and no pre-existing
arrangement with transportation partners for handling this situation, field supervisors
struggled to coordinate a plan for handling arrestees. The single SMPD jail van that can
seat 12 individuals was clearly insufficient. The result was restrained arrestees left
39 We even heard of personnel making a trip to Home Depot to purchase zip ties to serve as flex
cuffs.
40 In the early afternoon, most arrests were of individuals or small groups at locations that had
been looted. Later, after the curfew order was in effect and SMPD was attempting to clear the
streets, officers moved to strike teams that arrested groups of 35-50 people at a time, in the
area around 6th & Santa Monica and 3rd and Wilshire.
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sitting on curbs for extended periods of time with officers standing guard, unable to
move on and respond to additional service needs.
A well-coordinated plan for a potential mass arrest situation would have included a
means of transporting large numbers of detained individuals to a mobile field jail. Here,
as the SMPD command team cobbled together a plan on May 31, they contacted the
Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department (“LASD”) (which has a fleet of buses to
transport inmates to and from court and in between its various jail facilities). LASD
indicated it could send a bus, but not security personnel to staff it. Ultimately, LASD
sent one bus to the City to assist with transportation.
Commanders also contacted Big Blue Bus, but leaders of that City department were
initially reluctant to deploy its buses, in part out of concern for the safety of its drivers
(due both to potential COVID-19 exposure and the nature of transporting arrested
individuals) and in part due to the public relations aspect of being aligned with police in
confrontation with protesters. Eventually, SMPD did secure some Big Blue buses and
drivers to transport arrestees, but those actions came with delays that are the
consequence of trying to make decisions in the heat of a crisis without sufficient
preparation or any guiding policies or protocols.
The delays in finding transport for arrestees led to understandable complaints.
Arrestees were forced to sit for long periods of time (up to an hour or more) in
uncomfortable positions, and can be heard on various body-worn camera recordings
complaining about their cuffs being too tight, the need to use the restroom, and the
desire for water.
Field Jail
Early in the day, commanders realized the jail facilities at the Public Safety Facility
would not be sufficient to detain the anticipated large number of arrestees. They put
together a plan to create a makeshift jail, and after weighing different options, decided
to locate it at the Santa Monica Airport. While this setting had some advantages – it
was on the edge of the City and could be at least minimally secured – it also had some
significant downsides – no bathrooms or running water, no phone lines, and no space to
separate different classifications of arrestees.
The jail supervisor, along with a lieutenant who formally worked for LASD and had
custody experience, took over management of the effort to establish and run the field
jail. With no established precedent or protocols, they deployed to the airport and set up
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a mobile booking center within a hangar. LASD helped staff the jail with a mobile
booking team. That the mobile field jail was a source of post-event criticism and
complaints was neither surprising nor unpredictable, given the ad hoc nature of the
operation.
Operational problems were numerous:
• The area designated for holding arrestees was inadequate: no bathrooms (for
staff or arrestees), no running water, no phones, insufficient space to separate
males and females, or adults and juveniles, or to allow for appropriate physical
distancing.
• Officers staffing the jails lacked protective equipment (such as helmets and
Tasers).
• Insufficient number of personnel created significant officer safety concerns, in
terms of numbers and ability to thoroughly search detainees.
• Officers did not have shears capable of safely cutting flex cuffs.
These conditions would have been problematic even if this event had not occurred in
the midst of a public health pandemic. As it was, transporting individuals in crowded
buses and holding them for hours in the makeshift jail heightened the risk of coronavirus
spread – among arrestees, officers, and the broader community. The airport location
had the benefit of being outside, which may have mitigated the risk to some extent
(compared to some large cities where arrested demonstrators were held in crowded jail
cells). Unfortunately, SMPD did not have sufficient personal protective equipment, such
as masks, available to hand out to all arrestees who were not wearing their own.
Booking, Processing, and Citations
Issues with operation of the jail were compounded by significant challenges with how
arrestees were booked and processed. Officers making arrests in the field had no
access to systems to verify identification. As some officers waited in the field for buses
to transport arrestees, other officers, most commonly mutual aid partners who had
patrol vehicles, drove arrestees to the airport, so that the field jail had multiple agencies
literally dropping people off at the gate for processing. In many cases, jail personnel
were unable to determine what individuals had been arrested for, where, or by whom.
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Largely as a result of this booking chaos, nearly all of the arrests made on May 31 (289
out of 298) were processed as violations of the City’s curfew order.41 This was despite
the fact that many people had been detained for looting and possessed presumably
stolen property at the time they were arrested. The paperwork accompanying arrestees
was inconsistent and insufficient to process them on more serious charges, where
appropriate, and the staffing demands of maintaining distinctions between busloads of
arrestees were beyond the Department’s capabilities. The lack of organization or
control was exemplified by an exchange captured on one officer’s body-worn camera
recording, when he effectively gave an arrestee responsibility for presenting his own
identification and informing officials what he had been arrested for. These irregularities
in processing may have been one factor in the City’s subsequent decision to dismiss all
of these curfew-based citations.
The desire and need to expeditiously release people from the jail created another set of
problems. Everyone arrested was ultimately “cited out” that night, meaning they were
given a citation and admonition to appear in court on a later date. But the field jail was
not staffed with SMPD personnel authorized to write citations, so they had to rely on the
LASD mobile booking team, which turned out to be a lengthy and onerous process.
Other issues complicated the release process.
• In many cases, jail staff was unable to locate personal property which had been
taken from arrestees when they arrived at the field jail. Nor was there an efficient
means to reunite arrestees with their property once they were cited out. Many
left without being able to reclaim their phones, keys, or wallets, and there was
lingering uncertainty about how and how quickly this could be accomplished.
• The jail did not have a sufficient number of shears to safely remove flex cuffs
binding arrestees hands, which resulted in some injuries to arrestees as officers
used knives or other makeshift tools in an attempt to cut the cuffs.
• Finally, because the field jail was located adjacent to a residential neighborhood
and far from any bus or train routes, jail staff had to transport people away from
the field jail prior to release. This resulted in further delays, because the same
transportation challenges that existed in the field at the beginning of the arrest
and detention process also plagued mobile field jail operations.
41 Municipal Code sec. 2.16.100(1).
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These complications compounded the sense of injustice felt by many of the arrestees,
some of whom insisted later that they were simply protesting peacefully and were
unaware of a legal need to be off the streets.
Corrective Action
To the Department’s credit, it recognized its systemic failures on May 31 – while
emphasizing that those who staffed the mobile field jail had done their best under highly
adverse circumstances – and quickly sought remedies. As it regrouped from the days
of unrest and had time to meaningfully evaluate its own performance across several
categories, SMPD gave appropriate attention to this element of the response. It
prepared a comprehensive list of “May 31, 2020 Deficiencies” that included the issues
we discuss above, and worked on systemic reforms accordingly.
Among the highlights of this effort was a new policy governing Mass Booking
Procedures; it was accompanied by a detailed PowerPoint file that was used in a
Department-wide training and exists as a comprehensive resource for anyone tasked
with establishing a mobile field jail in the future. The new policy is an eight-page
document that addresses the location of booking facilities, arrest and booking
procedures, staffing and personnel, property handling, and equipment (down to the
minutiae of stocking pens, clipboards, and a long list of other supplies in transportable
storage bins to have at the ready if needed). It sets out expectations and processes for
procurement of temporary restrooms and handwashing stations. It includes the
assembly and distribution of field jail kits that include property bags and information
forms to provide documentation of arrest charges and evidence. It details
responsibilities for sworn personnel and a long list of non-sworn personnel relating to
arrest, booking, detention, and property maintenance. It also includes detailed COVID
guidelines setting out requirements for masks, distancing, and sanitation.
The Department also has addressed transportation issues with Big Blue Bus
administration, and the new policy sets out emergency provisions for use and staffing of
buses that should eliminate the conflict and logistical confusion that existed on May 31.
The new Mass Booking Procedures policy and associated PowerPoint establish a
clearly articulated plan for how to handle the various issues related to mass arrests.
The Department has finalized this policy and trained its personnel by October 2020 (in
advance of the November elections and concerns about possible demonstrations). We
have no additional recommendations regarding this new policy, other than a reminder to
the Department to regularly update it and ensure ongoing training and compliance. This
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is particularly important because of its specificity and requirements that certain
equipment be immediately available and accessible.
RECOMMENDATION 7
The Department should regularly review and update its Mass Booking
Procedures policy to ensure that the listed contact information and
location and availability of all itemized equipment is current and correct.
Subsequent Criminal Investigations
Many people in the Santa Monica community who we heard from during our various
outreach efforts were frustrated by what seemed to be complete lack of accountability
for looting and the widescale theft and other damage to businesses that occurred on
May 31. While the vast majority of those engaged in theft activity that day in Santa
Monica undoubtedly escaped apprehension and consequences, it is important to note
the proactive investigative efforts taken by SMPD since May 31.
Many people were, in fact, detained for looting – made clear through body-worn camera
footage and officer accounts. We noted, however, that virtually all of the citations
issued were for violation of the curfew order, a result of the flawed booking system that
we addressed above, and citations that were never processed. Certainly, this added to
the public perception that the SMPD’s focus had been in the wrong place, and that
protesters were wrongly targeted while serious crime was largely ignored. Public
concerns about accountability were also presumably heightened when the City Attorney
– for a variety of reasons – decided to dismiss all the citations related to curfew
violations (and the few other infractions individuals were cited for on May 31).42
In the days following May 31, SMPD continued in a defensive posture and was largely
effective at preventing further looting. As the immediate crisis subsided and the
Department regained its footing, SMPD’s Criminal Investigation Division (“CID”) began
quantifying, cataloging, and organizing the large amount of evidence related to a variety
of crimes. As mentioned earlier in this Report, CID tallied hundreds of crime reports
related to May 31, including 178 reports of non-residential looting, two residential
burglaries, nine robberies, 17 aggravated assaults, 12 arsons, and 49 accounts of
42 Our understanding is that flaws in the booking process, especially lack of supportive
documentation, were a key factor in this outcome.
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vandalism. CID compiled witness statements and video evidence to identify 120 active
cases with workable leads.
Detectives with CID and the Special Investigations Unit spent the next six months
working these cases, partnering with other regional law enforcement agencies and
analyzing hundreds of photographs and videos. They served over 30 search warrants
that resulted in 22 felony arrests. Of those, two suspects are being prosecuted by the
U.S. Attorney’s office on federal arson-related charges. Los Angeles County’s District
Attorney filed charges on 19 of the remaining 20 cases. All cases are still pending. The
remaining cases remain open, but detectives have no active leads to pursue.
Clearly, an effective mass arrest strategy on May 31 would have resulted in many more
prosecutions for criminal activity, and those impacted by the looters were
understandably dismayed by the Department’s failures in this regard. However, the
dogged efforts to bring a small percentage of offenders to account after the fact is some
solace, and a testament to SMPD’s resolve to address this community concern.
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Less Lethal Deployment
SMPD used various “less lethal” force tools throughout the afternoon and evening of
May 31. Less lethal force is defined by Department policy as “force that is not
reasonably anticipated and intended to create a substantial likelihood of causing death
or serious injury.” (Appendix B provides descriptions of the various less lethal force
tools used on May 31.) Fortunately, SMPD appears to have avoided a major problem
that arose with dismaying frequency in other jurisdictions that encountered large protest
movements: the misapplication of certain munitions that caused unjustified physical
harm to members of the public.43 Nonetheless, law enforcement use of force in any
context is inherently worthy of consideration, and the unique issues presented on May
31 are additional cause for careful analysis.
Force Deployment Counts
SMPD officers deployed various less lethal force tools on May 31, ranging from baton
strikes and takedowns to use of a Taser and chemical and impact munitions. These
tools were used in three general areas of the City: (1) the vicinity of Ocean Avenue and
Colorado Boulevard to disperse people from the area between the 1500 block of Ocean
Avenue to the intersection of Ocean Avenue and Olympic Boulevard, and into Tongva
Park; (2) the vicinity of 11th Street and Broadway, to disperse people attempting to
prevent the Fire Department from putting out a vehicle fire; and, (3) throughout the
Downtown Santa Monica Business District to combat looting.
Notably, and extremely disappointingly, when asked about the use of less lethal tools on
May 31, SMPD Command responded that they did not have a count or log of deployed
munitions. SMPD reported that it did not have a methodology for documenting uses of
force in crowd control situations and did not have a clear count of less lethal inventory,
who used them, and where.
In fact, as we understood it and as we discuss in more detail later in this Report, there
was no mechanism in Santa Monica for tracking less lethal munitions discharged by
officers, clearly contrary to general principles of reporting and tracking use of force. Nor
was there any expectation articulated by supervisors to ensure that force reporting
requirements as set out in Santa Monica’s policy manual were followed.
43 An example of this would be projectiles, designed for impact to the torso or legs only, that
struck subjects in the face, eyes, or other sensitive areas and caused significant damage.
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RECOMMENDATION 8
SMPD should develop a tracking mechanism, such as a log for less lethal
munitions, specifically to track how many of which types of munitions are
used and by whom.
OIR Group was able to obtain some semblance of the type, location, and count of at
least some of the less lethal force used by reviewing and tabulating information from the
Use of Force Reports submitted by officers who administered deploying force; these are
detailed in Table 2, below. For the reasons stated above, while these counts are
accurate based on the officers’ self-reports, one should not conclude that these even
begin to approximate the actual uses of force on May 31.44
TABLE 2: SMPD Use of Force Summary May 31, 2020
Generated from UOF Reports submitted to Command Staff by SMPD officers
Type of Force
11th &
Broadway
Ocean &
Colorado
DTSM Business
District Total
37mm Impact* 19 91 23 133
Baton strikes 3 1 8 12
Flashbang 1 1
2
Grenades 1 29
30
Pepperball* 50 50 5 105
Takedown 1 8 9
Taser
1 1
Total 75 172 45 292
* Impact Munitions and Pepperball counts were often estimated by officers in their reports.
44 As discussed later in this Report, this is clearly not an accurate of verifiable count of the force
deployed due to a delayed and incomplete internal force reporting and review process and
officers not having the means or directive to follow Department policy and document all force
used on May 31.
