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SR-032508-3A4 9 10 iz to 8 5 3 Z 'r Accitlc~~U^ ®Faail kcrn!e~#~ ~~ i~-0 iN&, 19:b i&S( 1&93 1999 2W6 2L01 2bV` Y'U:3 12 L C a.~ L TO'-]a' ]5'-]9' 8C'Sa' BSA9' 9C`SA' w v9' d0'-UA' fiyvre?L.xw4rgmz. ur ar..:NcN rue irer..t 13 ae.1n~=ae.l Ram Fa. tacouw Oieauva m E.re~a alsa~a na~.=1Nise m~amsa) NumEe~af Openimv at ynb Mpnl'a ~FA4-APO iennlial Pma RePoh) Source: NTSB 14 19P-1B% iBBi-1~8 199]2106 Time PenoE an rzvrxnr NEIyi~Y4Y iW ~ R~MH?Y yt flMb ~` ~ Wt%IW I ~ 0 ~~ O O RE~QS VrbNEU `\ NP41RNG5 ~'a'T ~/ 16 17 sbmren smma.n+ rtomlenn.t m Rnpv-m v..m.paea a Rbcnll Mpael GN Falc[n m0 lea6A 35 ER,Fi]5 Cessna i50 Hawker 125 E54mdba EAVS Steppn9 Capabb6i~a{EpiGetl ~d ~ 5)Om RS ]]OOOIta 355mbz to WOlbs d55001b; 29.000®5 20500 bs 25011 M1A pLa 2611 se16acR palal D$tpSB) 61166P5 )0 M1pb 60's m450's mxl6PS mla fibs )6 G-IV @ 57,000 Ibs CL-600 @.37,ODOIbs Falcon 900 @ 35,500 Ibs Lear 35 @ 14,000Ibs ERJ-135 at 41,5001bs Cessna 750 at 29,000 Ibs Hawker 125 @ 20,5001bs 25D ft bed + 25 ft setback zero exit speed froth bad (irl knots} zero exit speed frarn bed {in knoisp aera exitspeed from bed (in ltnots} !ow 40's exit speed from bed (in knots) zero exit speed frona b©c4 (in knots} 10 knots exit speed from bed (in knots) zero ezitspeed from bed (in knots) 18 19 20 zi 22 23 24 FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE DATE: October 31, 2005 CONTACT: Cathy Larson, Airport Committee Chair, Friends of Sunset Park (city-recognized neighborhood organization), P.O. Box 5823, Santa Monica, CA 90409, www.friendsofsunsetpark.org, (310)392-1907 This submission coincides with the October 20, 2005, passage of an appropriations bill NR 3058 by the U.S. Senate to which a provision was attached that mandates the FAA to bring all commercial airports into compliance on runway safety area regulations by 2015. (See Appendix A for Congressional Quarterly report on this development.) FAA Gambles with Santa Monica Lives - No Response to Safety Zone Request at Local Airport "I found it unfathomable that representatives of the Federal Aviation Administration could dismiss the Santa Monica and State safety concerns as merely a matter of probability that something dire could occur. Probability is the basis for odds, which is the basis for gambling. I don't believe any of us wants to gamble that no airplane will ever overrun the runway or land short of the runway if we can increase the margin of safety. " ~ R. Austin Wiswell, Chief, Division of Aeronautics, California Department of Transportation ~ The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is courting disaster in Santa Monica. In 2004, 18,091 jet takeoffs or landings took place at Santa Monica Airport: an increase of nearly 50% in the last five years and over 1,500% since 1983 (see Appendix B). z Yet, Santa Monica Airport does not meet the runway safety regulations of the FAA. a It has residents living closer to a runway than any other airport in the state (250 feet - literally across the street from both ends of the runway, with a gas station among them). a The jets are so close to the residents that they can destroy lawn furniture by their blast. s FAA Gambles with Santa Monica Lives -continued Nearby residents are seeking to prevent accidents Iike the one that occurred on February 2, 2005 at a similar airport in Teterboro, New Jersey, where a jet skidded across a busy freeway and crashed into a warehouse, injuring 20 people.6 The community of Santa Monica already experienced one dangerous event in November 2001, when a Cessna skidded off the Santa Monica Airport runway and burst into flames across the street from homes on 23rd Street.' A map of an impact zone for a hypothetical accident at Santa Monica Airport, akin to one that occurred at a comparable airport in Texas on May 9, 2005, s can be found in Appendix C. 9 On Sept. 8, 2004, the City of Santa Monica requested permission of the FAA to: 1) create a safety zone between residents and the runway of Santa Monica Airport, and 2) require aircraft to conform to the size and weight standards for which the airport was originally designed. The request to the FAA 10 was accompanied by a study, conducted by Coffman Associates aviation planning firm, recommending that the most viable way to create a safety zone would be to shorten the usable runway by 300 feet on each end. ~ ~ According to the study, an estimated 54% of jets that currently use Santa Monica Airport are in violation of FAA Airport Design Standards.12 If the City of Santa Monica were allowed to enforce the FAA's own standards, those jets would be banned. Despite the City of Santa Monica's request and study, and a similar request made by Congressman Henry Waxman in May 2000, is the FAA has resisted implementing this critical safety enhancement. 14 While the FAA is charged with oversight of airport safety and economics, correspondence from the FAA to Rep. Waxmant5 i6 and others " ~s i9 zo strongly suggests that economics ("access") take precedence over safety. On November 20, 2003, the FAA Western Pacific Region Airports Division made an agreement with the City of Santa Monica to study runway safety at Santa Monica Airport. zi Subsequently, the FAA Associate Administrator for Airports denied that the FAA Gambles with Santa Monica Lives -continued FAA had made that agreement, citing a statute saying that only commercial airports 2z proposing actual runway improvements would be qualified for such a study. 2s A follow up letter from R. Austin Wiswell, Chief of the Division of Aeronautics for the California Department of Transportation who was present at the November 20 meeting, chastised the FAA representatives for their "intellectual dishonesty... in trying to mask their fear that the Runway Safety Area issue was a stalking horse for an aircraft noise reduction/limiting maneuver..." 24 This scathing letter can be found in Appendix D. Despite the fact that air pollution and noise from Santa Monica Airport are serious concerns of residents, the requests to the FAA by the City of Santa Monica and Rep. Waxman dealt specifically with the runway safety area and aircraft conformance issue. Further evidence of FAA interests in economics can be seen by comparing its position on runway safety at Bob Hope Airport in Burbank compared to Santa Monica Airport. Ironically, the FAA has been encouraging Burbank to meet its recommended safety standards, 25 while it has been discouraging Santa Monica from meeting them. However, building a new terminal atBob Hope Airport to meet the recommended runway safety standards would ultimately increase air traffic, whereas implementing a safety zone or an aircraft conformance program at Santa Monica Airport would decrease traffic. Potential interviewees and contact information: Cathy Larson Title: Chair of the Friends of Sunset Park Airport Committee Area of expertise: Knows the history between the FAA and Santa Monica Airport better than any other member of the community and has copies of all letters referred to in this document. Phone: (310)392-1907 Fax: (310)396-1599 e-mail: fospairport@labridge.com Councilman Ken Genser Title: Santa Monica City Councilmember -Airport Commission Liaison Area of expertise: Representative of Santa Monica City Council who regularly attends meetings of the Airport Commission, which was appointed by City Council to serve in an advisory capacity on all airport issues. Busy but approachable person. See City of Santa Monica website under "airport commission" to see a description of its purpose. Phone (office): (310) 458-1621 Phone (home): (310) 395-0223 e-mail: city@genser.org Zahava Goldman Title: Legislative Assistant to Congressman Henry Waxman, U.S. House of Representatives 30`h District Address: 2204 Rayburn Building, Washington, DC 20515 Area of expertise: Has attended meetings for Congressman Waxman with FAA representatives. Phone: (202)225-3976 Fax: (202)225-4099 e-mail: zahava.goldman@mail.house.gov Lisa Pinto Title: District Director for Congressman Hemy Waxman, U.S. House of Representatives 30~' District Address: 8436 W. Third Street, Los Angeles, CA 90048 Area of expertise: Local contact person for Rep. Waxman. She is the aide in L.A. who deals with local airport issues. Holds dialogues with community members and has shown up for community meetings, including those sponsored by Friends of Sunset Park, regarding airport issues. Phone: (323)651-1040 Fax: (323)655-0502 e-mail: lisa.pinto@mail.house. gov Robert Trimborn Title: Manager, Santa Monica Airport Area of expertise: Worked on the proposal with Coffman Associates and has been Manager of Santa Monica Airport for many years. City employee who has met with FAA representatives regarding the runway safety proposal. Phone: (310)458-8591 Fax: (310)572-4492 e-mail: bob.trimborn@smgov.net Martin Tachiki Title: Santa Monica City Attorney Area of expertise: Has consistently handled airport issues for many years. Regularly attends Santa Monica Airport Commission meetings. Worked with Coffman Associates on the runway safety area/aircraft conformance program. Phone: (310) 458-8336 Fax:{310)395-6727 e-mail: marty.tachiki@smgov.net Martin Rubin Title: Founder and Director, Concerned Residents Against Airport Pollution Area of expertise: Has organized the West Los Angeles community to the east of the airport in bringing problems of airport pollution to the attention of local politicians. Has been helping Los Angeles City Councilman Bill Rosendahl to identify scientific, medical, environmental, and political experts for an advisory board on airport pollution in his district. Has also been organizing a Town Hall Meeting on health impacts of Santa Monica Airport, slated for November 10, 2005. Phone: (310) 479-2529 e-mail: ~etairpollution(a~earthlink.net Councilman Bill Rosendahl Title: Los Angeles City Councilman for District 11 Area of expertise: Former educator and an award-winning television broadcaster with a long record as a leader in Los Angeles civic affairs. Has publicly stated his commitment to addressing the environmental concerns of his constituents. City Hall Office: 200 N. Spring Street, Room 415, Los Angeles, CA 90012 Phone: (213) 473-7011 Fax: (213) 473-6926 Westchester Office:- 7166 W. Manchester Blvd., Westchester, CA 90045 Phone: (310)568-8772 Fax: (310) 410-3946 West Los Angeles Office: 1645 Corinth Avenue, Room 201,West L.A., CA 90025 Phone: (310) 575-8461 Fax: (310) 575-8305 e-mail: len.nguyen@lacity.org (Len Nguyen, Field Deputy- Palms, Mar Vista, West LA (310) 575-8461, who accompanied Mr. Rosendahl at a meeting of the South Coast Air Quality Management District in summer 2005.) Virginia Ernst Title: Administration, Buyer III for Information Services, University of Southern California Area of expertise: Local resident who lives directly across the street from the east end of Santa Monica Airport. Has a video of departing jets and the aftermath of patio fiuniture that was destroyed by jet blast. Address: 12130 Sardis Ave., Los Angeles, CA 90066 Phone: (310) 473-8370 e-mail: ernst@usc.edu Ellen and Stephen Mark Area of expertise: Local residents who are impacted by Santa Monica Airport on the west end. Address: 2211 Navy Street, Santa Monica, CA 90405 Phone: 310-392-1715 e-mail: familymark@aol.com or register@themarks.org Steve Benson Title: Senior Aviation Planner, Coffman Associates Area of expertise: Civil engineer with twenty-five years of experience in airport planning. With Coffman Associates, has been involved in more than 175 airport planning studies and managed more than 60 airport master plans. Primary specialty has been in the evaluation and projection of airport facility requirements as they relate to safety, capacity, and function. Coffman Associates is the aviation planning firm that prepared the study and recommendations for the runway safety area and aircraft conformance program at Santa Monica Airport. Their study and recommendations were submitted to the FAA by the City of Santa Monica. Address: 237 N.W. Blue Parkway, Suite 100, Lee's Summit, Missouri 64063 Phone: (816) 524-3500 Fax: (816) 524-2575 e-mail: stevebenson@coffmanassociates.com R. Austin Wiswell Title: Chief, Division of Aeronautics, California Department of Transportation Area of expertise: His department is responsible for public safety and enforcement of