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Force Deployment Analysis
SMPD’s policy on First Amendment Assemblies address the use of force in crowd
control as follows:
433.7 USE OF FORCE. Force or control devices, including oleoresin
capsaicin (OC), should be directed toward individuals and not toward
groups or crowds, unless specific individuals cannot reasonably be
targeted due to extreme circumstances, such as a riotous crowd.
Of concern is that the current SMPD policy set out above limits the use of force to
individuals, “unless specific individuals cannot reasonably be targeted due to extreme
circumstances, such as a riotous crowd” without providing any further definition for what
constitutes an “extreme circumstance” or a “riotous” crowd or why it would be
impossible under such circumstances to target individuals engaged in assaultive
activity. This is a large exception for non-targeted use of less lethal munitions against
groups and crowds during “extreme circumstances” such as a “riotous crowd.” This
becomes subject to wide variety of interpretations and an exception that could largely
swallow the rule. SMPD should amend its policy to either specifically define these
circumstances or eliminate the exceptions for the ambiguous “extreme circumstances
such as a riotous crowd.”
Tear Gas
As noted above, the policy on First Amendment Assemblies is troublesome in defining
use of force, including the use of OC (a type of chemical munition, or tear gas), on
crowds. We also evaluated SMPD’s policy on use of tear gas generally, 303.7 TEAR
GAS GUIDELINES, and found it to be lacking specific details about its use in crowd
control. The policy states:
Tear gas may be used for crowd control, crowd dispersal or against
barricaded suspects based on the circumstances. Only the Watch
Commander, or Incident Commander in consult with the Tactical
Commander or Special Operations Section Lieutenant may authorize the
delivery and use of tear gas, and only after evaluating all conditions known
at the time and determining that such force reasonably appears justified
and necessary to result in the safe control of the suspect(s).
When practicable, fire personnel should be alerted or summoned to the
scene prior to the deployment of tear gas to control any fires and to assist
in providing medical aid or gas evacuation if needed.
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Only SWAT team members trained in the use of tactical tear gas weapons
should discharge such devices at the scene.
As noted above, SMPD did not have any method for tracking individual deployment of
tear gas on May 31. Aside from the initial two tear gas grenades, which were directed
by SWAT supervisors and which followed the authorization to use gas to disperse the
crowd, SWAT team members used their individual discretion and training when they
deployed gas. As a result, we could not evaluate each instance of tear gas deployment.
And, as discussed later, the Department also did not conduct a robust evaluation of
each instance of tear gas use.
We did note some deviations from current policy. First, SMPD did not alert fire
personnel to the scene prior to deployment of tear gas (though we acknowledge that
SMFD was deployed to other calls for service in the City). Second, we noted some
circumstances in which officers deployed tear gas from a far distance, where it
disseminated in an ineffective way somewhere between the officers and the protesters.
In one instance, for example, an officer commented to another, “it is too far for gas” as a
gas canister was deployed by a third officer.
Use of Flashbangs in Crowd Control
SMPD does not, to our knowledge, have a policy for use of flashbangs as a means of
crowd control. Typically, these devices are used in tactical situations, such as a
barricaded suspect, to distract or disorient a suspect. The use of flashbangs in crowd
control has been the subject of much discussion in other jurisdictions, both for their
questionable effectiveness in open spaces and high potential for injury.
In discussing the less lethal force plan for Ocean Avenue and Colorado, none of the
SWAT leads or the Incident Commander requested the use of flashbangs to disperse
the crowd; the focus was on use of chemical munitions. And, we noted one exchange
in body-worn camera footage in which one officer reprimanded the officer who deployed
a flashbang, and interceded by stating, “don’t do that again […] don’t [flash]bang again.”
While we discovered this incident and flashbang use, we are not aware of any analysis
or remedial SMPD response to its deployment. SMPD should closely examine this
incident and assess the advisability of this deployment under the circumstances
presented.
RECOMMENDATION 9
SMPD should examine the use of the flashbang device on May 31 through
the lenses of accountability, advisability, and remediation.
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Pepperball
SMPD policy allows use of Pepperball in crowd control situations “to bring under control
an individual or groups of individuals who are engaging in, or are about to engage in
violent behavior,” while also noting that “Pepper projectiles […] should not, however, be
used against individuals or groups who merely fail to disperse or do not reasonably
appear to present a risk to the safety of officers or the public.” (Control Devices and
Techniques 303.8)
On May 31, officers deployed Pepperball in all three locations as noted above. One
incident involved the use of a Pepperball at a looting suspect who was running away.
Various rounds were also deployed on Ocean and Colorado where the “risk to the
safety or officers or the public” was not readily cognizable. SMPD did not engage in a
detailed force analysis regarding whether these two deployments were in compliance
with Department policy and expectations, as it should have done pursuant to its force
review policy.
RECOMMENDATION 10
SMPD should conduct a detailed analysis regarding whether the
Pepperball deployments on May 31 were consistent with Department
policy and expectations.
Impact Munitions
SMPD policy45 allows trained officers to use impact munitions, or “kinetic projectiles,” in
crowd situations when “the suspect is engaged in riotous behavior or is throwing rocks,
bottles or other dangerous projectiles at people and/or officers” (Control Devices and
Techniques 303.9).
As noted above, SMPD’s First Amendment Assemblies policy allows officers to use
force devices against individuals while also noting that they should not ordinarily be
directed toward groups or crowds. This is due to the potential for striking or causing
injury to unintended targets.
Of particular concern again here is the current SMPD force policy set out above that
allows use of impact munitions if “the subject is engaged in riotous behavior or is
throwing rocks, bottles or other dangerous projectiles at people and/or officers.”
45 In reviewing the Department’s policy, we noted that the Department does not specify where
on the suspect’s body to aim the projectile.
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Certainly, observations of “throwing rocks, bottles, or other dangerous projectiles” is
clear but the policy provides no further guidance on what constitutes “riotous behavior.”
On May 31, officers did use impact munitions against specific suspects that they
believed to be directly aggressive. At times though, these suspects were part of the
larger crowd; officers’ Use of Force Reports suggest that at least some of these
suspects were stepping out from the crowd, for example, to throw a projectile at the
skirmish line. We also noted some questionable deployments that, as with the
Pepperball deployments, should have prompted a greater degree of internal review by
the Department, such as using the impact munitions as “skip rounds” off the ground to
prevent protesters in general ( as opposed to a specific subject) from approaching tear
gas canisters. The strategy here seems not to take into adequate account the likelihood
that protesters reaching down for gas canisters could inadvertently but foreseeably be
struck in the head.
Of note is that the majority of officers who reported using impact munitions also reported
that they could not confirm if the subject had been hit, or if she or he had been injured.
No use of impact munitions was connected with an arrest.
We further note that SMPD’s current policy does not provide any limitations on where to
aim the projectiles. Policies of other police agencies limit targets to the torso and
instruct officers to avoid the head and other sensitive areas. SMPD’s policy should
provide additional guidance regarding appropriate targets.
RECOMMENDATION 11
SMPD should revise its use of force policies to either specially define
“riotous” or eliminate the terminology from its policies.
RECOMMENDATION 12
SMPD should amend its policy to provide further guidance regarding
deployment of less lethal munitions, particularly to guard against injuries to
the face and head.
RECOMMENDATION 13
SMPD should conduct regular and ongoing training on use of impact
munitions in crowd situations so that all officers trained in the use of these
munitions are advised of how to most effectively deploy them and have a
clear understanding of Departmental expectations.
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Force Deployment: Individual Questions or Concerns
Several narratives regarding force deployment or the effectiveness of the police
response emerged after May 31, both from the public and internal to the Department.
We address some of them here.
Munitions and Gas in Response to Protest Activity: The Right Tools for
Crowd Control?
In response to the police response to protest activity, nationwide, cities and states have
undertaken a review of how and when to effectively use less lethal munitions and tear
gas against protesters; some have gone as far as to either further limit or prohibit the
deployment of these force options. And at least one federal judge has temporarily
prohibited the use of certain less lethal munitions in the context of First Amendment
activity.
The use of tear gas and pepper spray has proven most effective in barricade situations
where individuals are in closed structures and the insertion of the irritant forces them
outside where they can be apprehended. When tear gas is deployed outdoors,
however, environmental factors such as wind limit its effectiveness and the ability to
control who is impacted. As a result, the intended targets of gas are able to fight
through its effects, while non-aggressive members of the crowd often feel the effects of
the spray as it travels downwind. And, as seen in Santa Monica, as the delivery devices
for the chemicals are launched into the crowd, they provide effective and potentially
dangerous projectiles to be hurled back at police, resulting in escalation rather than de-
escalation of the situation.
The less lethal impact munitions (sometimes referred to as “bean bags” and “rubber
bullets”) can be most effective when deployed in encounters with a single individual.
However, in the protest activity context, individuals are often not isolated, their activity is
frequently less definitively assaultive, and there is greater risk that a less lethal round
will either strike the individual in a vital, potentially lethal area or will strike an
unintended target. Moreover, in a protest activity context, officers are more prone to
“improvise” their deployment of less lethal munitions, as in Santa Monica where they
used some munitions as modified “cover fire” to keep individuals away from accessing
the gas projectiles.
While “textbook” deployment of gas and less lethal munitions can be effective
instruments in crowd control, an increasing number of cities have called for the
elimination of or severe restrictions on their use in responding to protests because of
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their unintended consequences. While some jurisdictions have banned their use in the
First Amendment context entirely, others have or intend to require approval for
deployment by the highest levels of the police agency or City leadership.
SMPD, in consultation with its public, should join this discussion and re-evaluate the use
of less lethal tools in protest situations. After listening to and weighing the particular
needs and desires of the Santa Monica community, the Department should revise its
policies to provide additional guidance, including potential restrictions and elimination of
munitions in a First Amendment context. 46
RECOMMENDATION 14
SMPD should engage with its community and City leaders to determine
whether and to what degree gas and other less lethal munitions should be
used in the First Amendment activity context.
RECOMMENDATION 15
After having the above discourse, SMPD should revise its use of force
policy related to deployment of tear gas and less lethal impact munitions in
crowd control situations to specify the circumstances, if any, under which
they may be used.
Dispersal Orders and Force on “Peaceful Crowds”
The most common, and significant, of the criticisms leveled against SMPD (and
numerous agencies around the country) as law enforcement addressed unprecedented
levels of large, ongoing protest activity in late May and early June of 2020 was the
allegation that “SMPD used too much force against peaceful protesters.” At its
core, it reflects the challenges faced by the police in reconciling the imperatives of the
First Amendment with the safety and management challenges posed by unruly – or
violent – behavior amidst the massive crowds.
A precisely tailored response is easier to expect than to effectuate. And it is important
to remember that circumstances in Santa Monica (as in other locations) were quite
variable, adding to the complexity of analysis – and, of course, to the original decision-
46 We have been advised that as a result of community engagement, all less than lethal hard
projective ammunition have been removed from patrol officers and replaced with foam tipped
projectiles. However, the City may want to revisit this issue to see if greater restrictions are in
order.
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making itself. That said, certain fundamentals guide the evaluation of enforcement
activity directed at protest groups. These include the provocation for force, the attempts
to tailor its application, and the extent to which clear, audible, and legally authorized
warnings were given in the context of large-scale dispersals. We cover these topics in
turn.
A dispersal order is an announcement given by law enforcement to two or more people
who are engaged in an unlawful assembly. The intention of a dispersal order is to
inform the crowd that they are engaged in unlawful assembly and to make clear that
they must immediately leave the area or be subject to arrest or force.47
According to modern crowd control best practices, dispersal orders should be loud,
understandable, repeated several times as practicable, and include the following
language:
• Declaration of an unlawful assembly and the location
• Order to leave immediately
• Potential for arrest
• Warning of use of less lethal force that may result in injury
• Route(s) for dispersal
• Length of time to disperse
SMPD’s policy does not expressly include these details, though most are included in the
intent of its provisions. In relevant part, the policy states (see 433.6 UNLAWFUL
ASSEMBLY DISPERSAL ORDERS).
Should the Incident Commander make a determination that public safety is
presently or is about to be jeopardized, he/she or the authorized designee should
attempt to verbally persuade event organizers or participants to disperse of their
own accord. Warnings and advisements may be communicated through
established communications links with leaders and/or participants or to the
group.
When initial attempts at verbal persuasion are unsuccessful, the Incident
Commander or the authorized designee should make a clear standardized
47 Deorle v. Rutherford 272 F.3d 1272, 1284 (9th Cir. 2001).
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announcement to the gathering that the event is an unlawful assembly, and
should order the dispersal of the participants. The announcement should be
communicated by whatever methods are reasonably available to ensure that the
content of the message is clear and that it has been heard by the participants.
The announcement should be amplified, made in different languages as
appropriate, made from multiple locations in the affected area and documented
by audio and video. The announcement should provide information about what
law enforcement actions will take place if illegal behavior continues and should
identify routes for egress. A reasonable time to disperse should be allowed
following a dispersal order.
On May 31, SMPD issued dispersal orders at various points in the afternoon, though
there is no evidence that anyone in command, consistent with the above-quoted policy,
attempted to persuade event organizers to disperse in the moments before these
warnings. The first dispersal order occurred at 3:09 PM at the intersection of Ocean
Avenue and Colorado Boulevard, was repeated at least two times in English and, as
heard on body-worn camera footage, was as follows:
This is a police officer of the City of Santa Monica. This is hereby an
unlawful assembly. In the name of the people of the State of California, I
command all those present at Ocean and Colorado to immediately
disperse. If you do not do so, you will be arrested for under section 409 of
the United States Penal Code, which prohibits remaining at an unlawful
assembly. The following routes are available: south on Ocean Avenue
only.
You have [one] minute to leave the area.
A second version of this dispersal order was issued after 4:00 PM, when the City-wide
curfew went into effect, warning the crowd that SMPD was now enforcing the curfew
and that those who remained were in violation of this curfew order. This was issued
both at the Pier Ramp and at other locations in the City.