California laws related to aeronautics. The department conducts regular safety inspections and issues operating permits to airports and heliports in California based upon safety standards for facility design, which happen to be those set by the FAA. State of California Department of Transportation Address: Division of Aeronautics - M.S./ #4Q 1120 N Street, P.O. Box 942873, Sacramento, CA 94273-0001 Phone: (916) 654-4959 or (916) 654-5470 Fax: (916) 653-9531 e-mail: robert.a.wiswell@dot.ca.gov David L. Bennett Title: Director, Office of Airport Safety and Standards, Federal Aviation Administration Area of expertise: Specializes in the law as it relates to airports and air traffic. His office is responsible for standards for airport design, construction, maintenance, operations, safety, and data. He was the one who sent a copy of the Notice of Investigation (FAA Docket No. 16-02-08) to Santa Monica Airport Manager Robert Trimborn, with an accompanying letter asking that consideration for implementing an aircraft conformance program be suspended until resolution. Address: Office of Airport Safety and Standards, U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, 800 Independence Ave., SW, Washington, DC-20591 Phone: (202) 267-3053 (Secretary, Suzanne Harper-Ball) Footnotes: ` Letter to Woodie Woodward, FAA Associate Administrator for Airports from R. Austin Wiswell, Chief of the Division of Aeronautics for the California Department of Transportation -dated 9/2/04. z The graph in Appendix A was assembled by Martin Rubin, founder of Concerned Residents Against Airport Pollufion, and it can be found online at www.jetairpollution.com. According to Mr. Rubin, all figures were obtained from Santa Monica Airport records and Matt Majoli, Operations and Noise Manager at Santa Monica Airport. Although the accuracy of airport staff record-keeping is unlarown, Mr. Rubin feels that they are accurate based on records that he has kept over the last 10 yeazs. Mr. Rubin noted slight inconsistencies in reported data for some years; however, they were minor. Records were not kept by the airport for the years noted on the bottom of the graph. The City of Santa Monica Airport History website shows total annual aircraft operations at Santa Monica Airport in 2004 as being 135,300, of which 18,091 were jet operations (13.4% of total aircraft operations). http://santa-monica.ore/airport/n airport h.as~ Regazding jet operations over the past five yeazs, in 2000 they were 12, 485 (about 35 per day). hi 2001, they increased, but remained roughly similar at 13,252. (The City of Santa Monica website states jet operations for 2000 and 2001 as 12,500, but precise figures for 2000 and 2001 were obtained from the Design Standazds Study: Santa Monica Airport that was commissioned by the City of Santa Monica.) In 2002 and 2003, jet operations were 16,157 and 16,210, respectively (about 44 per day). In 2004, jet operations were 18,091(about SO per day). By contrast, in the late 1960s, approximately 5 - 6 jet operations occurred per day. A graph of these figures can be found in Appendix A (City of Santa Monica. Airport History. http://wwwsanta-monica.ore/airport/n aimort h.aspx) ' FAA Order 5200.8, Runway Safety Area Program; FAA Advisory Circular (AC) 150/5300-13, Airport Design. ° http://www.pilotsguide.com/cart.php?m=product detail&p=1&c=1 s Virginia Ernst lives directly across the street from the east end of Santa Monica Airport, and she has a video of departing jets as well as the aftermath of patio furniture that was destroyed by jet blast. Her contact information can be found in the section of this document entitled, "Potential interviewees and contact information." v "Latest Crash Renews Calls For Fewer Flights At Teterboro," (httn://www.wnbacom/news/4549590/detail.html); The type of plane that crashed, the Challenger 600, is flown in and out of Santa Monica Airport on a regular basis and was involved in fatal crashes with multiple fatalities in Colorado in November 2004 (http:/laviation- safety.net/database/record.php?id=20041128-0), and in England in January 2002 (http://aviation- safety.net/database/record.~hp?id=20020104-0). ~ Los Angeles Times 11/14/01 "Plane Crash Kills 2 at Santa Monica Airport." " "During the takeoff roll on runway 17 [at Brownwood Airport, TX,] (a 5,599-foot long and 150-foot wide asphalt runway), just afrer the first officer announced that the airplane had reached the V 1 speed, the flight crew and passengers heard a "loud bang" followed by the airplane swerving to the left. The captain immediately aborted the takeoff, and applied maximum braking and thrust reversers in an attempt to stop the airplane. Subsequently, the airplane overran the departure end of the runway, impacting a fence and trees, before crossing a road and coming to rest upright within a freshly plowed field, approximately 1,300 feet beyond the departure end of runway 17. As the flight crew and passengers evacuated the airplane, they observed fuel leaking from the area of the left wing." (Aviation Safety Network. htto://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=20050509-0) The aircraft involved was a Rockwell Sabreliner 80, which is in the C-II class of aircraft that currently has access to Santa Monica Airport despite the fact that it would not meet the city's recommended safety standards under the proposed aircraft conformance program. Planes larger than the Sabreliner 80 can access Santa Monica Airport, rendering the 1300-foot accident span a conservative estimate. 9 The map was prepazed by a scientific expert, who prefers to remain anonymous. 10 The request was made in the form of a booklet with photos and graphs. Cathy Lazson has a copy. ~ ~ Santa Monica Airport: Design Standards Study, prepared by Coffman Associates aviation planning firm, 237 N.W. Blue Pazkway, Suite 100, Lee's Summit, Missouri 64063. The study documented the runway safety design limitations for Category Cand Daircraft -based on FAA Airport Design Standards - and the frequency of use by these jet aircraft at Santa Monica Airport. Category C aircraft have an approach speed > 121 but < 141 knots. Category D aircraft have an approach speed > 141 but < 166 knots 'Z In an a-mail sent October 28, 2005, to Sunset Park resident Ping Ho from Santa Monica Airport Noise and Operations Manager, Matthew Majoli, an esfimated 54% of jet operations for 2005 consist of Category C and D aircraft. is Letter to FAA Administrator Jane F. Garvey from Rep. Henry A. Waxman -dated 5/26/00. 14 The FAA suggested that a determination regarding the City of Santa Monica's proposed runway safety area would be made November 2004 in a letter to Mr. R. Austin Wiswell, Chief of the Division of Aeronautics for the California Department of Transportafion, from Woodie Woodward, FAA Associate Administrator for Airports -received 9/21/04. No determination has yet been made. 15 Letter to Rep. Henry A. Waxman from William C. Withycombe, Regional Administrator for the FAA - received 7/19/00. 16 Letter to Rep. Henry A. Waxman from David L. Bennett, Director, FAA Office of Airport Safety and Standards -received 12/12/00. Letter to Mr. Jeff Mathieu, Director of the City of Santa Monica Resource Management Department (which governs Santa Monica Airport), from Herman C. Bliss, Manager of the FAA Airport Division - dated 7/22/02. `$ Letter to Mr. Robert Trimborn, manager of Santa Monica Airport, from David L. Bennett, Duector of the FAA Office of Airport Safety and Standards -received 10!8/02. The letter included a copy of a Notice of Investigation (NOI) -FAA Docket No. 16-02-08 -and asked that consideration for implementing an aircraft conformance program be suspended until resolution. In another letter to Senator Dianne Feinstein from Woodie Woodward, FAA Associate Administrator for Airports, received 1/29!03, Sen. Feinstein was informed that the FAA had initiated an NOI in response to learning that the Santa Monica Airport Commission had recommended the implementation of an ordinance-based aircraft conformance program. Santa Monica Airport commissioner Ofer Grossman had noted in an earlier e- mail letter to Sen. Feinstein, dated 12/10/02, that the NOI was inappropriately initiated before a formal hearing or adoption of the Airport Commission's recommendafion by Santa Monica City Council. is E-mail letter to Senator Dianne Feinstein from Santa Monica Airport commissioner Ofer Grossman - dated 12/10/02. 20 Letter to Mr. Robert Trimborn, manager of Santa Monica Airport, from David L. Bennett, Director of the FAA Office of Airport Safety and Standards -received 10/8/02. zi Letter to Marion C. Blakey, FAA Administrator from Rep. Henry A. Waxman -dated 6/15/04. zz Commercial airports aze defined by the FAA as "...publicly owned airports that have at least 2,500 passenger boazdings each year and that receive scheduled passenger services," as opposed to general aviation airports, which aze, "All airports not designated as a commercial service or reliever airport " Santa Monica Airport is a general aviafion airport. http://www.faa.gov/arp/ace/ACE airports.cfm?nav=airport z3 Letter to Rep. Henry A. Waxman from Woodie Woodward, FAA Associate Administrator for Airports -received 7/19/04. za Letter to Woodie Woodward, FAA Associate Administrator for Airports from R. Austin Wiswell, Chief of the Division of Aeronaufics for the California Department of Transportation -dated 9/2/04. zs The FAA has threatened the City of Burbank with suspension of federal funding for Bob Hope Airport if a feasible runway safety plan is not implemented. (Malnic, Eric. Los Angeles Times 7/11/05 "Airport Safety Issues Left Up in Air") It has also threatened the City of Santa Monica in the past with suspension of federal funding should an aircraft conformance program be implemented, (FAA Docket No. 16-02-08, Notice of Investigation in the matter of compliance by the City of Santa Monica, sent to Mr. Robert Trimborn, Manager of Santa Monica Airport from David L. Bennett, Director, FAA Office of Airport Safety and Standards); however, since 1995 the City has made it a policy not to accept federal funds, which come with a 20 yeaz obligation. The City ceased accepting federal funds so it wouldn't be obligated to the FAA after 2015 when the 1984 Agreement between the City of Santa Monica and the FAA expires. A copy of the 1984 agreement, that establishes the terms of operation for Santa Monica Airport, can be found on the City of Santa Monica website (httn://santa- monica.or airport/PDF%20Files/1984%20Apreement.PDF). Appendix A: Congressional Quarterly report on passage of spending bill with runway safety area provision. Spending Bill Includes Runway Safety Provision; FAA Says Plan Already on Track By Kathryn A. Wolfe, CQ Staff Spurred by the recent crash of a business jet at New Jersey's Teterboro Airport, the Senate tucked a provision into a recently passed appropriations bill that would compel airports to improve runway safety by 2015. The amendment to the fiscal 2006 Transportation-Treasury-Housing bill (HR 3058), passed on Oct. 20, mandates an end date for a nearly 30-year struggle between safety advocates and commercial airport operators over safety zones at the ends of runways. "This measure will make all of the nation's commercial airport runways safer," said the amendment's author, Democrat Sen. Frank. R. Lautenberg of New Jersey. "If the government can do anything to make flying safer, it should and must be done." FAA Mandate At issue is the late-1970s Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) mandate requiring that America's almost 600 commercial airports install 1,000 feet of buffer space at the ends of runways, to give airplanes in trouble on takeoff or landing extra room to slow down. According to the FAA, 248 airports -more than 40 percent -still do not comply. The FAA has been loath to enforce its requirement for these buffer zones, known as "Runway Safety Areas," at all airports, believing it would be unfeasible for many older facilities constrained by encroaching developments or geographic obstacles, such as nearby water. Absent a public outcry for these buffer zones, airports have had little incentive to seek federal grants to pay for installing them. A relatively new technology to slow down aircraft, employing beds of soft concrete at the end of runways, allows