Unlike in other jurisdictions that we have reviewed, the dispersal orders on May 31,
which were mostly issued from the SWAT Bearcat loudspeaker, were clear and
repeated. We commend SMPD for using clear language and a sufficiently loud system
to make the announcement.
However, we also noted concerns with the dispersal order as issued.
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First, the directed route of dispersal, southbound on Ocean Avenue, required protesters
to walk toward or into oncoming traffic (northbound traffic on Ocean Avenue was not yet
stopped). Upon hearing this route, several protesters yelled that it was unsafe.
Movement in other directions was prevented by skirmish lines. In some body-worn
camera clips, protesters attempted to leave the area by moving northbound on the
sidewalk at Ocean Avenue and were told by officers that they could not cross the line.
In essence, protesters were seemingly “stuck” between skirmish lines and traffic,
possibly preventing their timely departure from the area. This speaks more to the
confusion and mismanagement of the day than to any intention to place protesters in
harm’s way.
Second, approximately seven minutes after the dispersal order, at 3:16 PM, and in
apparent contravention of the spirit of current Department policy, SMPD officers
deployed less lethal munitions without warning the crowd that any force might be used.
Including a specific warning that less lethal force, such as chemical munitions, may be
used is a best practice in modern crowd control; language such as, “police action could
include the use of force which may result in serious injury” is typically included in
dispersal orders and current SMPD policy indicates that it is important that the dispersal
order “provide information about what law enforcement actions will take place if illegal
behavior continues.”
Third, the announcement warned that those who remained would be subject to arrest.
While typical language in a dispersal order, we noted that SMPD had already discussed
that mass arrest at Ocean Avenue and Colorado Boulevard would not be an option
because they had too few units on the ground to effect arrests.
Finally, the dispersal order itself assumed that the crowd in its entirety was an unlawful
assembly, which we discuss in more detail below.
RECOMMENDATION 16
Training for supervisors on unlawful assembly should emphasize the need
to follow Department policy and reach out to event organizers or
participants with the goal of gaining voluntary dispersal prior to issuing
formal dispersal orders.
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RECOMMENDATION 17
In crafting dispersal orders to instruct crowds about the routes of egress
from a protest, SMPD policy and training should require officers to
consider conditions such as traffic and officer deployment to ensure the
feasibility and safety of any direction provided about dispersal routes.
RECOMMENDATION 18
SMPD policy and training regarding dispersal orders should be revised to
require personnel officers to include express warnings about the potential
use of force should the order be defied.
A “Tiered” Approach?
Another narrative we heard repeatedly from SMPD Command was: “SMPD used a
tiered less lethal approach to disperse protesters on Ocean Avenue and Colorado
Boulevard.” The assertion was that a “tiered” deployment plan at Ocean and Colorado
balanced the need to disperse the crowd with the potentially harmful effects, both
physical and political, of deploying tear gas. They reported that officers escalated from
the least harmful to the more irritating: they first used non-toxic smoke grenades to
“warn” the crowd, followed by tear gas and then impact munitions.
Our review of body-worn camera footage, radio, and officers’ Use of Force Reports,
however, suggests that this was not how deployment initially occurred at Ocean Avenue
and Colorado.
As noted above, in the first deployment of less lethal munitions near the 1500 block of
Ocean Avenue, SWAT officers deployed tear gas canisters immediately followed by use
of targeted impact munitions. They ceased use of chemical munitions only when they
learned that some officers arriving to the scene did not have gas masks.48 Once the
skirmish line moved further south and all officers had appropriate gear, the officers
48 Our understanding from involved supervisors is that this deployment occurred under hectic
conditions, with the SWAT commander’s sense of urgency pushing up against insistence from
within the Operation Center that announcements be made and other protocols followed prior to
authorization. The tense, uncertain communications that preceded the deployment were
symptomatic of both the extreme circumstances and the Department’s precarious command
structure. Fortunately, the dictates of the Operation Center prevailed in this situation and
dispersal announcements were made.
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again deployed various chemical and impact munitions at aggressive individuals in the
crowd.
It was not until 4:20 PM, when SMPD announced curfew enforcement, that SWAT
employed the tiered approach later described by command staff: first a flashbang,
followed by non-toxic smoke and then, only after many had left the area, targeted
chemical and impact munitions.
One of the attributes of the “tiered” approach is that it reinforces the intent to forcefully
disperse in a manner that provides additional warning and opportunity to leave prior to
introducing the more intrusive effects of noxious chemical munitions. This technique
counters one of the legitimate criticisms of tear gas in a crowd control context: namely,
that it indiscriminately ends up impacting individuals who are not only peaceful but also
genuinely unaware of their own status as “fair targets.”
Given the symbolic and actual implications of tear gas in a protest context, and to the
degree that it continues to be authorized in a First Amendment framework, it is
particularly important for agencies to initiate such deployments in as measured a
manner as possible. The “tiered” approach certainly relates to that goal. Accordingly,
the Department’s desire to highlight its use of the technique in defense of its actions is
understandable, and justified by the circumstances of the later deployment. But the
initial use of gas – for the first time in recent memory for crowd control purposes – was
apparently less orderly, and merits attention in terms of “lessons learned” and future
adjustments.49
RECOMMENDATION 19
SMPD should continue to impress upon its supervisors the need to follow
all dispersal order protocols before any introduction of less lethal
munitions.
The Question of Unlawful Assembly
The distinction between a “lawful” and “unlawful” protest has been the subject of
discussions nationwide. In California, it is unlawful for persons to assemble for the
49 We have been told that heightened planning continues on an ongoing basis as the
Department remains aware of current events with the potential to trigger responsive unrest.
Part of this is the designation of one high-level member of the agency to be the necessary
“pass-through” for any authorization of chemical munitions for crowd control – a strategy that will
focus the decision-making and help ensure that all appropriate steps are taken.
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purpose of disturbing the public and then fail to leave after being ordered to do so by the
police. The acts of the crowd must be either violent or tending to incite others to
violence. Simply assembling, without any violence or intent to commit violent acts, is
protected speech. We acknowledge that the diversity of behaviors and intentions within
large crowds can make it difficult to distinguish between lawful, protected speech, and
an unlawful assembly and create a challenging environment for law enforcement.
On May 31, many in the crowd at the time of the dispersal order were reportedly
peacefully demonstrating, chanting and/or holding signs in protest of police or support of
the Black Lives Matter movement. These individuals were not engaged in overt acts of
violence and reported in interviews that they were surprised and upset that their First
Amendment right to protest was, in their experience, prevented.
Conversely, at least some members of the Ocean Avenue and Colorado Boulevard
crowd, especially those closer to the Pier Ramp, were reportedly engaged in violent
acts such as throwing rocks and bottles at officers staged on the Pier Ramp, starting as
early as 2:14 PM. And SWAT units on the ground reported to Incident Command that
the crowd was growing in size and intensity as time went on. Personnel staged at the
Pier Ramp expressed concern that the crowd would “overtake” the Pier, along with the
officers and police vehicles parked at the location.50
And when officers deployed the first rounds of tear gas, some in the crowd immediately
responded by throwing glass, rocks, and other items at the skirmish line.
In our evaluation, what differentiated this scenario from others nationwide is that the
crowd, whether individually engaged in peaceful or violent action, was arguably “on
notice” that remaining at the location after 3:09 PM made them part of an unlawful
assembly regardless of their individual behavior or intentions. As we noted, the
dispersal orders were clear and loud and offered opportunity to leave the area before
enforcement action was taken (though we also note that the route of egress was not
ideal and there was no express warning that chemical munitions would be deployed).
Later that afternoon on Ocean Avenue and Colorado Boulevard, and in other areas of
the City, those assembled were, for the most part, engaged in aggressive or assaultive
behavior that warranted the declaration of an unlawful assembly. If some individuals in
50 Another concern for command staff was the reported possibility of opportunistic terrorism at
the Pier; in interviews after May 31, various personnel reported that there was a fear that the
Pier itself was a possible “hard target” that had to be protected. We were not provided nor did
we find hard evidence of this threat.
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the crowd were engaged in peaceful protest, they were doing so alongside aggressive
rioters.
Going forward, especially in the face of possible unrest in the coming months, SMPD
and the City should consider what set of circumstances should be required in a public
protest setting prior to the declaration of an unlawful assembly. Ideally, the Department
should engage with the community as it develops these guidelines, through direct
outreach to residents, business owners, and groups most impacted by the events of
May 31. The resulting policies and guiding principles should be publicly announced so
that City residents and stakeholders understand the “ground rules” in advance of the
next protest.
RECOMMENDATION 20
SMPD and the City should engage with the community as it considers the
circumstances required for a public protest to be declared an unlawful
assembly. The resulting guidelines should be publicized in a way that
provides City residents and stakeholders a clear understanding of under
what circumstances the SMPD will declare an unlawful assembly.
The Question of Force Against Looting
While some complained about SMPD using too much force, others promoted a narrative
with criticism from the opposite direction: “SMPD stood by and took no action while
looters ransacked downtown Santa Monica.” This concern is not that the
Department was problematically heavy-handed but that it lacked the requisite
assertiveness – including in the force arena – with regard to troubling lawlessness in
parts of the City.
While the force count was much higher on Ocean and Colorado, SMPD did report many
uses of force throughout the Downtown Santa Monica Business District to combat
looting. Officers engaged in force with looting suspects on several occasions, from
baton strikes and takedowns to one use of the Taser. As we discuss in the Arrest
section of this Report, many of these uses of force did not, surprisingly, result in arrests,
as suspects fled from officers who were appropriately hesitant to leave their assigned
positions to engage in foot pursuits. In their Use of Force Reports, several officers
describe their struggle between the instinct to “give chase” to catch suspects and the
need to protect their assigned area. Many commented that, because there was no
organized system to arrest and book suspects, they opted to remain at their post, even
after using force on looting suspects. Some commented that the use of force alone may
have deterred the looters from more criminal activity.
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Issues of “Command and Control”
As noted, while SMPD continued to experience civil unrest from June 1 to 6, the City
never reached the level of disorder experienced on May 31. On June 1 and beyond,
with clearly defined daily operations plans in place, the Department accomplished
everything that had glaringly been missing on Sunday. While other factors certainly
contributed to the relatively “managed” conditions on the ensuing days (including the
continued presence of the National Guard and the fact that organized looters had
largely moved on), SMPD deserves credit for its own role in leading an effective
response.
This is commendable, even as it magnifies one of the fundamental questions about May
31: Given the capabilities that it later showed, why did SMPD fall so short on Sunday?
The answer, as established at length above, has numerous component parts. The size
and fervor of the crowds, as well as the multi-faceted enforcement challenges they
ultimately presented, would have overmatched even a better-prepared version of the
Department, and the glitches and competing demands that undermined mutual aid were
less prevalent after May 31. But some of the deficiencies were produced internally – a
consequence of the aforementioned “disconnects” at the executive level and the
absence of a clear, unified approach to sorting through available information and taking
decisive, comprehensive action. Instead came limited leadership and frustrations,
mostly from individuals who did sense the need for greater preparation but went
unheard or felt unsure how best to proceed.
The implications for this lack of preparedness were both internal and external. The
basic pieces of effective internal command and control – clear objectives, strategic
resource deployment, and a unified command structure – were missing.
But similarly problematic was the lack of an effective external plan that centered public
safety priorities while benefitting from the assistance of outside entities – be they other
law enforcement partners or fellow City departments – that would have offered help with
some of the day’s many infrastructural demands.51
51 We mention many of these in the Intra-Agency Cooperation section later in this Report
including, for example, the use of Public Works to help arrange for suitable resources at the
Airport for accommodating mass arrests or help harden soft looting targets by positioning of City
vehicles.
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This Report’s evaluation of the SMPD approach on May 31 reinforces a fundamental
concept that public safety agencies – including the Department itself 52 – understand
well: the value of the Incident Command System (ICS) as a platform for organizing a
large-scale response.
The Incident Command System
Established in the 1970s, and strongly embraced by the former SMPD Chief, the ICS is
a commonly used management response system that allows for multiple agencies to
collaborate in emergency situations by establishing a unified command, maintaining
clear mission objectives, and sharing logistics and resources. The May 31 early
morning email by an SMPD lieutenant reflected those concepts quite well, if in
abbreviated fashion, and highlighted the key goals of a potential incident command for
the day:
• Protect persons, regardless of their participation in the disturbance;
• Disperse disorderly or threatening crowds in order to eliminate the immediate
risks of continued escalation and further violence; and
• Arrest law violators, including those responsible for property damage, and
remove or isolate persons inciting violent behavior.
The response is defined by incident using an Incident Action Plan. Creating a
comprehensive Incident Action Plan can be challenging, in the face of spontaneous
events such as May 31. In recognition of this reality, some experts recommend that
agencies may wish to establish various crowd management plan templates in advance
of protest activity. These generic plans can cover various types and sizes of protests to
provide general strategy and working tactics. These plans can then be quickly tailored
and adjusted when Incident Commanders are responding to a spontaneous event.53
An Incident Action Plan, even one that is generic, provides guidelines regarding incident
objectives and response strategies by stage or period, and formally documents
procedures and logistics. The plan also serves to identify the command post, a field
52 Interestingly, the former Chief was herself someone who had devoted considerable study and
professional emphasis to ICS principles. It makes their absence on May 31 all the more
striking.
53 It is our understanding that SMPD has embraced these concepts – both internally and in
dealings with other City departments – in the months following May 31’s assorted deficiencies.
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staging area, the command structure, roles and responsibilities, and logistical needs,
such as providing food and water to officers, all aspects that were missing in SMPD’s
overall response to May 31.54
RECOMMENDATION 21
SMPD should continue to provide command level staff with updated
training on the ICS so that command staff is knowledgeable about its use
and benefits.
RECOMMENDATION 22
SMPD should ensure that all command staff personnel are well versed in
contemporary crowd control responses, particularly in the First
Amendment context.
54 In reviewing body-camera recordings, we noted one instance in which officers were reduced
to sharing the only water bottle available at their location. We also heard that mutual aid
officers, some of who traveled great distances were dismayed that they had to figure out how to
obtain food and water during their deployment. This was a disservice to SMPD and assisting
officers under any circumstances, but the ongoing pandemic magnified the unacceptability.