airports with little room to expand to meet the safety standards, but at a cost of $5 million to $8 million per runway, according to airport lobby groups. The arresting systems, which generally require only anadditional- 400 feet beyond the runway, essentially bog down a plane's wheels in soft concrete, slowing it down quickly. "Obviously this is going to take an influx of funding," said Brad Van Dam, staff vice president for the Airport Legislative Alliance, a lobby group for airports. "Whether it means extending runways by an additional 1,000 feet or installing these [concrete arresting systems], you're going to need an influx of funding to pay for this stuff," he said. Pilots Concerned Safety advocates such as the Air Line Pilots Association, an airline pilots' union, said the FAA has been too willing in the past to allow exceptions with the explanation that the mandate should only be applied "to the extent practicable." "From our standpoint, we'd like to have runway safety areas be exactly what they're supposed to be," said Bill Phaneuf, a senior staff engineer with the association. "In the past ...the FAA would issue waivers to airports with minimal excuses." Phaneuf said the FAA considerably tightened its regulations in 2003, requiring that runway safety area improvements be a part of any major runway overhaul, but that the Senate bill would make the requirement unambiguous by holding airports to a completion date. The <National> <Transportation> <Safety> <Board, which has prodded the FAA for decades to take a more proactive approach to improving runway safety areas, said the the FAA has begun providing funding to bring the remaining airports into compliance at the rate of roughly 70 per year. FAA Spokesman Greg Martin said the Lautenberg amendment will essentially codify the FAA's current plans to use federal airport improvement grants to bring all airports into compliance by 2015. "This basically runs parallel to our current plans," Martin said. "We do expect to be able to substantially fund these improvements." However, Alex Formuzis, Lautenberg's spokesman, said the FAA only produced its plan fora 2015 compliance date a few days before the Senate passed the bill that included the mandatory deadline. Source: CQ Today Round-the-clock coverage of news from Capitol Hill. © 2005 Congressional Quarterly Inc. All Rights Reserved. Appendix B: Growth of jet operations at Santa Monica Airport over 22 years, from 1983 - 2004 Growth of Jet Operations at SMt3 1983 through 20{14 (Data is from SMD records} Graph assenebted by=triarzin ttuvin z4,a44 ~ 8,444 ~, ~ 16,044 .« a 14,004 g b 12,444 z 14,44p .~ e ~" 8,400 0 6,444 s .x,444 z,a44 4 Appendix C: Map of an impact zone for a hypothetical accident at Santa Monica Airport, akin to one that occurred at a comparable airport in Texas on May 9, 2005 M R Y'f L? O ,`l ?f Kt t3 fti W v C N H < as oa m oa c~ ~ c c. c~ ~ c cs a e o 0 0 a cs c es c+ cs i. e, c s o 0 0 0 0 r - r - - - - - r r - r N N N N N Na jat aperatian taunt wa<. kept far 1987, 88, 89, 91. and 7994. Appendix D (next page): Letter from R. Austin Wiswell, Chief of the Division of Aeronautics for the California Department of Transportation, to Woodie Woodward, FAA Associate Administrator for Airports -dated 9/2/04 1'~'ATF 1$~('~Ii'°°~ xrcr.~rv ARNOL~~!wwA1~F~ECW2R QOVemM1, DEFARTi41ENT OF TRAN$FOR;TATION I2IYISiON OF AERONAIITIGS - ltt5,#~l0 1126 N STREET P, O, ROX 94Z$73 SACRAMENTO, CA 94273-0001 PHONE {916) fi54-4959 FAX (316)653-9531 TfiY (916) fi5I-6827 September 2„ 2004 Ms. Woodie Woodwazd Associate Administrator For Airports Federal Aviation Administration $00 Independence Avenue SVtz Washington, I3.C. 20591 Dear Ms. Woodward:. F(exyo~errxiweri Beenergy efjci¢rztf I am drawn into theSarrta Monica Municipal Airport Runway Safety Area issue. Ia my role as rho Chief, Division of Aeronautics, California Deparpnent o€T'ransportation, I have a public safety responsibility. The State of California, bylaw (the state's Public IRlities Code}; issues `state operatingpermits to Fublie-Else and Special-Ilse airports and heliports in California, There aze 2S4 Public-Use airports and another 55 or so Special-Useairports (mostly airpazks), and a boogie hundredstate permitted heliports, of which k40 or so are hospital heligor~. Permit issuance is based on the facility meeting basic„ minimum design safety standazds. California adopted as standards the design guidelines contained in the Federal Aviation Administration's Advisory Circulars 1SOI5300-I3 Ydr airgortsand 154(539Q-2A fortreliports. We conduct regular "permit compliance" safety inspections of all permitted faci}ities, identifying. discrepancies {i.e. notmeeting the state's basictniniruum design standards and/orhaving obstructions to air navigation per Federal Aviation Regulation Part 77). Discrepancies aze expected to be corrected by airport sponsors, or if the correction is not economically, technologically„ or terrain feasible we MAY issues variance to the State standads, Having a Runway Safety urea per 15015306-13 is a state requirement to obtain estate-operating. permit. hi the ease of the Santa Ivionica Municipal Airport, we view the insufficient Runway Safety Area length to be s4ivable, thus we aze disinclined to issue a variance to state safety standards. The solution, unfortunatelyforcveryone, the State of California, the City of Santa Monica„ the Federal Aviation Administration, and the users ofthe Santa Monica Municipal Airport, is to adjust the effective length of the runwayso as to create suitable three hundred foot Long Runway Safety Areas at each end of-the smgle tunwayhavingnot lower than'/<stahttamile approach visibility minimums for a B-II aircraft. This "declared distance" approach still provides a landing length {LDA} of 4,400 feet and anaccelerate-stop distance (ASDA} for takeoff of 4,700 feet, The other two declared distances, takeoff run {TORA} and takeoff distance {TODA}„ would remain at the full length of the runway,. I attended the November 2D„ 2003,_ meeting between representatives of the Santa Monica Municipal Airport management and the. Federal Aviation Adminisration, when airport management's safety and liability concerns, and the State's public safety concerns, were aired. I found it unfathomable that representatives of the Federal Aviafion Administration could dismiss the Santa Monica and State safety concerns as merely a matter of probability that something dire "Cakran8 ~tl~proues Atokflityacross fokfdrnia" Ms, woodie woadward September 2, 2004 Page 2 could occur. Probability is the basis fox odds„ which is the basis far gambling. I don't believe' any of us wants to ga»ible that no airplane will. ever ovemrn the runway or land short of the ninway if we can increase the margin of safety. N[yaverriding concern, shazed,by Santa Monica, is the "consequences ofjust once". whatever the probability of an aircraft tarring offovemrtrning the runway, or landing short ofthe runway; the consequencesof either of those can be very severe for-airplane' occupants, rand maybe quite severe for peop]e residing ar wcfrkitig off of the nmway`ends - where there should be sufficient Runway Safety Area instead of structures. Inmy 36 months of U,S., Air Force aircraft accident investigation (30 accidents in 36 months at Nellis Air Foree.Base) we never accepted that an accident, a destroyed aur"raft, deceased occupants, was within the probabilities: We considered Elie consequences of ev-=cry single one trfthose `30 accidents to be severe and sought to further tilt tke probabilities in olrr favor. That is where we are with the Santa Nlanica Runway Safety Area issue: tilt the probabilities more towazd enhanced safety. I also found it laughable when Federal Aviation Administration representatives dismissed the runway overrunning ci undershootittg.issues as being tafially in the hands of pilots and the air traffic control tower staff, and then minimized, if not marginalized; the role a Runway Safety Area plays in;reducing the consequences of ogermrming ur undershooting the nmway. Pilots make mistakes, Airtraffic control personnel cannot prevent pilot mistakes; The Congress mandated a progxarrt of "runway safety area deterxninaYions" for commercial. service primary airports.. 1 don't believe the occupants of a General.. Aviation airplane aze any less valuable than are the occupants of a commercial airliner as regards the adequacy of a Runway Safety Area. when an important Reliever General Aviation airport, such as Santa Monica is, does not leave sufficient Runway Safety Areas; there should be an intellectually honest effort to mitigate the safety risk. Santa Monica:airport management wishes to use their approved AII?'s B-II Airport Reference Code designation as air upper limit. on the size,: and approach speed of airplanes using that airport. Limiring airplanes to B-II, or below, will allow the creation--of the desired 300-foot _ _ extended Runway Safety Area through the use- of declazed. fhrough the use of declazed distances: The State of Ca7ifomia concurs, in the interest of pubhc safety, as the most prudent and feasible solutiari~ The issue of safety should not have been subordinated to a perceptign of a hidden agenda, as seemed to me to be the very transparent position of the Federal Aviation Adminisfraton representatives.- at the November 20 2003 meeting. It was ad unproductive meeting, by any measure, in terrns of addressing the safety question. The intelleetualdishdnesty o£theFederal Aviation Adminrsirarion representatives in trying to mask their feaz that the Runway Safety Area issue was a stalkinghorse for an aircraft noise reduction/lrniting maneuver was appazent to all, even to most ofthe Federal Aviation: Administration delegation. , T don't see how the Federal Aviation Administration can prevent Santa Monica from doing what it thinks will:improve public safety, reduce their risk exposure, andtednce their liability to a "Cottrgiis improves m9btlity across Ca(ifornra" Ms. Woodie PFaodward September 2, 2QQ4 Pace 3 much. tttore defensible position. And I may have to suspend their stato-operating permit if they can't work out a solution to the Runway Safety Area issue that is acceptable to the State of t;alifornta._ fine present confusion, and cantradic'tary recollections of what was agreed to by the parties at the above referenced meeting is delaying resolution of an existing safety issue. There should be another meeting. A cast of thousands is not necessary, and lawyers shoutdn't be invited. Tliei issue is simpler Santa Monica Municipal Airport has insufficient Runway SafetyAreas and wishes to corrget the design standazd discrepancy in the interest of public safety. R?hat problem would the Federal Aviation Administration have with this proposal? Sincerely,. f3rigirial Signed by ,R. AUSTIN WISWELL, Chief Division of Aeronautics c: Mark McClardy Robert Trirribori 'Caltrarss niproces mobility across Ca£p(ornb" U.S. Department of Transportation Federca Aviation Administralion March 7, 2008 Mr. P. Lamon# Ewell City Manager City of Santa Monica 1 b85 Main Street, Room 209 Santa Monica, CA 40401 AsSOGate AdministraWr SOO Independence Ave., SW for Airports Washington, DC 20591 REi Engineered Material Arresting System at Santa Monica Airport Dear Lamont: Thank you very much for pulling your team together yesterday to discuss this important subject. I trust that you received the Engineered Material Arresting System {EMAS} graphic showing approximate dimensions which we dispatched yesterday afternoon. As promised, this letter generally outlines the four elements that we propose to move this project forwazd: 1. EMAS: We aze proposing that the City have the option to select either the 40-knot installation at each runway end, as previously discussed in detail, ar a 74-knot installation at the departure end of Runway 21, as generally depicted in yesterday's graphic. The latter includes consuming-mare current runway pavement than the FAA has previously been willing to approve: Although there are additional operational impacts associated with using more pavement, we are willing to permit this impact, as the City so forcefully azgued for the protection of a 1000-foot Runway Safety Area {70-knot EMAS equivalent) in our recent meeting here in Washington. Of course, selecting this option will mean #hat nothing is done elsewhere on the runway that would further shorten its length. We, nonetheless, hope that the City will select the 70-knot installation, as it clearly addresses whatever safety risk-may exist on this already safe airfield; that is, coverage of 97% of your operations including 94% of the Category C and D operations. 2. Hold Line: We propose moving the hold lines on bout taxiways to the approximate position of the current IFR hold line on Taxiway A and making those hold lines apphcabie to ail aircraft, IFR, and VFR. This should help insure that, in circumstances when an aircraft is held for departure, the noise and emissions experienced on properries adjoining the airport are decreased. The emissions should go back down the taxiway, staying on the airport, and the noise offthe airport will be sideline noise, which is naturally less than exhaust noise. 3. PEEER RNAV Departure: Our Air Traffic Organization has accelerated its work in redesigning this departure at the request of my office. As you know, the former departure was not successful, as we were not able to achieve 3 nautical miles separation from LAX departures.. The redesigned PEEER is virtually ready for announcement and public release: We certainly are hoping far success this time, and if we achieve it, the procedure should very substantially decrease the number of aircraft held idling on The ground at SMO, as departures will run independently from the LAX departures, except to the south: This is an operational benefit to the aircraft as well as a noise and emissions benefit to folks on the ground. 4. NOTAMs: As we discussed, the FAA has recently transitioned to electronic Notices to Airmen (NOTAMs}. We propose to add two items along with the NOTAMs whenever a pilot files a flight plan into or out of Santa Monica. The first order of business in safety is prevention; thus, the pilot will get an FAA hiFO {Information For Operators) as part of a Runway Safety Area Awareness Program. This InFO will describe the particular circumstances of the Santa Monica Airport, including the absence of Runway Safety Areas, and provide operational best practices far avoiding ovemms. Further, the pilot will get a copy of the Santa Monica "Fly Neighborly" program; including operations and noise abatement procedures, which you developed. Again, we're aiming at increased safety and mitigation of impacts an those around the airport. I challenged my staff to put aside their previous work on this matter and approach the problem with fresh eyes and a clean sheet of paper. I believe they have done exactly that, as evidenced by these four elements. As we discussed, I have already blocked March 25, 2008, an my calendaz to come to Santa Monica to discuss these elements in detail with your staff and the Cotmcil. In the meantime, I will be happy to answer any questions that may arise and hope that the Council will see fi# to forego further action on its pending ordinance banning certain aircraft from the airport. D. Kirk Shaffer Associate Administrator for Airports cc: Chairman James L. Oberstar Chairman Henry A. Waxman Congresswoman Jane Harman Acting Administrator Robert A. Sturgeil ~-~- ~la~)o~' Mar Vista Community Council 3759 Barry Avenue Los Angeles, CA 90066 Board of Directors 2007-2008 Chair Rob Kadota robCNmarv'sta org ta` Vice Chair Bob Fitzpatrick bobf(almarv'sta arg 2nd Vice Chair Albert Olson albert(almarvlsta org December 11, 2007 Santa Monica City Council City of Santa Monica 1685 Main Street, Room 209 Santa Monica, CA 90401 Councilmembers: The Mar Vista Community Council sends this expression of appreciation to the Santa Monica City Council for its recent decision to initiate the process to add Section 10.04.06.220 to the Santa Monica Municipal Code. We are in complete agreement that for the safety of all residents---both in Santa Monica and Los Angeles---living inclose proximity to the airport, it is an important step to conform the usage of the Santa Monica Airport to category A and B aircraft. Secretary Furthermore, we commend the Santa Monica City Council for its Laura eodensteiner courage in passing this ordinance in the face of stated opposition from (aura (olmarv sta oro . the Federal Aviation Administration. The MVCC will strongly Treasurer support any action taken by the Santa Monica City Council to pursue curt steindler curt(olmarvista ora all state and federal legislative means to also accomplish the goals of this ordinance, if such means become necessary. Zone Directors Zone 1 Best regards, Roberta Golan Schil4er Zone 2 Laura Bodensteiner Zone 3 J.D. Gaydowski zone 4 Stephen Boskin - zones - Rob Kadota Curt Steindler zone6 Chalr Keith Lamber[ Mar V1Sta COTnlnUtllty COlll1C11 At-Large Directors Ken Alpern Sharon Commins Bob Fitzpatrick Colin Hatton Bob Fitzpatrick Rob Kadota Albert Olson 1St Vice Chair Bill Scheding '~ ~~', `°~ ~=' Albert Olson ~ y Ep ~,, 2"d Vice Chair Certified Neighborhaotl Council August 13, 2002 2202 hill st Santa monica ca 90405 - Gooele Mans htto://mans.¢oosle.com/mans?1=a&h1=en&eeocode=&a=2202+hill... Address 2202 Hill St Get Google Maps on your phone ~ Santa Monica, CA 90405 ~ Tex[theword"GMAPS"to466453 3 ~' 31as~a~ s >'. ~, ~„ „s ~:.... ..~_•" as er , .._.. _._.. r Fva __ h St ~$ ~ ~ti 1 of 1 3/74/200R R:10 AM_ Myths and facts about bird hazazds 3 _ ~'~. Page 1 of 2 Bird Strike committee lDSA The Top 10 Bird Strike Myths There are many misconceptions by air travelers and the general public about the threat posed by birds to aircraft and the occupants. The following facts should shed some light on some of these issues. 1. Myth -Bird strikes cannot cause serious airline accidents. Fact -Since 1975, five large jet airliners have had major accidents where bird strikes played a significant role. In case, about three dozen people were killed. 2. Myth -Bird strikes are rare. Fact -Over 56,000 bird strikes to civil aircraft in the United States were reported to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) from 1990-2004, a mere 20% of the number that likely occurred. 3. Myth -Bird strikes are no more of a problem today than 20 or 30 years ago. Fact - In North America, bird strike hazards are increasing. Because of outstanding wildlife conservation and environmental programs in North America, populations of many bird species have increased dramatically since tl 1970s. Millions of acres have been set aside as wildlife refuges and strong environmental laws such as the Migrat Bird Treaty Act and the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act have protected birds and other wildli As a result, species like non-migratory Canada Geese, which frequent urban areas such as golf courses, pazks, an~ airports, have more than quadrupled in number from 1985 to 2004. As another example, the double-crested corrm population on the Great Lakes has increased over 1,000-fold, from 89 nesting pairs in 1972 to over 115,000 pairs 2004. These increases have led to an increase in the number of birds in the vicinity of both large and small airpor and greater opportunities for birds, especially larger birds, to hit aircraft. 4. Myth -Large aircraft are built to withstand all bird strikes. Fact - Lazge commercial aircraft like passenger jets aze certified to be able to continue flying after impacting a 4- bird, even if substantial and costly damage occurs and even if one engine has to be shut down. However, 36 spec of birds in North America weigh over 41bs and most of these large birds travel in flocks. About 30% of reported strikes by birds weighing more than 41bs to civil aircraft in USA, 1990-2002, involved multiple birds. Even floc small birds (e.g., stazlings, blackbirds) and single medium sized birds (e.g., gulls, ducks, hawks) can cause engine failure and substanfial damage. 5. Myth - If a bird flies into an engine during takeoff and the engine quits, the airplane will crash. Fact -Large commercial jets aze designed so that if any 1 engine is unable to continue generating thrust, the airpl will have enough power from the remaining engine or engines to safely complete the flight. However, because n birds travel in flocks, there is always a possibility that birds will be ingested into multiple engines. 6. Myth -Nothing can be done to keep birds away from airports. Fact -There aze a number of effective techniques that can reduce the number of birds in the airport area. In genet the techniques fall into three categories: malting the environment unattractive for birds, scaring the birds, or as a 1 resort, reducing the bird population. 7. Myth - It is illegal to kill birds just to protect aircraft. Fact - In North America, there are a few introduced (non-native) birds such as pigeons and stazlings which aze nc federally protected species and generally may be killed if they pose a threat to aircraft. Most birds, such as ducks. geese, gulls, and herons, may be killed in limited number by an airport authority only after obtaining appropriate permits and demonstrating that non-lethal techniques are not adequate. Endangered species may not be killed unc any circumstances. 8. Myth - If birds are a problem at an airport, killing them all would eliminate the problem. Fact - Even if it were legal to do so, killing off all birds at an airport will not solve the problem. An airport is an integral part of the local ecosystem, and like in all ecosystems, each plant or animal species plays an important ro Eliminating any one problem species will only lead to some other species taking its place. A combinafion of bird http://www.birdstrike.org/commlink/top_ten.htm 3/24/2008 Myths and facts about bird hazards Page 2 of 2 control measures which take into account habitat management is a superior long-term solution. 9. Myth -Except for the very rare accident, bird strikes are only a nuisance to airline operators. Fact - For a modern jet airliner, even minor damage can lead to significant costs. For example, if a bird strike res in damage that leads to replacing a single pair of fan blades, the airline has to deal with not only the direct cost of labor and materials, but also the indirect costs of keeping the aircraft out of revenue service and redirecting passengers. The FAA estimates that bird strikes cost civil aviation over $500 million per yeaz in the USA, 1990-~ Worldwide, bird strikes cost commercial air carriers over $1 billion each yeaz. Furthermore, minor damage to airl is usually not covered by aircraft hull or engine insurance, so the costs of most bird strikes directly affect airline profits. 10. Myth -Bird strikes are a concern only to those who fly. Fact -The issue of bird strikes is tied into a wide range of social and policy issues that go beyond aviation. The n important areas where this is true is the environment. Past and present policies of wildlife and habitat managemet can directly affect bird populafions and bird strike hazards. Because bird strikes can lead to aircraft accidents, biro strikes can have a direct effect on both the families and friends of potential victims both in the aircraft and on the ground. Bird strikes can also have environmental consequences. For example, as a result of a bird strike that disal an engine on a B-747 departing Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) in August 2000, the pilot had to dump tons of fuel over the Pacific Ocean before returning to land safely at LAX. 11. Bonus Myth -Bird strikes never occur at high altitudes. Fact - It is true that most strikes occur in the airport environment. About 41 % of reported strikes with civil aircr USA occur while the aircraft is on the ground during take-off or landing and about 75% of strikes occur at less th 500 feet above ground level (AGL). However, over 1,300 strikes involving civil aircraft at heights above 5,000 f AGL were reported from 1990-2003. The world height record for a strike is 37,000 feet. http://www.birdstrike.org/commlink/top ten.htm 3/24/2008 ~~ C~rv of Santa 7lonica" March 12, 2008 Office of the City Manager ib85 Main Street PO Box 2200 Santa Monica, Califiornia 90407-2200 Mr. D. Kirk Shaffer Associate Administrator for Airports Federal Aviation Administration .800 Independence Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20591 Re: Santa Mon'ca nicipal Airport -Runway Safety Areas Dear Mc Sha 3 -t~- ~~a~~~ Thank you for outlining the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) position regarding runway safety areas for the Santa Monica Municipal Airport (Airport). It remains the City's position that maximizing the safety for operafors of aircraft, passengers and for residents living adjacent to the Airport by applying FAA standards for runway safety areas is vital to the long. term interests of the Airport. The Gity Council has indicated its interest in hearing the FAA's explanation of its position regarding Runway Safety Areas and accepts your offer to appear at the Gity Council meeting of March 25, 2008 Yd provide that explanation. In reviewing your letter of March 7, 2008, the Gity has concerns regarding the non-standard safety options proposed for the west end of the runway and the complete absence of any safety options proposed for the east end of the runway. 