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Deployment & Training Issues
Lapse in Mobile Field Force Training
Department-provided records showed that SMPD had not held Department-wide
training on crowd management strategies, also known as “Mobile Field Force training”55
since 2015, a significant lapse in officers’ skills and tactics when they faced the
challenging circumstances of May 31.56 And, SMPD reported that, while at least some
officers received Advanced Officer Training on Mobile Field Force tactics, this
Department-specific training was also held several years ago.
Command reported that, at some point on May 30, and realizing the long lapse in
relevant training, an on-duty watch commander provided a Mobile Field Force training
PowerPoint presentation to all on-duty sergeants so that could provide refresher training
to their officers prior to deploying to Beverly Hills in response to mutual aid requests.
This was a conscientious gesture in a “last minute” timeframe. But a refresher
PowerPoint is, of course, no substitution for a properly focused, thorough, and live-
action training curriculum.
Further, crowd control tactics, like all policing, are ever-developing; the long lapse in
training meant that SMPD officers and command were not taught the newest crowd
control techniques, such as an increased focus on negotiation, communication, and de-
escalation, that may have resulted in more effective enforcement on May 31.
55 “Mobile Field Force” refers to a set of policing tactics designed to provide rapid and organized
response to manage crowds. A Mobile Field Force is typically made up of officers structured
“platoons,” or teams, each under the command of one team leader, who are collectively under
the command of a Field Incident Commander.
56 SMPD Command reported that, per the California Peace Officer Standards and Training
(POST) guidelines, all sworn officers should have received periodic crowd control management,
specifically, Mobile Field Force training, as part of their regular Department training. This
training teaches tactics for crowd management, both on the supervisorial level (for example,
creating an action plan and unified chain of command) and line-officer level (for example, mobile
tactical formations like skirmish lines and traffic management).
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Skirmish Lines versus Strike Teams: Deployment Strategies
As we previously described, SMPD officers, including SWAT teams, were first deployed
in traditional Mobile Field Force tactical formations, also known as skirmish lines, to hold
intersections and protect assets, like the Pier Ramp. This initial deployment strategy
had several ineffective outcomes on May 31.
First, SMPD did not initially have sufficient resources to effectively deploy in traditional
skirmish line formations. Skirmish lines are traditionally resource-intensive and require
a significant number of officers to effectively execute in large geographical areas (like
the entire length of Ocean Avenue with its various alleyways and intersections). In
listening to radio from May 31, we heard many instances when team leaders repeatedly
requested more resources to effectively span the length of an intersection and, because
resources were limited, formation of the skirmish lines was delayed or did not occur at
all. For example, early in the afternoon, the Incident Commander called for a skirmish
line to form at Lincoln Boulevard and Montana to prevent protesters from looping back
into downtown Santa Monica, but resources were not available for this request and the
line never materialized.
Second, the Mobile Field Force approach tied up already-limited resources for hours.
We noted that at least some of the officers deployed to Ocean and Colorado spent
nearly four hours “holding the line” at this location when, perhaps, they could have been
used elsewhere in the City to respond to other incidents.
Third, this deployment strategy was not agile. Once stationed at a location, officers
were seemingly unable to quickly transition to respond to the ever-changing situation.
As we detailed above, the Incident Command asked officers to “corral and arrest”
people on at least two occasions, once on Ocean and Colorado when the protest was
first reported to become unruly, and second at 11th and Broadway, where individuals
were assaulting Fire Department personnel. In both instances, the team leaders on the
ground reported that they did not have sufficient resources to both effectively maintain
the skirmish lines and effect arrests, and the arrest plans were abandoned. This had
larger implications for the day, as individuals intent on causing chaos moved through
the City instead of being detained.
To their credit, around 6:00 PM, SMPD realized that the traditional Mobile Field Force
tactics they were using were not effective. With the support of mutual aid resources
now in place, SMPD transitioned from those traditional tactics to small, two to six officer
“Strike Teams.” These teams were highly responsive to changing circumstances and
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able to quickly move from one location to another. They deterred looting while also
pushing individuals to a centralized location, where other teams were waiting to arrest
those who refused to leave or were engaged in unlawful actions.
We discuss this deployment strategy, SMPD’s new training, and recent updated in
Mobile Field Force training, later in this Report.
RECOMMENDATION 23
SMPD should continue to regularly train all officers in Mobile Field Force
tactics, to include the newest techniques with live, hand-on scenario
training and new laws related to First Amendment Assemblies and civil
unrest.
RECOMMENDATION 24
SMPD should consider additional Department-wide trainings on topics
such as use of de-escalation techniques and other tactics to reduce
tension in civil unrest or other similar scenarios.
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Intra-Agency Cooperation: Other City Stakeholders
Santa Monica is no stranger to large-scale events, like the Twilight on the Pier summer
concerts or the Los Angeles Marathon, which for many years has finished in the City
and annually attracted thousands of runners and their supporters. In our interviews with
City officials and SMPD personnel alike, the Marathon was cited repeatedly as an
example of Santa Monica’s ability to successfully handle a major logistical challenge.
One aspect of that event that is especially noteworthy is the relatively seamless
cooperation that it apparently engendered among different City departments. Fire and
Police obviously had significant responsibility – and authority – with regard to medical
responsiveness and security. But they were not alone. The road closures, temporary
signs, transportation demands, parking, and other logistics required – and received
contributions from – Public Works, the Office of Emergency Management, and other
stakeholders.
However, and significantly, the pre-planned nature of the Marathon and the obviously
widespread nature of its infrastructure requirements created a paradigm that was, in
some ways, the exception rather than the rule. In talking with us, any of these non-
SMPD partners respectfully expressed a common frustration regarding SMPD: namely,
that the agency’s “default” setting inclined much more toward independence and
autonomy than a prioritization of inter-department communication and teamwork.
Longtime observers of the dynamic described it as a reality of police culture that is far
from unique to Santa Monica. The very nature of their usual work supposedly promotes
this: Police are used to responding spontaneously to unpredictable circumstances.
Flexibility and adaptability are valued, and, accordingly, reliance on other City partners
can be relatively limited.57
But there are shortcomings to this approach. One is that the other departments would
actually like to benefit from consistent coordination with SMPD for accomplishing their
respective goals.58 The other was exposed to an unfortunate extent on May 31: By not
57 This same dynamic has implications for the “Incident Command Structure” that is second
nature to the Fire Department but that is used in more tailored ways by SMPD (and many other
law enforcement agencies). We talk about ICS above, and how deviation from its basic
principles was costly on May 31. Some of these repercussions were internal to SMPD, but they
also affected the overall outcome on May 31.
58 An official familiar with Public Works offered the example of its landscape and maintenance
crews regularly clashing with homeless individuals as they sought to perform City services and
finding SMPD to be a reluctant or elusive partner in assisting with security needs.
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incorporating entities like Public Works and OEM into their planning, or taking
advantage of suggestions and offers that different City partners made prior to May 31
with an eye toward possible unrest, SMPD lost valuable ground in scrambling for
resources and assistance of various kinds that could have mitigated some of the
vulnerabilities the City experienced.
This is not to say that no effective collaboration occurred. On the contrary, there were
instances that showed the positive promise of these interactions:
• Public Works, in collaboration with a resident, quickly cleaned up anti-police graffiti
from City buildings, possibly diffusing tension.
• Public Works erected fencing in Palisades Park, which one SMPD officer reported
greatly assisted with enforcement efforts, sometime between May 28 and 30.
• Agencies worked together to establish a State of Emergency on the afternoon of
May 30, which allowed for activation of the EOC and made other emergency
resources available to Santa Monica.59
• On May 31, traffic enforcement officers set up Jersey barriers at the intersection of
Olympic and Ocean Avenue, which may have deterred protesters from marching to
the Pier.60
• SMPD personnel responded quickly to protect Fire Department personnel who were
sent to various fire calls; SMPD sent a Motor Squad to escort SMFD to a business
fire call in the business district and a SWAT unit to assist when SMFD personnel
faced assaults on 11th and Broadway.
But we also noted instances where gaps in intra-agency coordination resulted in
troublesome outcomes, both leading up to and on May 31:
59 Interestingly, team members within the Office of Emergency Management also noted that
communication with the Department had improved considerably when the Assistant Chief was
re-assigned to the version of the EOC that had been operating since March to respond to the
pandemic. This suggests that the prior shortcomings in the collaboration arena were more a
matter of prioritization than inevitability.
60 We also noted that the Pier Ramp itself was blocked by several rows of bicycle racks and
other barriers. These were in place due to COVID restrictions, which required that the Pier be
closed to the public.
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• We noted one anecdote in which SMPD SWAT personnel were sent to “secure” the
3rd Street Promenade on the morning of May 31 without the assistance of Public
Works; they used “orange cones and yellow tape” to “secure” the Promenade
entrances. Not only was this effort seemingly useless – yellow tape was hardly a
deterrent to determined looters – but it was also an ineffective use of the highly-
skilled SWAT team that could have been used for other, more tactical, operations.
• We heard different explanations for the non-deployment of heavy equipment (such
as trash trucks) to serve as a means of blocking street or alley access. On the one
side was the asserted lack of timely requests, while on the other was an alleged
reluctance to use the trucks out of concern for damage and insurance
consequences. Even without attempting to discern the exact reason, we recognize
that the lack of a definitive protocol was itself indicia of a deficiency.61
• As detailed in the Mass Arrest section of this Report, transportation of arrestees was
significantly impacted by the Big Blue Bus agency’s initial unwillingness to provide
both buses and drivers for that purpose, stating that it was not the risk or image that
they wanted.
• The woefully inadequate conditions at the airport (also discussed in Mass Arrest)
could almost certainly have been alleviated by enlisting the aid of Public Works.
This reality compounded the frustration that many “insiders” felt about the City’s
performance on May 31.
To its credit, this is one area that the City quickly worked to remedy in a variety of ways
in the aftermath of May 31. These ranged from simple enhancements in the quality of
communication between departments to more formalized, elaborate revisions of past
protocols. One of the more significant gestures in this latter regard was the
development of a comprehensive City-wide emergency operations plan.
Under the direction of the Office of Emergency Management, the City created a special
Emergency Operations Plan called “Civil Unrest Annex.” This comprehensive
document details the coordinated response of City agencies during spontaneous civil
unrest specifically, most importantly by providing specific guidelines for Incident
61 We are aware of other jurisdictions in Southern California where the deployment of equipment
in this fashion “saved” stores from significant damage from looting.
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Command that include leaders from various City agencies. One key goal is to “maintain
interoperability and coordination between all departments and divisions within the City.”
Most notably, the plan sets a clear chain of command for operations and
communication, placing SMPD at the head of Overall Field Incident Command. In this
capacity, SMPD “shall oversee all tactical and operational aspects of the field response.
The designated Incident Commander shall oversee and serve as the ultimate authority
for field responders, safety of all field locations within their command, and
communications with the EOC and Policy Group” and “Enter a Unified Command
Structure with the Fire Chief (or their designee) as appropriate.” We note that this high
level of responsibility requires that SMPD have, at all times, a sufficiently skilled and
high-ranking officer available in the EOC to execute this role.
RECOMMENDATION 25
City leadership (specifically, the Office of Emergency Management)
should hold a City-wide training event with all relevant City agencies to
review the Civil Unrest Annex so that all agencies are aware of their role
and expectations during times of spontaneous civil unrest.
RECOMMENDATION 26
SMPD should consider who from command-level staff will take on the role
of Overall Field Incident Command if the Civil Unrest Annex is activated
and train this/these personnel on the requirements and expectations of the
plan.
RECOMMENDATION 27
City leadership, in collaboration with Public Works, should consider
determining guidelines for use of barriers in advance of civil unrest, both
protective fencing on public and private property and for traffic control, that
are practicable and effective.
RECOMMENDATION 28
City leadership, in collaboration with Public Works, should consider
establishing guidelines for use of heavy equipment to support defensive
enforcement action.
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Mutual Aid: Communication and Command Challenges
Regional Partners
A Mutual Aid system is used to facilitate assistance to jurisdictions when its own
resources are exhausted or inadequate. Santa Monica is part of the “Area A Mutual Aid
System,” which includes larger agencies such as the Los Angeles Police Department
and Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department as well as smaller jurisdictions such as the
Torrance, Hawthorne, Culver City, and Beverly Hills Police Departments.62
SMPD formally activated Area A mutual aid shortly after 1:00 PM, a sign that, even in
this “early” point in the day, command had realized that the scope and scale of unrest in
the City was well beyond their enforcement capacity. In theory, when Area A Mutual
Aid is activated, other local agencies send resources to assist when one of their Area A
partners is overwhelmed, but, on May 31, nearly all Area A partners were experiencing,
faced the threat of, or had just responded to their own civil unrest; some local partners
sent the limited support that they could spare.63
Aside from limited resources, a factor outside of SMPD’s control, however, our review
identified two issues that may have impacted the effectiveness of mutual aid overall:
• SMPD’s own command and control struggles compounded the limitations of mutual
aid; when they did arrive to Santa Monica, some partner agencies reported that they
did not know where to go, what routes to take to deploy effectively, or what actions
were required of their teams. A couple of factors cited elsewhere in this Report
contributed to this phenomenon. One was the overall inadequacy of the command
structure, from the deficient pre-planning to the absence of a defined incident
commander and a unified “real time” vision for adapting to unfolding conditions.
62 As previously detailed in this Report, on May 30, Santa Monica sent teams to support
neighboring Beverly Hills when civil unrest overwhelmed the Beverly Hills Police Department’s
capacity. Other SMPD personnel assisted that day and night in Culver City. The officers who
responded to other local jurisdictions expressed that these deployments, to areas that rarely, if
ever, experienced civil unrest of that magnitude, were concerning to them. These events, they
reported, confirmed for them that civil unrest was happening at an unprecedented rate and
scale, and that it was possible that Santa Monica might see this level of civil unrest.
63 As previously noted, for example, SMPD requested Air Support from neighboring Hawthorne
Police Department, but the Department was not able to send their police helicopter. Manhattan
Beach and Torrance Police Departments also were unable to fulfill requests for mutual aid.