1. Engineered Materials Arresting System (EMAS) -The City is pleased that the FAA has agreed with the City's position that a 1000-ft. Runway Safety Area (or 70-knot EMAS equivalent) is needed. on the west end of the runway. However, the EMAS graphic forwarded to the City on March 6, 2008', and referred to in your March 7 letter, indicated an FAR recommendation fora 250 foot EMAS bed with a 25 foot lead-irr to the EMAS bed. The analysis (attachment A) requested by FAA and performed by Engineered Arresting Systems Corporation (ESGO), the manufacturer of EMAS, shows that: a 250-ft. EMAS bed at SMO would provide 70-knot stopping capability for only 2 of the 7 aircraftselected for analysis by ESCO. In other words, the 250-ft. EMAS bed would not provide 70 knot stopping capability for 5 of the 7 aircraft selected far analysis. Perhaps the wrong graphic was inadvertently sent to the Gity on March 6. If so, please provide the actual dimensions of the 70-knot EMAS installation referred to in your March 7 letter. tel: 310 458-8301 • fax: 310 917-6640 D. Kirk Shaffer, Associate Administrator March 12, 2008 Page 2 of 3 To provide some frame of reference, both the attached January 18, 2006 ESGO data, which was attached to the January 20, 2006 (attachment 6} letter sent by David Bennett of the FAA, and the subsequent attached May 30, 2006 (attachment C} ESCO data which expanded the number of options modeled, demonstrate that a 70 knot standard could be met with either a 250 foot EMAS bed with a 350 foot lead-in or a 400 foot EMAS bed with a 35 foot lead-in. In addition to meeting the 70 knot standard on the west side of the runway, the City is also concerned about providing adequate safety protection for the east side of the runway. As the previous FAA Administrator, Marion C. Blakey, stated in her June 12, 2006 letter to Congressman Henry Waxman concerning RSAs at SMQ, "We have heard the concerns of neighbors of the airport and agree thafsafety improvements should apply to both ends of the runway." Your letter indicates that 97% of aircraft operations are to the west. The City's data indicates that the actual figure is somewhere between 94% and 97%, leaving 3-6% of operations to the east. FAA's position is apparently that this is a sufficiently low number as to not warrant any safety protection. If so, the City does not understand how an impact on a fraction of these operations, due to implementation of same RSA (whether through the use of declared distances or other means) on the east side, would impose an impact on operations that is unacceptable to the FAA. This is particularly true since FAA's statutory manda#e is that the safe operation of the national airport and airway system is its highest priority. Consequently, an FAA position that there should be no provision of safety margins for the 3-6% of the operations that are eastbound (apparently due to concerns over implementation of safety margins that would affect a much lower level of operations) would appear to be contrary to the agency's statutory mandate to promote safety. Perhaps the City has misunderstood FAA`s position, and the agency would support safety enhancement for the east side of the runway. We would appreciate FAA clarification of its position in this regard. 2. Hold Line -Although this proposal is not related to the runway safety. discussions above, the City appreciates the FAA`s consideration of changes to the procedures foraircraft movement on the field. In order to minimize the time aircraft spend on the taxiways. and at the departure end of the runway, the City has instituted two policies in cooperation with the FAA. The IFR Engine Start Procedures minimize the delay between engine start and departure by having fixed-wing turbine aircraft obtain a departure release time from Air Traffic Contra) prior to starting its engines or taxiing to the IFR Hald Areas on the taxiways. The IFR Hold Area Procedures provide foran area on the taxiway 200 feet from the end of the runway for aircraft to hold while waiting for departure clearance from Air Traffic Control. Although the City rarely receives complaints regarding the holding times for VFR traffic, the City would be glad to discuss the inclusion of VFR traffic in the current Engine Start and Hold Area Procedures, including 4he impacts on sideline noise on residential areas to the north and impact of the westerly winds on any aircraft noise or engine emissions when holding on the taxiways. D. Kirk Shaffer, Associate Administrator March 12,.2008 Page 3 of 3 3. PEEER RNAV Departure -The City remains very interested in this new procedure. During the development of this procedure and during its prior unsuccessful test period, the City's staff at the Airport was not consulted about implementation of this procedure. It is our understanding that only aircraft with appropriate navigational equipment {CPS/RNAV) will be able to use this procedure. Under the prior attempt, only one user of the Airport had the appropriate equipment. It is also our understanding that the new procedure does not change the current flight path to areas over residential areas, but involves a change in the flight path after it has crossed the coastline. The Gity would appreciate receiving a full briefing of this new procedure and presentation to the City's Airport Commission. 4. NOTAMs -Wider dissemination of the City's Fly Neighborly Program is an ongoing goal for the City and the FAA's participation in that effort is a positive development. Raising the awareness of the users of the Airport regarding the geographically constrained nature of the Airport's facilities is a good interim step, but it cannot substitute for real runway safety areas on the runway. Use of the NOTAMs and other methods of outreach to pilots, operators and owners of aircraft in conjunction with runway safety areas that meet the 70 knot standard will significantly increase the safety for everyone us"tng or living near the Airport. Providing a briefing. to City staff and a presentation to the City's Airport Commission on this issue would be a good first step in starting the dialogue on this recommendation to address the Airport's runway safety issues. After many years of discussion, the City appreciates the FAA's recognition that runway safety systems should meet the 70 knot standard. Consistent with former Administrator Blakey's statement that safety. improvements should .apply at both ends of the runway,. the City is ready to implement true 70 knot runway safety system at both ends of the runway for the safety of those on board the aircraft, and for residents living adjacent to the Airport. If you have any questions or comments, please do not hesitate to contact the City. Sincerely, ~.?~? ~__ ,,,~% . Lamont Ewell City Manager cc: Mayor and City Council Marsha Jones Moutrie, Gity Attorney Robert Trimborn, Acting Airport Director Attachments: A ESCO Modeling (March 2008) B David Bennett Letter (January 20, 2006} C ESCO Modeling Data (May 30, 2006) Attachment A 0 strength beds performances (in knots - RW exit speed) ircraft.Model -IV L-600 alcon 900 earjet 35 RJ-135 essna 750 awker 125 stimated EMAS Stopping Capability@ specified perating weights. 57,000 ]bs 7,000 lbs 35,500 ]bs 14,000 lbs 1,500 lbs 9,000 lbs 0,500 Ibs 50 ft bed plus 25 ft setback (tota1275 ft RSA) igh 60's 0 igh 60's id 50's id 60's mid 60's 70 160 ft bed plus 25 ft setback (total 185 ft RSA) low 50's id 50's low 50's low-mid 40's high 40's 50 id 50's 175 ft bed plus 25 ft setback (tota1200 ft RSA) low-mid 50's igh 50's id 50's id 40's low 50's low 50's 60 Notes: Some A/Cwere modeled using similar A/C that we have data available from the manufacturer. (G-IV modeled as G-III, Cessna 750 modeled as Falcon 900, Hawker 125 modeled as Learjet 35) Based on design case using poor braking (0.25 braking coefficient) and no reverse thrust. Assumes RSA slope of zero percent. Attachment B U.SDepartment orn~eaarpnrts of TronsportQlbn and SFaMaads ~Y SOO independenceAve„ S1N. waaltingmn, DC 20591 Federd Av~ion Adminisfr~ian a>;n z e z<~ Mr. Robert T:•irnbom Airport Manager, Santa Monica Airport Office of the.~irport Manager 3223 Donald Douglas Loop South Santa Morrica, CA 90405 Deae Mr. Triniborn: We have considered the proposal and supporting information in your letter of September 8, 2004. As noted in our earlier letters, we are very interested in safety enhancements to the runway environment a.t Santa Monica Municipal Airport (SMO). At the same time, we recogni2e the importance of 5MU to aviation in the Southern California region, and we are interested in preserving the utility of this airport and its availability to all classes of operator that can safely use the airport, The recon#igwation of the runway proposed in yotu letter would provide a 300-foot runway safety area at tech end of the nvnway through a combination of displaced thresholds and declared distances. On takeoff, the fall runway length would be available for calculating takeoff distant a and takeoffrun available (TORA), but the declared distance for accelcrats- stop distance available (ASDA) would be 4,687 feet, a reduction of 300 feet from current conditions. For landing sir7aft, the combination of a 300-foot displaced threshold would reduce pavement available by 300 feet. Thy declared landing distance available {LDA) would be 4387 feet, or 6i)0 feetless than at present. The displace3 thresbold bas no benefit for overruns, but s~~ves as protection for aizcaraft that land short of the nmway pavement. Statistically, ur:dershooi incidents at airports are significantly less common than ovemuis. A review of Nf:tionai Transportation Safety $oard accident records indicates that SMO follows the standard pattern. One short landing aceidem has occurred at SMO since 1982, a nonfatal accident in 1992. The existing nrrway safety area at SMO presently extends only a short distance beyond each end of the runty ay. While the approved airport Layout plan lists the airport reference code as B-II, the design aircraft, based on the current usage of the airport, is D-II. To meet the FAA standard for a rmway serving that ai>•craf}, the RSA would have to extend 1000 feetbeyond each end of the runway. It is clear from the outset that a standard RSA for D-II aircraft is not possible wit bout major construction off the ends of the'runways, involving substantial grading, relocation of public roads, and the taking of residential property. To meet that standard without affecting areas offthe ends of the runway would be impractical, as.it would require shortening the runway to the point of virtually eliminating its utility, z When it is no::possible to provide a standard RSA, ii makes sense to design a nonstandard RSA in a mariner that-will provide the highest net safely enhancement that is consistent with the basic functionality of the runway. As mentioned above, undershoots are experienced much less fre~iuently than overruns. Also, airport operations data for SMO indicate that 95% to 98% c f operations are on runway 2 L It is clear that the highest safety benefit would be achieved 8om a measure that addresses overruns on runway 21, which could result either from landings or from rejected takeoffs on that runway- !t is also generally beneficial to preserve as m'rch actual pavement as possible for operations on runway 3-21, both to preserve acce~ s io the airport and to provide the maximum pavement for braking aircraft. The proposal in your letter meets these objectives for takeoffs, albeit with some effect oa access to the airport resulting from the reduced ASDA of 4,687 feet. For landings, however, your proposal would reduce actual pavement available by 300 feet, to provide as approach- and RSA for undershoot protection. Tha safety benefit of the proposed changes, aside from the undershoo~ protection, wvuld result from prohibiting some aircraR from taking off at a certain weight or at all, in order to eliminate marginal operations which appear to require almost al! vsatde pavement- For all other landing operations at SMO, however, the benefit of the propose is limited to undershoot protection, and that benefit would be offset by a loss of 300 feet of ~ unway length. We are concerned that a reduction in nurway length of 300 feet or mare would have an adverse effect on safety in auy incident whore there is the potential for ar. vvem~ ' regardless of the design group of the aircraft. Given the special circumstances That exist at SMO, we believe a reduction in available pavement for landings to obtain undershoot protection would not result in a~nei enhancement to safety. We suggest two alternatives for enhancing safety for aircraft overruns at SMO. F,ngineered material arresting system (EMAS) and declared dfstance of 4, b87 feet. We understand that there is not sufficient land at the ends of the runway for a standazd );MAS installation, wb ich would take approximately 600 feet including both the setback from the runway and the EMAS bed itself. You have rejected EMAS on this basis in your prior letters. Howev;r, FAA standards provide for anon-standard EMAS installation where a certain ~*++++:*..un benefit can be achieved. That benefit is considered the ability to stop the design aircraft leaving the nmway end at a speed not less than 40 knots. we took a preli Winery look at the possibility of installing EMAS at the departure end of runway 21 only, since most operations at SMO use that runway. Our. correspondence with the Engineered Arresting Systems Company indicates that the installation of an_EMAS no more than 165 f tier in length at the end of tvmvay 2 t could provide protection for operations at SMO where a m airplane exits that runway at 40 knots or less (preliminary report attached). F..MAS iastallarons are custom-designed for the size aircraft that use a particular airport. As a result, the overnm protection provided by this EMAS installation would extend to a substantial portion of the aircraft fleet using SMO, including alt of the lazgest aircraft. types using the airpor.. This 40-knot stopping perfomtarrce meets our criterion for practicability of installation o'°EMAS. 'lIte option of installing a 165-foot 1rMAS would require grading and possibly usr of a small Iength of existing runway, but on a first look it appears feasible from an engineering standpoint. Declared distances jot ASDA arrd LDA af4, 687 feet. Without EMAS, a smaller safety enhancement could be obtained by the ux of declared distances alone without a displaced threshold or o';her physical change to the runway. This option would have less adverse effect on aiipcrt access than the city's proposal, because it would retain all existing pavement for ~ rse in both takeoff and landing, and would affect fewer operations. In each of then a alternatives-the city's and the two alternatives we propose is this letter- operators that ase SMO would be affected to some degree. For that reason we intend to discuss these alternatives informally with users to get better information on how they would be affected. Also, we note that any FAA decision required for a change to the runway environment a: SMO will requixe environmental review. We look forward to your comments on these proposals and to further discussions with you on how best to enhance safety at SMO. Sin~cerely~, ~ David L. $enn+;tl Director ofAirwrt Safety and Standards Enclosure ESCO ~ ~ ~ EMAS PRELIMINARY PERFORMANCE & COST ESTIMATES FOR Santa Monaca Airport January 18, 2006 8ngineeredArresung Systems Corporation Santa Monica Airpart Yto Id8-06 Prelimit~a•~Per1nrmance & CostingEstimates• Airport: Santa Monica Location: Santa Monica. CA Runway: 3-21 Runway Dimensions: 4 987 ft lone x 150 ft wade Elevation: 175 ft above ses level RSA slope(s): Assume aero sloce Ootion#7 Re uest: Size EMAS for maximum ava0able RSA len of 600 feet `S$.7 Million for EMAS materials 8 installation (excluding any site preparation costs) Cost Estimate (Per System) Please note site preparation mrtslsts of rurwvay shouMer type paving of suffident strength to support an occasior~l airaaR passage. The site prep dimensions recommended for this EMAS system would be 800' long x ~ 70' wide. 'Cost estimate based On FY06 costs 260' long x 170' wide EMAS arrestor bed (plus 350' tong setbaeknead-in ramp} Size: Suggested total site prep area = 6p0• long x200' wkle {200' width to allow room for vehxte access •Ses attached sketch for typical EMAS configuration. Performance Estimate: Predkted runway exit speeds of 70 knots for G-IV {73,000 Ibs), CL-600 (dt,000 Ibs modeled as CR.1-2goj, and Lear 35 {17,OO01bs). This covers the range of weights for the fleet mix provided. Notes: (1) EMAS performances shown above were predicted by ESCO's earr~uter simula0on, an FAA validated ram. 2 Based on desi n ~ usi braid 0.25 txakin c0eflldent antl no reverse thrust Eagincernd Am:sdng Systems Co~ppration Santa 1Nonica Airport Prapossi 1.18-06 O tion#1 uest: Sae EMA8 for current ava~ble RSA Idt th of 165 feet '51.9 Million for EMAS materials & lnstapaHon {excluding any site prepataflon costs) Cost Estimat Please note site preparation consists of runway shoulder type Paving of sufficient strength to t e (Per System) suppor an occasional aircraft passage. The site prep dimensions recommended for this tJNAS system would tfe '165' long x 170' wide. Cwt estimate based on PY06 cosffi '130' long x 170' wide EMAS arrestor bed (plus 35' long setbaekiieadan ramp) Size: Suggested tool site prep area =165' long x 200' wide (200' width to allay room fobvehicle access 'Sea attached sketch for typical EMAS configuration. Pertormance Estimate: Predkted runway exit speeds of 4045 knots for Gal/ {73,000 Ibs), CLai00 {41,000 Ibs modeled as CRJ-200), and Lear35 (17,000 Ibsj. This covets the ran e of w i ht f th g e g s or e flea! mix provided. Notes: {1) EMAS performances shown above were predicted by !'cSCD's cort~mer simNatlan, an FAA validated ro ram. 2 Based on Wse usi braki 025 (saki coel5~nt and no reveiSe thrust. Engieaeted AreSlmg Systems CWIMrJCOn Saoc Monica AicpuR Proposal 1-18.06 7'vpieal EMAS Configuration TYPM.AL PW! YIEW lR T rtPicu aEVAnox MEwr ~~ ~e~roa LEpO rN tWAP / OYEfl CDNCAEiE 851M ~ ARhESTOR ~0 B11EE SfIflflICE ~ 510E STEPS 1 ! ~1'4AF. 3G4~UR ~E~~ ~~~~ ~r"'pii~NDE ARFF IY~t~58 ~ ANO Pl1S$ENGER ~6~£S$ $A$E`SURFACE Engmwcd Aeresfing Systems Corpofadoa Sanm Monica Ntpost Proposal 1-18-06 fll~nvarsA~rawtx~Ewen1--.. Attachment C ESCO EMAS PRELIMINARY PERFORMANCE & COST ESTIMATES FOR Santa Monica AiYpoYt May 30, 2006 revised Engineered Arresting Systems Corporation Santa Monica Airport Proposal 5-30-06 revised.doc ~iilil~a~r Preliminary Performance & Costing Estimates: Airport: Location: Runway: Runway Dimensions: Elevation: RSA slope(s): Option #1 Santa Monica Santa Monica. CA 3-21 4 987 ft lone x 150 ft wide 175 ft above sea level Assume zero slope Re uest: Size EMAS for 70 knots erformance for cafe o C&D usin 35 ft setback *$5.9 Million for EMAS materials & installation (excluding any site preparation costs) Please note site preparation consists of runway shoulder type paving of sufficient strength to Cost Estimate support an occasional aircraft passage.-The site prep dimensions recommended for this (Per System) EMAS system would be 435' long x 170' wide. *Cost estimate based on FY05 costs 400' long x 170' wide EMAS arrestor bed (plus 35' long setback/lead-in ramp) Size: Suggested total site prep area = 435' long x 200' wide (200' width to allow room for vehicle access) *See attached sketch for typical EMAS configuration. Performance Predicted runway exit speeds of 70 knots for G-IV (73,000 Ibs), CL-600 (41,000 Ibs Estimate: modeled as CRJ-200), and Lear 35 (17,000 Ibs). The Saab-340 (category B-II) would be in the low 60's. This covers the range of weights for the fleet mix provided. (1) EMAS performances shown above were predicted by ESCO's computer simulation, an FAA validated Notes: ro ram. 2 Based on desi n case usin oor brakin 0.25 brakin coefficient and no reverse thrust. Engineered Arresting Systems Corporation Santa Monica Airport Proposal 5-30-06 revised.doc ~i~=` Option#2 Re uest: Size EMAS for maximum available RSA len th of 600 feet '$3.7 Million for EMAS materials & installation (excluding any site preparation costs) Please note site preparation consists of runway shoulder type paving of sufficient strength to Cost Estimate support an occasional aircraft passage. The site prep dimensions recommended for this (Per System) EMAS system would be 600' long x 170' wide. 'Cost estimate based on FY06 costs 250' Tong x 170' wide EMAS arrestor bed (plus 350' long setback/lead-in ramp) Size: Suggested total site prep area = 600' long x 200' wide (200' width to allow room for vehicle access) `See attached sketch for typical EMAS configuration. Predicted runway exit speeds of 70 knots for G-IV (73,000 Ibs), CL-600 (41,000 Ibs Performance modeled as CRJ-200), and Lear 35 (17,000 Ibs). The available RSA length of 600 ft would Estimate: satisfy the RSA length requirement for category A&B. This covers the range of weights for the fleet mix provided. (1) EMAS performances shown above were predicted by ESCO's computer simulation, an FAA validated Notes: ro ram. 2 Based on desi n case usin oor brakin 0.25 brakin coefficient and no reverse thrust. Engineered Arresting Systems Corporation Santa Monica Airport Proposal 530-06 revised.doc Giiif~§a~s„ Option#3 Re uest: Size EMAS for current available RSA len th of 165 feet *$1.9 Million for EMAS materials 8 installation (excluding any site preparation costs) Please note site preparation consists of runway shoulder type paving of sufficient strength to Cost Estimate support an occasional aircraft passage. The site prep dimensions recommended for this (Per System) EMAS system would be 165' long x 170' wide. *Cost estimate based on FY06 costs 130' long x 170' wide EMAS arrestor bed (plus 35' long setbackllead-in ramp) Size: Suggested total site prep area = 165' long x 200' wide (200' width to allow room for vehicle access) 'See attached sketch for typical EMAS configuration. Predicted runway exit speeds of 40-45 knots for G-IV (73,000 Ibs), CL-600 (41,000 Ibs Performance modeled as CRJ-200), Saab-340 (26,500 Ibs), and Lear 35 (17,000 Ibs). Performance Estimate: estimated for the King air (12,500 Ibs) would be in the low 30's. This covers the range of weights for the fleet mix provided. (1) EMAS performances shown above were predicted by ESCO's computer simulation, an FAA validated Notes: ro ram. 2 Based on desi n case usin oor brakin 0.25 brakin coefficient and no reverse thrust. Engineered Arresting Systems Corporation Santa Monica Airport Proposal 5-30-06 revised.doc i~.~ ~. Option#4 Re uest: Size EMAS for current available RSA len th of 195 feet *$2.4 Million for EMAS materials & installation (excluding any site preparation costs) Please note site preparation consists of runway shoulder type paving of sufficient strength to Cost Estimate support an occasional aircraft passage. The site prep dimensions recommended for this (Per System) EMAS system would be 195' long x 170' wide. *Cost estimate based on PY06 costs 160' long x 170' wide EMAS arrestor bed (plus 35' long setbackllead-in ramp) Size: Suggested total site prep area =195' long x 200' wide (200' width to allow room for vehicle access) *See attached sketch for typical EMAS configuration. Predicted runway exit speeds of 45-50 knots for G-IV (73,000 Ibs), CL-600 (41,000 Ibs Performance modeled as CRJ-200), Saab-340 (26,500 Ibs), and Lear 35 (17,000 Ibs). Performance Estimate: estimated for the King air (12,500 Ibs) would be in the mid 30's. This covers the range of weights for the fleet mix provided. (1) EMAS performances shown above were predicted by ESCO's computer simulation, an FAA validated Notes: ro ram. 2 Based on desi n case usin oor brakin 0.25 brakin coefficient and no reverse thrust. Engineered Arresting Systems Corporation Santa Monica Airport Proposal 5-30-06 revised.doc ~iYi~a.