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Another – and certainly related – factor was the unannounced shift in staging areas
(also alternatively described as the “rally point” or the in-field command post – from
the Civic Center parking lot to the Big Blue Bus depot at approximately 1:00 PM. In
radio transmissions, various partner agencies are heard asking “where do you need
us” or “what is the best route,” and not receiving any decisive responses from SMPD
command.
• According to SMPD personnel, some partner agencies wanted to follow their own
internal command, were not properly equipped, and did not collaborate in the most
effective manner. For example, SMPD reported that, when asked to deploy in small
Strike Teams to looting calls, responding LAPD teams did not want to separate their
personnel; their insistence on remaining in large groups limited their utility and
effectiveness, especially as myriad and smaller-scale “hot spots” developed
throughout the City. When responding to Ocean Avenue and Colorado Boulevard to
assist with dispersing the crowd, LAPD personnel was not equipped with gas masks,
limiting the force options available for crowd dispersal. SMPD Command also
reported that responding LASD teams were rotated out throughout the day, making it
difficult to track where or how many LASD resources were available and deployed.
SMPD Command also called for support from partners outside of Area A; namely,
resources from Area 1A, including the Santa Barbara Sheriff’s Office and the Santa
Maria, Lompoc, and Santa Barbara Police Departments. Personnel from these
agencies reported that deployment in Santa Monica was particularly difficult as they
were not familiar with the area and did not have adequate support or direction from
SMPD Command.
National Guard
Many of the people with we spoke, both within and outside of SMPD, expressed
concern and confusion about the National Guard64 response. Specifically, they
wondered why Guard troops were not used more effectively to support SMPD and
control the chaos. The narrative we most often heard was that SMPD leadership did
not request that National Guard early enough to successfully control the City on May 31.
But the circumstances surrounding National Guard activation and deployment turned
out to be more complex than initially understood.
64 The California National Guard is a military reserve force under the control of the Governor of
California that can be activated when the State declares a state of emergency.
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First, some questioned why the National Guard had not been called into Santa Monica
in advance of civil unrest, given the nature of violence elsewhere in the region (e.g., in
Beverly Hills on May 30). But National Guard resources cannot be deployed in advance
of, or to prepare for, potential activity. National Guard resource deployment is
determined by California’s Law Enforcement Mutual Aid Plan, which states that
“[California] does not deploy the National Guard in support of law enforcement agencies
until local law enforcement capabilities have generally been exhausted, more resource
are needed, and the emergency develops in a manner that cannot be resolved by a law
enforcement agency.” In a letter from the California Military Department to Santa
Monica City Council, the Adjutant General wrote that, under the Mutual Aid Plan, it
would not have been appropriate for the National Guard to have “prepositioned” forces
in Santa Monica on May 30 or even the morning of May 31.
Second, there was confusion about the seemingly long length of time between SMPD’s
request for Guard troops and their arrival, with many suggesting that the Chief called
the Guard “too late” to be effective.
The Chief repeatedly stated, to us and in various public forums, that she called for the
National Guard at approximately 2:30 PM on May 31. The National Guard and radio
transmissions confirm this timing. At that time, approximately 100 National Guard
personnel were assigned to Santa Monica. But the Guard did not arrive in Santa
Monica until 8:15 PM, and then took nearly 45 minutes to deploy from the Command
Post to various locations throughout the City.65
SMPD and City leadership were persistent in their repeated requests for National Guard
deployment. From 2:30 to 8:00 PM, various SMPD command personnel requested
National Guard assistance over the radio, but the de facto Incident Command continued
to broadcast that their “estimated time of arrival” was unknown. We were advised that
the Chief continually made calls to both the California Office of Emergency Services
(eight calls) and the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department (three calls) to ask about
National Guard deployment and make the case for emergency need in Santa Monica.
City leadership, including the EOC Director and Interim City Manager, also made calls
to the LASD and the Office of the Governor to determine the status and request
deployment of the National Guard.
65 Approximately 140 National Guard personnel deployed to Santa Monica on May 31.
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So why, despite these pleas, did it take nearly seven hours to receive National Guard
personnel? It was, seemingly, a bureaucratic issue tied to resources and competing
priorities.66
The National Guard is divided into “Operational Areas,” which share available Guard
resources in times of high demand. The period from late May to early June was one of
extremely high demand, with many local jurisdictions throughout this region requesting
National Guard activation to assist in controlling civil unrest.
The Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department manages local National Guard
deployment in the Operational Area. It is our understanding from Department records
that on May 31, LASD determined that the 100 personnel initially assigned to Santa
Monica at 2:30 PM were actually needed in other areas, particularly Long Beach and
the Hall of Justice in downtown Los Angeles. When National Guard resources were
finally available, they required an LASD “escort” to travel to Santa Monica; it took
additional time to find and deploy this escort given LASD’s asserted limited capacity.
The National Guard stated that they responded to Santa Monica “as soon as resources
were available.”
When they did arrive and deploy, National Guard personnel were used mostly as “fixed
security posts,” to protect essential facilities, such as City Hall and the Public Safety
Facility, and staged at otherwise unprotected businesses throughout the downtown
area.
The frustration over the National Guard’s late arrival to Santa Monica is understandable
– SMPD and other mutual aid resources were overwhelmed long before Guard troops
reached the City. The level of region-wide unrest was simply unprecedented, taxing
and challenging communications systems and deployment strategies in ways that the
area’s law enforcement agencies and partners were not entirely prepared to handle.
SMPD has developed an internal plan that could serve as a temporary fix to address the
bureaucratic confusion that impacted the Guard’s timing on May 31, but should work
with its partners to develop formalized solutions.
66 In not particularly insightful email correspondence between SMPD Command and the EOC
after May 31, the EOC cited that the National Guard was not timely deployed “due to
bureaucracy with [California Office of Emergency Services] and paperwork.”
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RECOMMENDATION 29
SMPD leadership should work with Area A partners to develop solutions to
address the bureaucratic challenges exposed on May 31 and ensure an
equitable distribution of National Guard assets in future situations
involving civil unrest.
Response to Protest Activity: Learning from Others
A number of other cities in Southern California experienced levels of violence and
looting similar to that in Santa Monica in late May and early June 2020, particularly Los
Angeles, Beverly Hills, and Long Beach. Other cities, however, were able to forestall
looting and other violence. Whether these outcomes were the result of good fortune or
superior planning is largely case specific, but SMPD should study these different
outcomes to identify strategies employed by other law enforcement agencies and
consider their potential future application in Santa Monica.
Moreover, Santa Monica should also review after action reports from other cities
(such as Los Angeles, La Mesa, Iowa City, New York, and Denver) to evaluate the
issues confronted by their law enforcement agencies so that it can learn from
recommendations coming out of those reviews. The newly minted Intelligence Unit
seems a good fit for identifying best practices identified elsewhere and importing them
to the City.
RECOMMENDATION 30
SMPD should reach out to other law enforcement agencies who
confronted violence and looting in the summer of 2020 and review after
action reports from other jurisdictions to identify best practices that could
be imported to Santa Monica in responses to future protest activity.
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Dispatch Issues
One of the issues that generated a measure of public interest in the aftermath of May 31
was the performance of the city’s “Public Safety Communications” center – the
dispatchers who handle calls in Santa Monica on behalf of both the Police and Fire
Departments. This unit’s performance attracted attention in a couple of ways. The first
was because the deluge of calls from concerned residents (as well as other individuals
monitoring events on television) was one metric for the scope of the unrest, particularly
in the chaotic hours of the late afternoon. The other was the experience that numerous
individuals had of being more disconcerted about the situation as a result of how their
outreach was handled.
The Public Safety Communications (“PSC”) team is part of the Office of Emergency
Management for the City – and a separate entity from either Police or Fire. This has
created issues in the past, insofar as PSC supervision believed that more regular
communication and notification from SMPD would assist them in being more aware of
major issues and thereby serve the Department better. We were advised that, while the
PSC did have a designated SMPD liaison for planning purposes and logistical
questions, advance contacts were not commonplace. And, indeed, PSC attempts at
outreach with the designated SMPD liaison in the early hours of Sunday morning were
not successful; he indicated he was preoccupied with other duties and did not suggest a
designee.
Our understanding is that the dynamic has improved noticeably in recent months,
consistent with overall reports that SMPD has made a conscious effort to engage more
pro-actively with a range of City partners. We were advised that SMPD is viewed as
“much more inclusive now,” a positive development that should work to the advantage
of all parties.
As for the performance of the dispatch team on May 31, the managers we spoke with
professed to be extremely proud of their overall effectiveness on a uniquely difficult day.
As the hours progressed, it became clear to supervisors that the normal protocols were
no longer feasible, as a team of six call-takers attempted to work through the massive
number of incoming communications. The dispatchers were given direction to prioritize
medical or safety concerns, while reports of damage to property were to be dealt with
very quickly, which meant calls were often dismissed brusquely. Calls about the same
situation were ended with a brisk, “We’re aware,” and some individuals were told to “call
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back tomorrow” to report a non-dynamic concern, given that police resources were
unlikely to be available for hours.
From the perspective of residents who were understandably rattled, and who had
perhaps called 911 rarely if ever in their lives, the experience of being hurried along and
swiftly dismissed was disorienting – or worse.67 We are sympathetic to the impact of
this experience. At the same time, having listened to a large and randomly selected
sampling of the calls in conjunction with a PSC supervisor, we found much to admire in
the professionalism and steadiness of the call-takers as they operated under significant
pressure.
It helps, of course, to understand the broader context and the legitimate rationale for the
direction given to the dispatchers to expedite their interactions. This backdrop was
obviously not known to the hundreds of people who reached out for different reasons.
And, to be sure, we also heard individual instances of impatience and obvious
frustration that took away from the positive overall impression that we had.68 But those
were significantly outnumbered by calls that were handled professionally, efficiently, and
with composure. We heard a small number of actual medical emergency calls that were
unrelated to the unrest, and in each instance the dispatcher slowed things down,
worked well with the caller, and addressed the situation appropriately.
With all that said, we were interested to learn that the PSC had not yet engaged in any
type of formal internal “debrief.” The day was an extraordinary one, and some sort of
training or reinforcement that was built around actual calls and their processing would
likely be beneficial. We proposed the idea to supervision at the center and appreciate
their receptivity and their informative visits with us.
RECOMMENDATION 31
The Public Safety Communications Center should review a sampling of
calls (of varying degrees of effectiveness) as a platform for the staff-wide
reinforcing of strengths and offering of constructive alternatives as
warranted.
67 One individual whose calls had been terminated before he was satisfied called back
repeatedly, and with increased anger on each occasion.
68 To be clear, none of these instances was egregious, or corroborated the rumored extremes
that were brought to our attention during this project. It should also be noted that the PSC did
not receive any formal complaints in connection with the May 31 response.
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Curfews: Restoring Order and Sparking Controversy
On Saturday, May 30, the interim City Manager, acting as Director of Emergency
Services, issued a Proclamation of Existence of a Local Emergency that provided the
legal basis for the City to impose a curfew for that night beginning at 8:00 PM. No
protest activity had as of then begun in Santa Monica, but violence associated with
demonstrations in Los Angeles, Beverly Hills, Culver City, and West Hollywood had
prompted those cities to institute curfews, and City leaders wanted to be prepared in a
similar way.69 Saturday night’s curfew lasted until 5:30 AM on Sunday.
The initial decision to institute a curfew on Saturday came together in the early evening
in response to events in surrounding jurisdictions. A series of email communications
between the interim City Manager, the interim City Attorney, and a senior supervisor in
Santa Monica’s Office of Emergency Management reflect the preparations and
deliberations that went into the decision. Because there is formal regional cooperation
between individual cities, the curfews that had been declared earlier in neighboring
jurisdictions were clearly an influence. Even so, it was after 7:00 PM that Santa Monica
officials finally decided to move forward.
At 2:09 PM on Sunday, as reports of looting were streaming in from various places, the
City extended the curfew order and declared that a City-wide curfew would go into effect
at 4:00 PM. The curfew was extended on Monday, with restrictions starting at 1:30 PM.
The City issued supplemental curfew orders on Tuesday and Wednesday of that week
(June 2 and 3), with prohibitions on access to public streets and other public places
beginning at 2:00 PM and 6:00 PM, respectively. The curfew orders expired on
Thursday morning at 5:30 AM.
The existence of the curfew order (particularly on May 31) gave the SMPD an effective
tool for clearing the streets by making large-scale mass arrests. As we discuss
elsewhere, it also provided a short-cut for officers to detain and arrest suspected looters
without having to gather and document evidence (though this had significant
implications for accountability and public opinion). Without the curfew as an
enforcement tool, it likely would have taken the SMPD much longer to restore calm to
the City on Sunday night. And the subsequent curfew orders through the first part of
69 It is notable that the City was sufficiently alarmed on Saturday night to impose a curfew order,
yet the SMPD did not begin to seriously prepare for potential violence until Sunday morning.
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week of June 1 receive partial credit for keeping violence and looting from spiraling out
of control as it had on Sunday.
But Santa Monica’s decision to shut down its
streets was not universally applauded. In June
2020, the ACLU filed a lawsuit on behalf of Black
Lives Matter-Los Angeles and four individuals
impacted by the curfews, challenging the
constitutionality of the curfew orders in the City
and County of Los Angeles. Santa Monica and
other municipalities have been named
defendants in a more recent lawsuit brought by
various other individuals. Among other things,
the lawsuits allege the curfew order was used as
a tool to suppress protesters’ criticism of police.
Litigation also will involve allegations related to
the conditions of detention that we discuss in
more detail elsewhere.
Criticism of curfews throughout Southern California and nationwide has included
concerns about selective enforcement in communities of color and the burden they
impose on people who work irregular hours, most often in service industry jobs where
workers are disproportionately people of color. Enforcement of curfews leads to
increased police interactions with individuals and potential confrontations that can be
seen as exacerbating the dynamics that gave rise to the protest movement in the first
place. And while the curfew provides an effective enforcement tool for keeping City
streets clear, it creates the potential for overreach, disparate impact, and largely
unfettered discretion to police on who to arrest and when.