~7°' Option#5 Re uest: Size EMAS usin 130 ft Ion bed with 300 ft setback from RW end 430 ft lop RSA *$1.9 Million for EMAS materials & installation (excluding any site preparation costs) Please note site preparation consists of runway shoulder type paving of sufficient strength to Cost Estimate support an occasional aircraft passage. The site prep dimensions recommended for this (Per System) EMAS system would be 430' long x 170' wide. *Cost estimate based on FY06 costs 130' long x 170' wide EMAS arrestor bed (plus 300' long setback/lead-in ramp) Size: Suggested total site prep area = 430' long x 200' wide (200' width to allow room for vehicle access) *See attached sketch for typical EMAS configuration. Performance Predicted runway exit speeds of mid 50's knots for G-IV (73,000 Ibs), CL-600 (41,000 Ibs Estimate: modeled as CRJ-200), and Lear 35 (17,000 Ibs). This covers the range of weights for the fleet mix provided. (1) EMAS performances shown above were predicted by ESCO's computer simulation, an FAA validated Notes: ro ram. 2 Based on desi n case usin oor brakin 0.25 brakin coefficient and no reverse thrust. Engineered Arresting Systems Corporation Santa Monica Airport Proposal 5-30-06 revised.doc ~~ir~° Option#6 Re uest: Size EMAS usin 130 ft Ion bed with 170 ft setback from RW end 300 ft Ion RSA *$1.9 Million for EMAS materials & installation (excluding any site preparation costs) Please note site preparation consists of runway shoulder type paving of sufficient strength to Cost Estimate support an occasional aircraft passage. The site prep dimensions recommended for this (Per System) EMAS system would be 300' long x 170' wide. *Cost estimate based on FY06 costs 130' long x 170' wide EMAS arrestor bed (plus 170' long setback/lead-in ramp) Size: Suggested total site prep area = 300' long x 200' wide (200' width to allow room for vehicle access) *See attached sketch for typical EMAS configuration. Performance Predicted runway exit speeds of 45-50 knots for G-IV (73,000 Ibs), CL-600 (41,000 Ibs Estimate: modeled as CRJ-200), and Lear 35 (17,000 Ibs). King Air (12,500 Ibs) would be estimated in the 35-39 range. This covers the range of weights for the fleet mix provided. (1) EMAS performances shown above were predicted by ESCO's computer simulation, an FAA validated Notes: ro ram. 2 Based on desi n case usin oor brakin 0.25 brakin coefficient and no reverse thrust. Engineered Arresting Systems Corporation Santa Monica Airport Proposal 5-30-06 revised.doc ~. ~.. ~ ~" Ontion#7 Re nest: Size EMAS usin 130 ft Ion bed with 110 ft setback from RW end 240 ft Ion RSA *$1.9 Million for EMAS materials & installation (excluding any site preparation costs) Please note site preparation consists of runway shoulder type paving of sufficient strength to Cost Estimate support an occasional aircraft passage. The site prep dimensions recommended for this (Per System) EMAS system would be 240' long x 170' wide. *Cost estimate based on FY06 costs 130' long x 170' wide EMAS arrestor bed (plus 110' long setbackllead-in ramp) Size: Suggested total site prep area = 240' long x 200' wide (200' width to allow room for vehicle access) *See attached sketch for typical EMAS configuration. Pertormance Predicted runway exit speeds of 40-45 knots for G-IV (73,000 Ibs), CL-600 (41,000 Ibs Estimate: modeled as CRJ-200), and Lear 35 (17,000 Ibs). King Air (12,500 Ibs) would be estimated in the 30-35 range. This covers the range of weights for the fleet mix provided. (1) EMAS performances shown above were,predicted by ESCO's computer simulation, an FAA validated Notes: ro ram. 2 Based on desi n case usin oor brakin 0.25 brakin coefficient and no reverse thrust. Engineered Arresting Systems Corporation Santa Monica Airport Proposal 530-06 revised.doc ~i~~. Typical EMAS ConT~uration Engineered Arresting Systems Corporation Santa Monica Airport Proposal 5-30-06 revised.doc ~.. ~ .. rfriiiii~~' MAR 2 5 2008 SANTA MONICA AIRPORT Impact of Relocated Threshold Runway Safety Area of 300 Feet and Analysis of March 7, 2008 Runway Safety Area Proposal Submitted by the FAA March 20, 2008 At the request of Congressman Waxman, the City of Santa Monica, with the assistance of the aviation consulting firm of Coffman Associates, has examined the operational chazacteristics of the aircraft types that generally utilize the Santa Monica Airport. The analysis shows that only a small percentage of the 127,036 total aircraft operations at Santa Monica last yeaz would likely be affected by relocated threshold runway safety areas (RSAs) of 300 feet at each end of the runway. With realistic assumptions concerning variables affecting aircraft flight operations, the City estimates that none of the aircraft operating at the Santa Monica Airport during 2007 would be prevented from operating at the Airport with the addition of a 300 ft. relocated threshold RSA at each end of the runway and an appropriately sized EMAS bed. The installation of 300 foot RSA's at both ends of the runway would result in a reduction of runway length from the current 4973 feet to 4500 feet available for takeoff or landing in either direction. The 300 foot RSA's would meet the FAA's RSA standard for category A & B aircraft -the preponderance of the aircraft using the Airport and for which the facility was designed to safely accommodate. It would not however meet the RSA standard for the more demanding category C and D aircraft which require a 1,000 foot flat surface RSA or an equivalent EMAS bed to meet FAA standards. That equivalency is an EMAS bed that can stop a category C or D aircraft leaving the end of the runway at 70 knots or less. However, by incorporating an appropriately sized EMAS bed within the 300 foot RSA, this safety option would move closer to meeting federal RSA standazds for all aircraft currently utilizing the Santa Monica Airport with the exception of the Lear Jet 30 series aircraft. Of the 127,036 total aircraft operations at Santa Monica Airport last year, 108,466 aircraft operations, or more than 85%, were with non jet aircraft. A 4,500 foot runway would not affect these non jet operations. Of the remaining 18,570 operations by jet aircraft, 10,060 (53%) of such operations were conducted with category A and B aircraft. The resulting 4,500 foot runway would have very little effect on these slower approach speed jet operations. The remaining 8,510 jet aircraft operations, or 6.7% of total aircraft operations at Santa Monica Airport, are the more demanding higher approach speed category C and D jet aircraft. Only a fraction of these operations would potentially be affected, because the preponderance of the jet operations at Santa Monica are typically short haul flights - 77% are less than 500 nautical miles and 90% are less than 1000 nautical miles. These short stage lengths require fuel loads well below the maximum capacity of the aircraft. In the .;g. '~ 3~1-~ ~ MAR 2 5 2008 unusual case where fuel loads would need to be reduced for a longer range flight in order to safely operate at the reduced field length of 4,500 feet, the impact would likely be limited to making an en route fuel stop either earlier than would otherwise have been needed, or in limited cases, where no stop was previously required. In either case, this is a very minor inconvenience for a major improvement in safety. It is also unlikely that reducing the available runway to 4,500 feet would have any impact on passenger load, as a survey by the staff of the Santa Monica Municipal Airport demonstrated that aircraft operating at SMO average only 1.9 passengers per flight and rarely exceed 4 passengers. Many aircraft that would potentially be affected by a 4,500 foot runway are already affected by the current runway length of 4,973 feet at SMO. These more demanding category C and D business jets are currently operating at the edges of safety without the protection of any federally mandated runway safety areas. Reducing the effective runway length from 4,973 feet to 4,500 feet to accommodate 300 foot RSAs could further limit, for instance, the amount of fuel that these aircraft could carry at takeoff, but would not prohibit their operation at the Santa Monica Airport. For example, a Gulfstream IV, which is now restricted based on pavement strength and noise abatement reasons to a useful load of 58,000 pounds, would need to reduce its useful load to 57,000 pounds. Thus, the impact on the effective range of the aircraft would not be substantial. For landings, the potential impacts aze related to the Federal Air Regulations (FARs) under which the specific aircraft operations are being conducted. Jet operations at SMO aze conducted under one of three sets of FARs. Privately owned and/or operated aircraft are subject to FAR Part 25. Aircraft operating for hire (air taxi) must comply with FAR Part 135. This affects the calculated landing length as the pilot must determine if the aircraft can land within 60 percent of the available runway length. Fractional share aircraft aze required to operate under FAR Part 91(subpart k). These aircraft must also operate within the 60 percent rule unless the operation is conducted in accordance with an approved "Destination Airport Analysis". With this approved analysis, the fractional aircraft is allowed to operate within 80 percent of the available runway length. It can be assumed that most of the fractional operators desiring to operate at Santa Monica Airport have obtained an approved Destination Airport Analysis. As a result, all three landing length requirements are presented on the Table B Landing Length Analysis. Finally, consideration must be given to the fact that participants in fractional aircraft ownership arrangements, or those individuals who charter aircraft, are readily able to switch to other aircraft that would not be affected by limitations related to runway length. Thus, if someone did not want to comply with the necessary operational limits on their first choice of aircraft, could, in many cases, readily switch to another aircraft that can safely operate out of a 4,500 foot runway with even less significant restrictions. 2 Assumptions Runway length requirements vary between aircraft type which are also affected by myriad other operating conditions and variables. For all aircraft operations (including business jets), the runway length required for a given flight/stage length considers: the airport's elevation, temperature, atmospheric pressure, wind direction and velocity, available runway length and gradient (slope), runway surface condition (wet/dry), the aircraft's performance characteristics and the respective useful load factor and payload anticipated for a given flight. The airport elevation and runway gradient aze set for a given runway. At Santa Monica the airport elevation is 177 feet above mean sea level (MSL), and the runway gradient is 1.2 percent towards the west. For purposes of analysis Coffman based performance chatacteristics of the aircraft using an assumed yeazly average temperature for Santa Monica as published by the National Weather Service -which is 63 degrees. A higher temperature would increase and a lower temperature would reduce required runway length on takeoff. The analysis also assumed "zero wind" conditions. Additionally, based on the fact that Santa Monica Airport averages very few days of rain, we have assumed a dry pavement. Wet pavement can affect the friction coefficient of a runway and therefore, length calculations typically include an additional safety factor for operating from a wet runway, particularly on landing. The gradient has the greatest impact on Runway 3 (east flow) takeoff requirements. Departing to the east, the upward gradient of the runway requires more effort to reach the critical speed for takeoff. The downhill slope on Runway 21 assists the aircraft in accelerating to the critical takeoff speed earlier. Thus, less runway length is necessary for departures to the west. Approximately 95 percent of all operations are on Runway 21. For purposes of this analysis, the runway length at maximum takeoff weight as well as at 60% useful load was calculated with a gradient correction for Runway 3. Since takeoffs on Runway 21 require less runway length, a sepazate