Balancing these concerns with the need to give police tools to prevent looting and
violence is a delicate task, and one that requires trust and confidence in the police to
wield a rather blunt instrument (a curfew order) judiciously. In Santa Monica, curfew
enforcement dropped off through the week, to just five citations issued on Wednesday
into Thursday morning, when the last order expired at 5:30 AM.
RECOMMENDATION 32
The City should engage with its community in developing guidelines on
whether and how curfews should be deployed, particularly when adjacent
to First Amendment protected activity.
TABLE 3: Curfew Citations Issued
Date Number of Citations
May 31 289
June 1 63
June 2 31
June 3 4
June 4 1
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Assessment & Analysis: Post-Protest
Communication with the Public in the Aftermath:
Making a Tenuous Situation Worse
As we have detailed throughout this Report, there were significant issues with SMPD’s
preparation and response to events as they unfolded on May 31, with SMPD personnel
scrambling throughout the day to respond to various outside forces converging on the
City. Shortcomings in planning and deployment prevented SMPD from taking the
initiative; instead it was stuck in a defensive posture, unable to provide adequate
responses on all fronts.
But in the ensuing days, the then-Chief and other City leadership attempted to put a
positive spin on the events rather than candidly acknowledging the significant
shortcomings in SMPD’s response. For example, in one widely-accessed podcast, the
Chief admitted the Department had not performed as well as it could have and owed it
to their community to do better, but the rest of the interview touted the
“accomplishments” of SMPD that day and failed to mention one specific way in which
the Department’s response could have improved.
In the same podcast, the Interim City Manager said that she would give the Police
Department a “strong A” for its performance, acknowledging the challenging tactical
decisions they confronted but touting their techniques and training while also expressing
gratitude for keeping the community safe.70
This podcast is illustrative of the Chief (and City’s) problematic responses in the
immediate aftermath of May 31. Instead of conceding that SMPD was overwhelmed by
the challenges that day and taking some responsibility for the planning and deployment
decisions that made what was going to be a difficult day even worse, the Department
insisted on describing the events in a way that suggested it had actually performed quite
well. That it accomplished this by telling only a part of the story, and in the light most
favorable to SMPD, contributed to the poor impression it made among many interested
70 The Interim City Manager soon recognized that her assessment of the Police response was
premature and ill-advised, though her emphasis on the importance of the community’s physical
safety was sincere.
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community members – as well as a number of individuals within SMPD.71 This
dissonance between the Department’s message and the public’s experience (either in
person or watching on television) caused a serious rift in trust that increased the unease
of many Santa Monicans in relation to what had transpired on May 31.
A particularly troubling assertion repeatedly made by the Chief in the days following
May 31 was that the Department had no prior intelligence that the protest activity had
the potential for violence. As detailed above, SMPD did in fact have information
suggesting it should be prepared for violence in the run up to Sunday afternoon. The
credibility of the Department was further undermined as members of the public
uncovered social media posts that predated the afternoon of May 31 predicting looting
and potential clashes in Santa Monica.
It is crucial that the messaging following an event involving issues of the magnitude
faced by the City of Santa Monica and its Police Department on May 31 be carefully yet
candidly crafted. This is no easy feat; oftentimes law enforcement and city leadership
are still in the throes of figuring out what happened – both what went well and where
performance fell short – while being pushed by impatient demands for information.
There are some overarching principles, however, that must be considered as any city
communicates with its public in the aftermath of an event such as May 31.
First, while the public is entitled to receive preliminary information, there must be a high
degree of confidence in the accuracy of the information to be released. As significantly,
the agency should make it clear that any information released in the immediate
aftermath is preliminary and subject to further confirmation. City and law enforcement
leadership should refrain from responding to questions designed to elicit a simplistic
evaluation of performance of a complicated operation until the facts are fully distilled
and analyzed. If further vetting and analysis needs to be done before leaders have a
good handle on what occurred, they should save any unconfirmed details for another
day, with commitments for subsequent follow up.
Second, any information must strive to provide a fair and balanced account of what
transpired, along with the governmental response. A carefully crafted message in
support of the line officers for their efforts in conjunction with some recognition that
command had let them and the City down in notable ways would have been a fairer
characterization of SMPD performance on May 31 that would have resonated better
71 More than one Department member expressed the view that the subsequent communications
were as damaging to SMPD’s status in the City as were the shortcomings of May 31
themselves.
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with the public. Details of police performance should not be “cherry picked”; rather, a
fair account of a response is needed, with open (albeit uncomfortable)
acknowledgement of the department’s shortcomings.
In this case, police leadership should have recognized the need to support its personnel
while conceding that command staff planning and decision-making was sub-optimal.
We understand that since the event, the City has engaged a Public Information Officer
for SMPD who will be assigned and available during an emergency event to coordinate
with the EOC and to provide continuous information to the community and key
stakeholders. This is a promising indicator of the City’s recognition that communication
to the Santa Monica community is an important element of the police response to
signification events.
RECOMMENDATION 33
The City and SMPD should continue to evaluate and refine the ways it
communicates with the Santa Monica community following any significant
event involving a police response, guided by principles of transparency,
accuracy and objectivity.
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Use of Force Review Process
In law enforcement deployments that are as long, complex, dynamic, and widespread
as the efforts to maintain or restore order in Santa Monica on May 31, a number of
factors can complicate the effective internal review of individual force deployments. The
sheer scope of the demands on the agency – which persisted in this case for many
days – can lessen the emphasis on the kind of initial documentation and accountability
that is normally expected. The chaotic, ongoing nature of the encounters to which
officers reacted meant that force of various kinds proliferated at levels that posed
challenges for tracking. And, unlike the customary circumstance in which force occurs
in an arrest context that facilitates assessment of possible injury and appropriate
investigation, many if not most of the deployments involved individuals who were not
taken into custody, and whose identity is unknown.
While all of these challenges merit consideration and some level of understanding, they
are not a valid justification for dispensing with some form of meaningful assessment at
the individual as well as systemic levels. As opposed to the later comment that was
reportedly made by a supervisor – perhaps in jest – that he thought May 31 was a “free
day” in terms of the usual force documentation protocols, SMPD should be giving
heightened attention to the behavior of its officers on this day.
Public concern over deployment like the tear gas and less lethal rounds that were used
on Ocean Avenue, as well as the learning opportunities afforded by unprecedented
circumstance, should provide impetus for SMPD to carefully consider the role of force in
its responses that day. And regardless of extenuating circumstances, individual
accountability at some level is warranted to ensure that personnel are appropriately
trained or counseled for future action.
Additionally, evaluation of individual uses of force serves to inform larger, Department-
wide changes. For example, if many officers have problematic deployments of
Pepperball during an incident, the Department should consider that training on
Pepperball deployment was ineffective and/or that policy changes are needed at the
organizational level. The inverse is also true: if only one officer’s use of Pepperball was
out of policy while others were appropriate, the Department might consider individual
remedial action rather than a larger scale systematic change.
Indeed, these are all reasons why departments have regular systems of force review,
and SMPD is no exception. In day-to-day policing, SMPD typically employs a robust
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use of force review process in which anything beyond mere handcuffing is reviewed and
documented. While the Department has made initial gestures in applying this standard
to May 31, there is seemingly much more grist for meaningful supervisory attention than
has occurred so far, and we encourage SMPD to prioritize it.
SMPD attempted to review officers’ May 31 uses of force in some systematic way, but
the process that was employed was delayed, limited and, to date at least, insufficient.
The force review that has occurred so far did not result in any detailed report or any
findings that one might expect from an appropriately comprehensive review process.
Instead, the Department’s minimalist effort left space to question both individual officer’s
actions, larger training needs, and necessary organizational changes.
SMPD’s policy on use of force reporting states in relevant part:
Any use of force by a member of this Department shall be documented by the
involved member(s) promptly, completely and accurately in an appropriate
incident/crime report or supplemental incident/crime report, depending on the
nature of the incident.
The policy requirement that the force documentation be “prompt” was apparently not
followed with regard to the deployment on May 31 as it was not until mid- June 2020,
that all officers who used force on May 31 were instructed to submit a use of force
memorandum detailing, to the best of their recollection, the force used, the location and
victim(s), and the circumstances. Thirty-three officers of the nearly 200 deployed on
May 31 submitted memos documenting uses of force that ranged from takedowns and
baton strikes to deployment of chemical and other less lethal munitions. We
acknowledge the officers who submitted a report for their forthrightness. We also
acknowledge that many Departments nation-wide used this directed reporting strategy
in response to their large-scale incidents.
To its credit, the Department recognized this strategy likely resulted in underreporting.
While much of the force used on May 31 met the traditional reportable force criteria,
most was not initially reported and, therefore, not documented. If an officer did not
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submit a use of force memo, SMPD assumed that the officer did not use any force on
May 31.72
Despite this, SMPD represented that they reviewed the reported uses of force using
their established Internal Review Board process. This involves a panel of command
staff, subject matter experts, and peer officers who perform an extensive review of the
force itself and reach a final disposition, or conclusion about whether the force was in
policy. According to command staff, the Internal Review Board for May 31 was a day-
long session on February 3, 2021, consisting of subject matter expert and peer review
of body-worn camera video and other evidence related to each use of force reported by
officers on May 31. Some uses of force, they stated, were even “kicked back” to the
involved officer for more detail. In some cases, an SMPD executive informed us,
officers might have received a “White Card,” or supervisor counseling session, for the
uses of force that were within policy but might have related concerns.
This all seemed reasonable and effective given the totality of the circumstances. Few
Departments nationwide had systems in place to evaluate force on such a large scale,
and that SMPD completed a review process at all was at least worthy of “partial credit.”
However, the evaluation and findings memo documenting the outcome of the Internal
Review Board lacked the kind of details we expected to see, and that might be valuable
for both individual remediation and systemic change. First, we noted that the Internal
Review Board evaluation happened nine months after the incident, itself an unusually
long time for case review. Second, the memo did not detail any specific uses of force or
evaluate specific force for compliance with Department policy, instead conceding that
there “was no way to specify the type of force that would be reasonable to effectively
control a situation” like May 31. Third, it contained limited general findings and no
specific conclusions about any individual officer’s use of force. Instead, the memo
concluded that “no investigative referral [was] needed regarding the use of force on May
31, 2020.”
72 SMPD also represented that nearly a year after the incident, Detectives were still conducting
a comprehensive review of May 31 body-worn camera footage to identify unreported uses of
force for internal review; at the time of this Report’s publication, it is not clear when this review
will be complete or what the outcome will be. But even a comprehensive review will include
gaps on this front, as detailed elsewhere, there were apparently a significant number of officers
who failed to heed policy and activate their body-worn cameras during their deployment that
day.
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The memo did highlight two Department-wide training items and one policy update: (1)
use of body-worn cameras in accordance with Department policy; (2) a review of the
use of force reporting policy; and (3) development of a use of force reporting
policy/procedure for civil unrest situations and when the subject of a use of force cannot
be identified. However, the details of specifically how to address apparent deficits in the
force review process were not provided.
The force review process as documented did not sufficiently provide accountability for
the force used on May 31. In our review of the available body-worn camera footage, we
noted some uses of force that could have and should have risen to the level of
administrative review, or “investigative referral;” a detailed review of these and other
uses of force may have resulted in accountability, remediation, or training for the
involved officer to improve future performance and, perhaps more importantly, might
have highlighted the need for additional Department-wide training. In our review, we
identified a number of specific instances where a more rigorous evaluation of
questionable force would have been beneficial.
For example:
• An officer who struck an individual seated on the ground with a baton to make
the individual move.
• Officers’ uses of Pepperball on a suspect who was running away from a parking
garage.
• Officers who fired rounds at the ground to “skip” in various directions versus at
specific targets.
• Officers’ use of 37mm less lethal impact munitions fired at areas other than the
center mass of a suspected aggressive target or at individuals who were running
away.
• Officers who executed takedowns of individuals who were attempting to leave the
area when officers mistakenly believed them to be looters.
• An officer who cut an arrestee’s hand while removing flex cuffs with a knife.
• Officers’ repeated uses of profane language in high-intensity tactical situations,
which further heightened tensions.
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This is to say nothing of the gas deployments that occurred in different locations, most
notably to address the standoff with protesters on Ocean Avenue, and which implicate
important questions about the conditions and precautions that should dictate this
approach to crowd control.
Command staff has acknowledged the deficiencies in the final memo and have
represented that they are committed to the needed Department-wide changes and on-
going trainings. We encourage them to prioritize this and to update the public on the
progress of its efforts, as well as a more detailed incident specific summary of final
conclusions and “lessons learned.”
RECOMMENDATION 34
SMPD should develop and approve a use of force reporting
policy/procedure requiring officers to document force used in civil unrest
situations, or any circumstance where the subject of a use of force cannot
be identified, and make clear that in crowd control situations, officers are
expected to document all reportable force, including each deployment of
less lethal munitions.
RECOMMENDATION 35
SMPD should revise its force reporting policy to require that all
documentation of use of force be completed prior to an officer completing
her/his shift and entrust supervisors to enforcement of this policy.
RECOMMENDATION 36
SMPD should complete the two Department-wide training items identified
in the Internal Review Board memo related to uses of force on May 31: (1)
review of body-worn camera policy and (2) review of the Department use
of force reporting policy.
RECOMMENDATION 37
SMPD should develop and deliver on-going Department-wide training
related to documenting and reporting use of force in civil unrest situations
or other large-scale incidents, and incorporate body-worn camera
procedures and use of force reporting into all department tactical training.
RECOMMENDATION 38
SMPD should remind all officers – in daily briefings, a Department-wide
training or a Training Bulletin, and specifically in briefings prior to any
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protest activity – of the requirement to activate their body-worn camera
generally per policy and during crowd control incidents in specific.
RECOMMENDATION 39
SMPD should identify and consider appropriate remediation for those
officers who failed to comply with the Department’s body-worn camera
policy on May 31, 2020.
RECOMMENDATION 40
SMPD should regularly audit body-worn camera use by officers to ensure
that policy requirements and expectations are being met in the field
regarding activation.
RECOMMENDATION 41
SMPD should conduct and document a meaningful administrative review
of officers’ uses of force following civil unrest situations or other large-
scale incidents and should consider “investigative referral” of specific uses
of force that may be out of policy or require specific remedial action.
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Officer Morale and Wellness
Over the course of this project, we met Department personnel from several different
rank levels and were struck by the number who became emotional during our
conversations about the events of May 31. This is not a common experience for us in
dealing with the notoriously stoic world of law enforcement agencies, but it is also not
surprising. The events of May 31 in Santa Monica were extraordinary. The
consequences of that day and the regrets over deficiencies in SMPD’s initial response
had clearly left a strong impression. And underscoring this was a woundedness over
the intense, dangerous hostility that these officers – who think of themselves as well-
meaning and committed to the City – encountered to an unprecedented degree.
In addition to encountering steady vitriol, officers had rocks, bottles, and in one case,
fireworks, thrown at them, and some were physically injured. Several officers reported
that glass bottles thrown at the skirmish line shattered at their feet and a sergeant
shared that a glass bottle hit her calf. Another shared that a firework was thrown at the
skirmish line, exploding on the ground directly in front of him, shooting up debris and
causing disorientation and momentary hearing loss. An officer who was attempting to
control the situation at 11th and Broadway reported that the scene was unlike any other
that he had seen in his long career, describing it as “chaotic and violent” and admitting
that he was fearful that they would be overrun. Another supervisor described the painful
experience of having his wife and young children come to Santa Monica on Monday
June 1 to assist with the cleanup, and knowing that they were seeing “Fuck the Police”
written in graffiti in multiple locations.
Adding to this dynamic within SMPD was a sense of being scapegoated for the harms
that came to the City on May 31. Indeed, as much as the ongoing national dialogue
about police reform has prompted uncertainty and concern about the future of the
profession, the feelings of unearned condemnation and loss of community status are
even seemingly even more burdensome. Officers throughout the organization
committed dozens of hours during those days to navigating an extremely challenging
landscape, and their perseverance had been critical in regaining a sense of control. But
the “conventional wisdom” in the City appeared to revolve almost exclusively around
SMPD’s failures. In subsequent weeks, the rank and file did not hear significant public
efforts to provide context or address some of the harshest criticisms against their
performance.
In their conversations with us, the Department’s leaders took ownership of significant
shortcomings. And, to be clear, our own review left us with a detailed sense of ways in
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which things could and should have gone better – particularly on May 31. Moreover,
while acknowledging that we do not have a specific finger on the pulse of SMPD’s
broader amenability to law justice system reforms, we also know that an openness to
adapting to new expectations – rather than defensiveness or resentment – will need to
be part of every high-functioning agency’s philosophy in the months ahead.
At the same time, though, we recognize that fairness toward and collaboration with
police departments are ingredients for positive change that certainly deserve their place
in the conversation. Part of that process is an appropriate concern for the wellness of
officers in Santa Monica and elsewhere.
RECOMMENDATION 42
SMPD should review its systems for supporting officer wellness, including
the availability of counselors and other professionals, and should consider
ways to encourage officers to take advantage of those programs who may
be struggling with the trauma of the events of May 31 and other events of
the past year.
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Implementation of OIR Recommendations
When the City engages independent experts or consultants to review systems or
events, it is critical that it ensure a robust and transparent feedback loop on the degree
to which the Police Department accepts any systemic recommendations made, and
whether, how, and when recommended changes are implemented. As a first step, the
Police Department should report back to its elected representatives and its public on the
degree to which it agrees with the recommendations and the feasibility of
implementation. Then, the City should work with the Police Department to develop an
implementation plan with regard to the accepted recommendations. Finally, the City
should consider whether an independent body should review the degree to which the
Police Department has implemented the recommendations. We note the City’s newly-
formed Public Safety Reform and Oversight Commission and the Office of Inspector
General might be tasked with reporting on the progress of or overseeing any
implementation plan.
RECOMMENDATION 43
The City should request that SMPD prepare a response to this report
indicating the degree to which it accepts each of the recommendations
made and setting out a plan for implementation.
RECOMMENDATION 44
The City should develop a plan for independent evaluation and public
reporting on the status of SMPD’s implementation of the
recommendations.
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After the Unrest: Progress for SMPD and the City
In early March of 2021, we received a letter from the Interim City Manager in response
to a request for information about new approaches that the City had adopted after May
31. Each item identified and addressed in this letter, most of which we learned about
during the course of this review, strike us as being constructive and worthwhile in ways
that should reassure the City’s residents.
We discuss these reforms throughout our Report (see, for example, the discussion of
the “Civil Unrest Annex” when we evaluate the Intra-Agency response). Many of them
reflect the value of – and an increased commitment to – collaborative, coordinated
interactions between the City’s various service providers. As the City has itself proven
in the execution of successful, large scale events in the past and since May 31 (and as
May 31 showed by unfortunate contrast), there is much to be gained from regular
communication and taking advantage of each other’s strengths.
A second component of the City’s post-May 31 commitments involve public
contributions to shaping the future of law enforcement in Santa Monica. A “Public
Safety Advisory Committee” was formed in the summer of 2021, bringing together
representatives from a range of stakeholder groups. This committee issued a report
that identified key issues and spurred substantive conversation about use of force and
other influential topics that have long remained the isolated purview of police agencies
themselves. It also directly informed a series of reform measures adopted by the City.
One of these, the new “Public Safety Reform and Oversight Commission” will provide
new levels of accountability for SMPD.
Meanwhile, the Department itself moved forward with a number of internal shifts that
sought to rectify shortcomings while reinforcing the “real time” adaptations that had
proven effective on May 31 and subsequently. To her credit, the former Chief drove or
authorized some of these steps prior to her retirement in October. They include the
following:
• An expanded “Mobile Field Force” unit that has trained numerous new officers
(who volunteered for this important collateral assignment73) focusing on modern,
effective responses to crowd management. SMPD’s unit is now three times
73 A “collateral assignment” or “collateral duty” is when an officer takes on a task or role in
addition to his/her regularly assigned role.
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larger than it was in May of 2020, and has been provided with specialized
training and equipment.
• A new commitment to its “small team tactics” as a response strategy for
widespread and diffuse acts of vandalism, looting, or aggression. As a deviation
from the traditional and somewhat monolithic “skirmish line” approach of holding
positions with large groups of officers, it was quick response teams of 4-6 officers
that were able to react more nimbly, and in a more focused fashion, to the most
problematic incidents/individuals. (We discuss this concept above in our
recounting of May 31’s events.) Santa Monica’s success with this approach was
shared with other agencies as the summer progressed, as law enforcement
throughout the region looked for productive adjustments to the unique challenges
of the May/June unrest.
• A new “Intelligence Cadre” that, per a description we recently received from the
Deputy Chief, was created “to establish a network of motivated employees who
are committed to acquiring and assessing information from a variety of sources
to best safeguard our community.” This ongoing project is staffed as a collateral
duty by a team of Department members who work in conjunction with the two
sergeants of the Planning and Intelligence Unit. Its efforts show the agency’s
unequivocal recognition of the value of intelligence gathering from a variety of
sources, including social media. The unit is a direct response to the information
gaps and disjointed efforts that marred preparedness in the run-up to May 31.
Each one of these adaptations constitutes a positive response to the issues that May 31
exposed or produced. Taken together, they underscore a theme that has recurred in
our conversations with knowledgeable parties within SMPD and throughout the City:
that the failings of May 31 were real, but they do not define the Department’s
capabilities or the City’s determination to move forward in stronger fashion.
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Conclusion
As this Report was being finalized, the verdict in the murder trial of Minneapolis Police
officer Derek Chauvin brought a measure of justice to the tragedy that initiated a
movement. But the broader pursuit of racial equity and a new paradigm for public
safety is still very much a work in progress. Santa Monica, like numerous other
jurisdictions, continues to grapple with these ideas in a variety of forums. And SMPD, to
its credit, has been an active participant in these efforts.
Each community brings its own history, politics, and distinctive experiences to the
process of moving forward. In Santa Monica, dismay over the events of May 31 meant
that one necessary task was the creation of a full and independent “after action” report
that would provide clarification as to what had gone wrong, and why. This Report
obviously seeks to answer those questions. We hope that the facts and analysis it
offers provide a basis for community members to reach their own conclusions, and to
assess the Department’s ongoing performance from a foundation of heightened
understanding.
Nearly a year has passed since Santa Monica experienced unprecedented unrest. If
this Report contributes to the productive closing of that chapter from the past, then we
will be gratified. But as our own work on this project progressed over the course of
several months, we encountered regular reminders that the City and SMPD were not
sitting still and waiting. On the contrary, significant and positive changes have already
occurred, informed by – but also extending well beyond – people’s experience of May
31. We look forward to watching the evolution as it continues to unfold, and wish the
best to both the people of Santa Monica and the members of its Police Department as it
does so. We also look forward to presenting this report to City leadership and Santa
Monicans and engaging in any ensuing dialogue.
8.A.e
Packet Pg. 217 Attachment: EXA-OIR Group Report (4560 : May 31 After Action Report)
111 | Page
APPENDIX A: Recommendations
1: When engaging outside assistance to review significant events, SMPD and the
City should carefully and deliberately consider the scope and terms of that review
and should be open and transparent about the engagement.
2: The Chief of Police should make clear to the Department and City leadership
when they will be out of town and clearly designate an Acting Chief in her or his
absence.
3: SMPD should develop written protocols to ensure that an operations plan is
developed in advance of all potential crowd control situations, establishing
expectations for the depth and inclusion as well as a chain of command approval
mechanism.
4: SMPD should develop written protocols to ensure timely and thoughtful
designation of an incident commander for special operations.
5: SMPD should ensure that critical personnel, including those tasked with
intelligence gathering and other crucial functions, remain in the City prior to a
major incident and are not sent out as part of a mutual aid response or otherwise
assigned supplementary duties.
6: SMPD should establish a dedicated listserv with “read receipt” functionality for
command to receive intelligence briefings in a formal and timely manner and
confirm receipt of such information.
7: The Department should regularly review and update its Mass Booking
Procedures policy to ensure that the listed contact information and location and
availability of all itemized equipment is current and correct.
8: SMPD should develop a tracking mechanism, such as a log for less lethal
munitions, specifically to track how many of which types of munitions are used
and by whom.
9: SMPD should examine the use of the flashbang device on May 31 through the
lenses of accountability, advisability, and remediation.
8.A.e
Packet Pg. 218 Attachment: EXA-OIR Group Report (4560 : May 31 After Action Report)
112 | Page
10: SMPD should conduct a detailed analysis regarding whether the Pepperball
deployments on May 31 were consistent with Department policy and
expectations.
11: SMPD should revise its use of force policies to either specially define “riotous” or
eliminate the terminology from its policies.
12: SMPD should amend its policy to provide further guidance regarding deployment
of less lethal munitions, particularly to guard against injuries to the face and
head.
13: SMPD should conduct regular and ongoing training on use of impact munitions in
crowd situations so that all officers trained in the use of these munitions are
advised of how to most effectively deploy them and have a clear understanding
of Departmental expectations.
14: SMPD should engage with its community and City leaders to determine whether
and to what degree gas and other less lethal munitions should be used in the
First Amendment activity context.
15: After having the above discourse, SMPD should revise its use of force policy
related to deployment of tear gas and less lethal impact munitions in crowd
control situations to specify the circumstances, if any, under which they may be
used.
16: Training for supervisors on unlawful assembly should emphasize the need to
follow Department policy and reach out to event organizers or participants with
the goal of gaining voluntary dispersal prior to issuing formal dispersal orders.
17: In crafting dispersal orders to instruct crowds about the routes of egress from a
protest, SMPD policy and training should require officers to consider conditions
such as traffic and officer deployment to ensure the feasibility and safety of any
direction provided about dispersal routes.
18: SMPD policy and training regarding dispersal orders should be revised to require
personnel officers to include express warnings about the potential use of force
should the order be defied.
19: SMPD should continue to impress upon its supervisors the need to follow all
dispersal order protocols before any introduction of less lethal munitions.
8.A.e
Packet Pg. 219 Attachment: EXA-OIR Group Report (4560 : May 31 After Action Report)
113 | Page
20: SMPD and the City should engage with the community as it considers the
circumstances required for a public protest to be declared an unlawful assembly.
The resulting guidelines should be publicized in a way that provides City
residents and stakeholders a clear understanding of under what circumstances
the SMPD will declare an unlawful assembly.
21: SMPD should continue to provide command level staff with updated training on
the ICS so that command staff is knowledgeable about its use and benefits.
22: SMPD should ensure that all command staff personnel are well versed in
contemporary crowd control responses, particularly in the First Amendment
context.
23: SMPD should continue to regularly train all officers in Mobile Field Force tactics,
to include the newest techniques with live, hand-on scenario training and new
laws related to First Amendment Assemblies and civil unrest.
24: SMPD should consider additional Department-wide trainings on topics such as
use of de-escalation techniques and other tactics to reduce tension in civil unrest
or other similar scenarios.
25: City leadership (specifically, the Office of Emergency Management) should hold
a City-wide training event with all relevant City agencies to review the Civil
Unrest Annex so that all agencies are aware of their role and expectations during
times of spontaneous civil unrest.
26: SMPD should consider who from command-level staff will take on the role of
Overall Field Incident Command if the Civil Unrest Annex is activated and train
this/these personnel on the requirements and expectations of the plan.
27: City leadership, in collaboration with Public Works, should consider determining
guidelines for use of barriers in advance of civil unrest, both protective fencing on
public and private property and for traffic control, that are practicable and
effective.
28: City leadership, in collaboration with Public Works, should consider establishing
guidelines for use of heavy equipment to support defensive enforcement action.
29: SMPD leadership should work with Area A partners to develop solutions to
address the bureaucratic challenges exposed on May 31 and ensure an
equitable distribution of National Guard assets in future situations involving civil
unrest.
8.A.e
Packet Pg. 220 Attachment: EXA-OIR Group Report (4560 : May 31 After Action Report)
114 | Page
30: SMPD should reach out to other law enforcement agencies who confronted
violence and looting in the summer of 2020 and review after action reports from
other jurisdictions to identify best practices that could be imported to Santa
Monica in responses to future protest activity.
31: The Public Safety Communications Center should review a sampling of calls (of
varying degrees of effectiveness) as a platform for the staff-wide reinforcing of
strengths and offering of constructive alternatives as warranted.
32: The City should engage with its community in developing guidelines on whether
and how curfews should be deployed, particularly when adjacent to First
Amendment protected activity.
33: The City and SMPD should continue to evaluate and refine the ways it
communicates with the Santa Monica community following any significant event
involving a police response, guided by principles of transparency, accuracy and
objectivity.
34: SMPD should develop and approve a use of force reporting policy/procedure
requiring officers to document force used in civil unrest situations, or any
circumstance where the subject of a use of force cannot be identified, and make
clear that in crowd control situations, officers are expected to document all
reportable force, including each deployment of less lethal munitions.
35: SMPD should revise its force reporting policy to require that all documentation of
use of force be completed prior to an officer completing her/his shift and entrust
supervisors to enforcement of this policy.
36: SMPD should complete the two Department-wide training items identified in the
Internal Review Board memo related to uses of force on May 31: (1) review of
body-worn camera policy and (2) review of the Department use of force reporting
policy.
37: SMPD should develop and deliver on-going Department-wide training related to
documenting and reporting use of force in civil unrest situations or other large-
scale incidents, and incorporate body-worn camera procedures and use of force
reporting into all department tactical training.
38: SMPD should remind all officers – in daily briefings, a Department-wide training
or a Training Bulletin, and specifically in briefings prior to any protest activity – of
the requirement to activate their body-worn camera generally per policy and
during crowd control incidents in specific.
8.A.e
Packet Pg. 221 Attachment: EXA-OIR Group Report (4560 : May 31 After Action Report)
115 | Page
39: SMPD should identify and consider appropriate remediation for those officers
who failed to comply with the Department’s body-worn camera policy on May 31,
2020.
40: SMPD should regularly audit body-worn camera use by officers to ensure that
policy requirements and expectations are being met in the field regarding
activation.
41: SMPD should conduct and document a meaningful administrative review of
officers’ uses of force following civil unrest situations or other large-scale
incidents and should consider “investigative referral” of specific uses of force that
may be out of policy or require specific remedial action.
42: SMPD should review its systems for supporting officer wellness, including the
availability of counselors and other professionals, and should consider ways to
encourage officers to take advantage of those programs who may be struggling
with the trauma of the events of May 31 and other events of the past year.
43: The City should request that SMPD prepare a response to this report indicating
the degree to which it accepts each of the recommendations made and setting
out a plan for implementation.
44: The City should develop a plan for independent evaluation and public reporting
on the status of SMPD’s implementation of the recommendations.
8.A.e
Packet Pg. 222 Attachment: EXA-OIR Group Report (4560 : May 31 After Action Report)
116 | Page
APPENDIX B: Less Lethal Munitions
Defined
In the interest of informing those who may not be familiar with less lethal force options
used by SMPD over the course of this incident, we provide the following definitions.
• Flash Sound Diversionary Device (FSDD) or Flash bang(s). At least one,
possibly two, flashbangs were deployed by SMPD officers on May 31; these
devices create a loud explosive sound and bright light that is meant to shock,
surprise or otherwise distract a subject in the context of a tactical operation.
• Tear gas. This term is applied to two different types of chemical munitions. On
May 31, officer Use of Force Reports suggest that SMPD deployed some of each
type. The first is Oleoresin Capsicum (OC) gas, commonly referred to as “OC” or
“pepper gas.” OC gas is an inflammatory agent derived from the oil of hot
pepper plants, which causes heat, redness, and swelling to the skin and irritation
to the nose and eyes. The second is Ortho-Chlorobenzalmalononitrite (CS) gas,
or what most people refer to when they say, “tear gas.” CS gas is an irritant,
which causes intense stinging to the eyes and respiratory system.
CS and OC gas was disseminated on May 31 using one of two methods. The
first method was via a hand-held grenade that contained canister(s) of the gas
that released in increments.
CS and OC gas was also deployed via a launcher, sometimes referred to as a
“37-millimeter (mm) launcher,” which looks something like a shotgun. In this
deployment method, the gas is contained in canisters within a single shell that is
ejected from a launcher. The canisters deploy in rapid sequence. This method is
used to shoot the gas canisters to a father distance.
• Smoke. SMPD officers also deployed several canisters of smoke. This less
lethal tool disseminates white smoke and is typically used by law enforcement for
distraction or concealment during an operation. Sometimes, Departments use
smoke to increase the effect of the tear gas because the smoke can trap and
suspend gas for a longer increment of time but SMPD did not report that this was
their rationale for using smoke on May 31. While it is non-toxic, smoke can
sometimes cause dizziness or a choking sensation.
8.A.e
Packet Pg. 223 Attachment: EXA-OIR Group Report (4560 : May 31 After Action Report)
117 | Page
• 37mm Impact Munitions, or Kinetic Projectiles. A “37mm impact munition,” or
what SMPD policy calls a Kinetic Projectile, is a single projectile, targeted less
lethal munition launched from a 37mm launcher similar to that referenced above.
Impact munitions are target-specific and used for pain compliance. While
SMPD’s policy does not explicitly define how to deploy the impact munitions,
officers are typically trained to deploy at the target’s center mass, avoiding the
head, neck, and groin areas.
On May 31, SMPD reported use of two types of impact munitions: the impact
baton and the sponge round, which is made of a foam material.
• Stinger Grenade. A “stinger grenade” is a tool that combines approximately 180
small rubber pellets and a chemical agent like OC or CS powder into an
approximately 3-inch ball that looks like a traditional military grenade. It is meant
to cause both irritation of the skin/respiratory system and pain. These are
different from “rubber bullets.”
• Pepper projectiles, or Pepperball. These are small, powder-filled projectiles
that are shot from a 37mm launcher similar to that referenced above. These are
meant to be target-specific; upon impact, they cause pain and saturate the area
with the enclosed powder. SMPD used pepper balls that contained OC powder,
which, like the gas, is an inflammatory agent.
8.A.e
Packet Pg. 224 Attachment: EXA-OIR Group Report (4560 : May 31 After Action Report)
May 10, 2021
To: Members of the Santa Monica City Council
From: The Santa Monica Coalition for Police Reform
RE: City Council Meeting of May 11, 2021
Agenda Item 8: (a-e) OIR Group Independent After-Action Report and Evaluation Regarding Events
Leading To, During, and Following May 31, 2020
Dear City Council Members:
We, The Santa Monica Coalition for Police Reform (CPR), having read and discussed the OIR Group
Report, respectfully request that you adopt the staff recommendations regarding the report, with the
changes and additions discussed below.
The OIR Group Report reveals a police department with serious systemic challenges, including weak
systems of accountability, inadequate training, poorly conceived policies and concerns for the morale
and wellbeing of officers, all of which contributed to the many detailed failures and challenges in the
handling of the May 31, 2020 protests and opportunistic criminal activities. We urge you to recognize
that these systemic challenges will take a significant amount of effort to address. We will need new
leadership, new collaborations with stakeholders and the community, and substantial changes to how
the department operates. We hope that the newly constituted Public Safety Reform and Oversight
Commission will provide one mechanism for addressing some of these concerns. The Council and the
City staff must also participate in the change efforts.
Leadership:
The City is engaged in a process to identify a new Police Chief and a permanent City Manager. These
individual leaders will be critical to leading the changes needed in our systems of public safety and must
be capable of addressing a significant change effort, including the many recommendations in the OIR
report.
We request that the OIR Report be shared with all serious candidates for both City Manager and Police
Chief, and that finalist candidates be asked - after meeting with community groups including the Black
Agenda, as well as SMPD and representatives of the business community - to outline their approach to
public safety reform. Also, City Manager candidates should be asked how they plan to address overall
city government reform that will create a more unified, customer (community, business and visitor) and
employee-focused city government given the multiple impacts of drastic revenue loss, the devastation
of downtown and the myriad other impacts of the pandemic.
We must recruit and hire for these two key positions individuals who are qualified to lead with
demonstrable experience in community relations, organizational change, support of staff and
community. We must recruit with honesty about our challenges if we are to learn from the events of
May 31, and all that led up to them.
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Packet Pg. 225 Attachment: Written Comment (4560 : May 31 After Action Report)
Suggested Changes to the Staff Recommendations:
Staff recommendation No. 2 asks the SMPD to indicate the degree to which it “accepts” the
recommendations. We believe the direction should be more prescriptive. The SMPD should report on
what steps it is taking to address each of the 44 recommendations. In addition, the SMPD should
provide that report to the Council and share it with the PSROC and the public within three months.
The response should:
- Describe progress in implementing each of the 44 recommendations in the report. It should specify
what changes have already been made as well as how they are being institutionalized and embedded in
the culture and regular practice of the SMPD. It should also outline steps they have taken to ensure that
all recommendations are implemented, and if not, why not and what is being done instead.
- Indicate more broadly how they are incorporating learning from the events of May 31 into policies,
procedures, training and SMPD culture. On May 31st the SMPD prioritized policing protests over
preventing looting – the timeline shows that – how will that be different next time? In addition, the
SMPD should be asked to identify the particularly challenging issues including those that reach beyond
the SMPD itself (e.g. the issue of lack of coordination with other city departments). What are the most
challenging issues the SMPD faces?
Staff recommendation No. 3 asks that staff be directed to develop a plan for oversight and independent
evaluation of the SMPD’s implementation of the OIR report recommendations. We would urge the
Council to include in its direction the proviso that the PSROC should not be limited in addressing issues
that it determines to be priorities for public safety, notwithstanding the OIR recommendations. The OIR
Report did not address the full spectrum of issues relevant to the need for reform in SMPD. The OIR
Report, while significant, should not replace the fundamental intention of the PSROC ordinance to
provide for structured community input on all aspects of public safety. In other words, the OIR Report
should not be considered the final word on changes needed, instead it is a beginning and a reference
point.
Racial Equity:
We must also remember that the events that sparked our local crisis stem from the cry for racial justice.
We must not lose the momentum on addressing racial equity. If those of us who have non-violence as a
core value are to prevail, we must all step up.
We need a police department that is truly integrated into our community, so that it can collaborate with
community members during protests, rather than shooting munitions indiscriminately because there are
some bad actors among peaceful protestors. We must demand a police department that views us as
allies, not as enemies to be controlled, dispersed and shot at with “less than lethal” weapons.
The police need to interact with us regularly and see who we are, using the connections that already
exist and forging new ones. For example, why not give Citizens Police Academy and CERT graduates a
role in staffing first-aid tables at protests and helping feed mutual aid first responders that are brought
in to help? All of Santa Monica needs to work together, and our whole community needs to be involved,
not just those with the loudest voices.
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Packet Pg. 226 Attachment: Written Comment (4560 : May 31 After Action Report)
Here in Santa Monica, as we face continuing racial injustice - as well as economic and social injustice -
The Coalition for Police Reform stands ready to help reimagine Public Safety as part of a broader system
of policy and system level reform.
We appreciate the leadership of the City Council, Interim City Manager, Interim Police Chief and the OIR
Group in helping move us toward a more just system of Public Safety. We look forward to pulling
together to achieve it.
Respectfully,
The Santa Monica Coalition for Police Reform
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Packet Pg. 227 Attachment: Written Comment (4560 : May 31 After Action Report)
1
Vernice Hankins
From:Jon Katz <tmbjon@gmail.com>
Sent:Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:48 AM
To:councilmtgitems
Cc:Kristin McCowan; Gleam Davis; Councilmember Kevin McKeown; Phil Brock; Oscar de la Torre;
Christine Parra; Sue Himmelrich; Lane Dilg
Subject:Item 8A
EXTERNAL
Mayor Himmelrich, Mayor Pro Tem McCowan, and Councilmembers,
Like you, I am still reeling from May 31, 2020, and have spent much of the time since then thinking about what
happened that day.
Now we finally have a full report ‐ 121 pages detailing the catastrophic failures of the SMPD leadership team. The report
points to systemic failures beyond the scope or power of any individual chief. Body cameras were not worn; rules for
using tear gas and rubber bullets were not followed; protestors were told to "disperse" into oncoming traffic;
department leadership lied about their whereabouts and did not loop in public officials. Perhaps most disturbing of all
though: like all of us, SMPD leadership knew that these attacks were coming the night before they occurred. In some
cases these warnings were ignored; in other cases, the emails were not even opened.
These behaviors, happening across the country, are the motivation behind the call to disinvest from these irresponsible
departments and instead invest in unarmed city services to respond to some situations. Thus we must assess the entire
department and ensure that drastic steps are taken if we are to ever restore trust in SMPD.
With this context, I recommend that you push back on the staff recommendation that the Police Department respond to
this report with "the degree to which SMPD accepts each of the recommendations." Instead, the SMPD should report
back with the concrete steps it IS taking to address each of the 44 recommendations. Areas of shortcoming or concern
can be part of that report, but the expectation should be clear that we expect them to follow each and every
recommendation as prescribed by the OIR Report.
Additionally, the OIR Report should be seen only as a launching point for the serious reforms needed in our Police
Department. While this report addresses priority items that could prevent a future version of May 31, it does not at all
address the day‐to‐day concerns regarding police‐civilian interaction that led to the murder of George Floyd and so
many other Black and brown individuals in our country. We should refer the OIR Report to the Public Safety Reform and
Oversight Commission and ask them to prepare their own list of recommendations, as that Commission's jurisdiction is
not limited to only the events of May 31, and therefore it may be more thorough in its prescriptions.
Finally, as you make your selection for City Manager, I ask all seven councilmembers to please consider the growing
national movements for both public safety reform and racial equity, and how these movements relate to our City's
response to the events of May 31, 2020. We must address both of these issues, concurrently, if we are to make
progress.
Thank you,
‐Jon Katz
Delegate, California Democratic Party
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Packet Pg. 228 Attachment: Written Comment (4560 : May 31 After Action Report)
2
‐‐
tmbjon@gmail.com
cell: (215) 962‐4357
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Packet Pg. 229 Attachment: Written Comment (4560 : May 31 After Action Report)