takeoff length at 60 percent useful load was also calculated. While the downhill slope in this direction would serve to reduce the runway length required, no gradient correction was used. This conservatively overestimates the runway length requirement for Runway 21. The maximum useful load of an aircraft is considered to be the difference between the maximum allowable gross weight and the operating empty weight. In essence, the useful load consists of passengers, cargo, and usable fuel. At SMO, which has no cazgo operations and averages just under two passengers and rarely more than four passengers per flight, the useful load primarily relates to the amount of fuel carried. As a benchmark to show the affect of a 4,500 foot runway, we have assumed a useful load of 60 percent for takeoff. This is based upon the runway length that FAA is typically willing to fund at general aviation airports. Reducing the useful load below 60 percent simply reduces the amount of fuel that may be carried and, therefore, the distance that the aircraft can fly nonstop. When aircraft fly short distances; as typically is the case from SMO, there may be no impact at all on such operations. Table A -Takeoff Length Analysis presents the runway takeoff length requirements for aircraft operating into Santa Monica Airport. Essentially 44 different models of jets used the airport in 2007. Access to performance data was adequate to analyze aircraft representing all but 896 takeoffs.. Under the stated conditions, all of the evaluated aircraft using the Airport were able to safely takeoff at a 60 percent load factor within 4,500 feet on Runway 21. All of the evaluated aircraft, except for 8 aircraft types representing only 1212 takeoffs in total, could takeoff from Runway 3 under the same conditions. Since Runway 3 is only used approximately S% of the time, only 61 annual takeoffs would be affected during Runway 3 operations (5% of the 1212 takeoffs mentioned above). Table B -Landing Length Analysis presents the runway length requirements for landing under FAR Part 25, Part 91(K) ,and Part 135 regulations. All aircraft could land under Part 25 regulations and the stated conditions. Analysis of Part 91(K) operations using maximum certificated gross landing weights indicate that a vast majority of the Part 91(K) operations can safety use a 4,500 foot runway. As shown on Table B, a minor reduction in gross landing weight would permit the small number of aircraft affected by a 4,500 foot runway to continue operating under Part 91(K) at the Santa Monica Airport. Assuming that the major fractional operators have had Santa Monica Airport appropriately designated under Part 91(K) as an approved Destination Airport, only true Part 135 flights would have to meet the 60% rule for runway length. For landings, since most fuel has been burned off during flight, the analysis assumes a 30% useful load for a landing aircraft. In 2007, of the 1,089 Part 135 landings at the Santa Monica Airport required to meet the Part 135 landing regulations, 1,043 can operate at 30 percent useful load from the existing 4,973 foot runway. The reduced runway length of 4,500 feet would still be capable of accommodating 891 of these operations. Thus only I52 annual Part 135 landings would be affected by the reduced length. FAA PROPOSAL The FAA's most recent proposal transmitted to the City on March 7, 2008, contains two options: (1) EMAS beds of 130 feet with a 25 foot lead-in at both ends of the runway; or (2) a 250 foot EMAS bed with a 25 foot lead in at the west end of the runway with no runway safety option on the east end of the runway. Both proposals are non-standard runway safety area options that do not meet the FAA's standard for stopping an aircraft departing the end of the runway at a speed of 70 knots or less. The first option of 130 foot EMAS beds is only intended to stop an aircraft departing the end of the runway at a speed of 40 knots or less. Although the second option has been characterized as a 70 knot standard proposal, modeling by ESCO, the manufacturer of EMAS indicates that the proposed 250 foot EMAS bed and 25 foot lead-in would not meet the 70 knot standard for 5 of the 7 aircraft modeled for the FAA by ESCO. 4 EMAS is currently not effective for aircraft weighing 12,500 pounds of less. For the safety design analysis for lighter aircraft, the EMAS bed must be treated as if it were a regular surface beyond the end of the runway. Since these lighter aircraft make up over 85 percent of the Airport's operations, it is important that the 300 foot RSA design standard for these lighter aircraft be met. As an airport that has planned, designed and maintained its facilities pursuant to the B-II standards agreed to in the Santa Monica Airport Agreement (" 1984 Agreement") between the FAA and the City of Santa Monica, the Airport needs runway safety areas that meet the FAA's standards for a B-II airport. Given the increase in stopping power of EMAS with incremental increases in size, it appears that safety options that meet the 70 knot standard, but also preserve the utility of the Airport's runway, are feasible with a minimal impact on aircraft users. CONCLUSION Our extensive operational analysis indicates that the utility of the Santa Monica Airport is only slightly affected by a reduction in the overall runway length from 4973 feet to 4500 feet. However; the implementation of compliant 300 foot RSAs substantially increases safety in accordance with published FAA design guidelines. In short, the safety benefits of 300 foot runway safety areas that include appropriately sized EMAS beds dramatically outweigh the minor inconvenience of the small number of operations that would have to make an eazly or extra fuel stop en route to a final destination, or be conducted with other readily available aircraft. Consequently, the decision with regard to 300 foot RSAs is reduced to a simple choice between conveniences versus safety. Prepared by: Coffman Associates Kaplan, Kirsch & Rockwell City Staff Attached Take Off and Landing Analyses Prepared by: Coffman Associates 3/21/08 Table A Takeoff Length Analysis Santa Monica AirpoR Mean Tem perature (63 degrees F)IDry Runwa y Takeoff Len th (ft) Useful Load Maximum 60% Useful Load for Runway 3 2007 ARC Aircraft T pe TO Wei ht* Runway 3" Runway 21 4,500' T.O. Operetions Non-Jet O erations NA Helicopters , 1,565 A/B-1111 Pro Aircraft less than 12,5001bs. 3,830 52,415 B-II Beech Kin Air 300/350 3,394 - 233 B-II Beech Kin Air 350ER 4,621 20 et Operat ions B-I Eclipse 500 2,665 33 8-II Cessna 551 Cit II/SP 3,074 5 B-I Cessna 501 3,283 92 B-I Cessna 500 3,399 64 B-11 Cessna 550 (Cit. II) 3,469 402 B-I Cessna 525 CJ-1 3,573 240 B-I Cessna Mustan 3,608 4 B-II Cessna 5258 CJ-3 3,689 - 263 B-II Cessna 525A (CJ-2) 3,968 482 C-I Lear et 31 3,994 - 94 B-II Cessna 560 Encore 4,130 - 862 B-II Cessna 560 Excel 4,169 1,095 B-II Cessna 550 Bravo 4,179 - C-II Cessna 680 Soverei n 4,286 279 C-I Beech'et 400 4,411 - 147 B-I Ra theon Premier I 4,398 212 B-I Hawker 400 XP/MU 300 4,408 20 C-I Lear et 40/45 4,891 310 B-I Falcon 10 5,221 - 24 C-II Hawker 4000 5,231 3 B-II Falcon 900 3,429 Data Needed Data Needed Data Needed 79 B-II Falcon 50 5,470 98 C-II Bombardier CL-300 5,580 - • * 254 C-II Cessna 650 5,524 4,640 56% 106 C-I HS 125500!700 5,675 Data Needed Data Needed Data Needed 108 C-II Hawker 900 XP 5,743 4,591 47% 11 C-II Falcon 900 EX 5,7Sd Data Needed Data Needed Data Needed 24 C-I Lear'et 35/36 5,779 * - * 321 B-II Hawker 850 XP 5,812 4,794 44% 17 D-II Gulfstream 350 5,831 Data Needed Daia Needed Data Needed 23 B-II Hawker 800 XP 5,862 4,794 46% 523 C-II Cessna 750 Cit X 5,935 719 B-11 Falcon 2000 5,028 Data Needed Data Needed Daia Needed 383 C-II HS 1251000 6,038 Data Needed Data Needed Dafa Needed 4 B-I HS 125800 5,038 Data Needed Data Needed Data Needed 127 C-I Lear'et 55 6,100 4,527 59% 56 D-I Lear et 60 5,152 4,556 59% 162 D-II Gu/fstream 100 6,188 Data Needed Data Needed Data Needed 2 B-II Falcon 20 6,193 5 C-II Embraer 1356) 6,2d5 Daia Needed Data Needed Data Needed 146 D-II Gulfsiream IV/400/450* 5,245 699 C-II Bombardier CL-600/601!604 $50d , • 450 D-II Gutfstream 150 6,639 4,790 47% 49 D-II Gulfstream 200 6,898 4,666 44% 288 "Runway length adjusted for+1.2 percent gradient. Length exceeds capabitiry of current runway lengfh (4,973 fr) Len th exceeds 4,500 feet but current runwa adequate Table B Landing L ength Analysis Santa Mo nica Airport Mean Tem perature (63 degrees F)/Dry Runwa y Landin Len th ft Total 2007 At Maximum Landin Wei ht Part 135 2007 Part 135 ARC AircraftT pe Part 25 Part 91 Part 135 30% Useful Landings Landings NonJet O perations NA Helico tern 1,565 A/B-I/II Prop Aircraft less than 12,5001bs. • • 52,415 423 8-II Beech Kin Air 300/350 2,718 - 4,530 233 8 B-II Beech King Air 350ER 3,006 - 5;010 4,670 20 12 et O era tions B-I Ecli se 500 2,232 33 B-II Falcon 50 2,263 98 9 B-II Cessna 551 Cit II/SP 2,289 - 5 B-I Cessna 500 2,351 64 4 8-II Cessna 550 (Cit. II 2,351 402 15 C-II HS 125-1000 2,393 4 1 B-I HS 125-800 2,393 127 18 B-II Hawker 800 XP 2,428 - 523 24 C-II Hawker 900 XP 2,428 11 B-1 Cessna 501 2,434 92 7 B-II Falcon 900 2,450 79 15 C-II Falcon 900 EX 2,460 24 B-I Cessna Mustang 2,476 - 4 B-II Falcon 2000 2,652 383 24 C-II Bombardier CL-300 2,693 • 254 47 B-II Hawker 850 XP 2,745 4,575 17 2 C-I Learjet 40/45 2,755 4,592 310 57 C-II Embmer 135BJ 2,771 4,618 Data Needed 146 B-I Cessna 525 (CJ-1) 2,648 4,747 240 22 6-I Falcon 10 2,848 4,747 - 24 4 C-II Bombardier CL-600/601/604 2,874 4,791 450 66 C-I Learjet 3l 2,894 4,823 94 17 8-II Cessna 560 Encore 2,968 4,946 862 37 C-II Cessna 650 3,004 5,006 106 11 C-I Learjet 35/36 3,004 5,006 321 77 C-II Hawker 4000 3,020 6,034 3 1 D-II Gulfstream 100 3,025 5,041 Data Needed 2 B-I Ra heon Premier I 3,045 5,075 4,942 212 B-II Cessna 525A (CJ-2) 3,087 6,144 482 B-II Falcon 20 3,107 5,179 5 1 B-II Cessna 5256 CJ-3) 3,180 5,300 4,675 263 C-II Cessna 680 Sovereign 3,257 5,425 279 B-II Cessna 550 Bravo 3,294 5,490 4,535 11 B-II Cessna 560 Ezcel 3,294 5,490 4,615 1,095 24 D-II Gulfstream IV/400/450' 3,304 5,507 4,853 699 27 C-I Learjet 55 3,366 5,511 4,818 56 11 D-II Gulfstream 350 3,377 - 5,628 Data Needed 23 D-II Gulfstream 200 3,397 5,662 268 C-II Cessna 750 Cit X 3,532 5,887 4,838 719 18 D-I Learjet 60 3,542 5,904 5,220 162 45 D-II Gulfstream 150 3,574 • 5,955 4g C-I HS 125600/700 3,625 4,532 6,042 Data Needed 108 1 C-I Beechjet 400 3,640 4,550 6,066 4,970 147 49 B-I Hawker 400 XP/MU 300 3,640 4,550 6,066 20 1 ~: Length exceeds capabiHfy of current runway length (4,973 ft) Len th exceeds 4,500 feet but current runwa adequate 3-~ ~~a sla 8` .: President Zina Josephs ~ ~T}Ty Vice-President ~ -q ~1 I ~ 11 NNN Lorraine Sanchez ~I t i 1 J l ~ III"' Treasurer John Reynolds Secretary Charles R. Donaldson ~y ~~ ~` • ~~ y~ y~y ~7-Q ~ ,~\~y J ~\\~`JI ~\y 1~~t-Q%r ~~~~ www.friendsofsunsetpark.org . friendsofsp rr yahoo.com . P.O.Box 5823, Santa Monica, CA 90409-5823. (310) 358-7117 March 24, 2008 To: Santa Monica City Council From: Board of Directors, Friends of Sunset Park Re: 3/25/08 agenda items 3-A (FAA proposal) and 7-A (Ordinance banning Class C and D aircraft) The FOSP Board of Directors has taken the following position regarding the FAA proposal and the pro- posed city ordinance: The FAA's March 7th proposal offers no safety options for the east end of the runway at Santa Monica Airport (SMO). The FOSP Board rejects any "safety" proposal for SMO that does not protect residents living near the east of the runway. These are people's lives we're dealing with. It's not just a matter of percent- ages. Everyone has been living under a cloud of imminent disaster while the FAA has dawdled, de- layed, decided what's "practicable," and seeemingly done its darnedest to protect aviation interests and increase airport capacity at the expense of residents' safety. 2. The FAA proposal for the west end of the runway will not protect neighbors to the west because it doesn't meet the FAA's own safety standard. Standard options would include either: a. 400 foot EMAS bed with a 35 foot lead-in, or b. a 250 foot EMAS bed with a 350 foot lead-in. Instead, on March 7`h, the FAA proposed: c. a 250 foot EMAS bed with only a 25 foot lead-in. According to the EMAS manufacturer, this latest FAA plan would provide 70-knot stopping capa- bility for only 2 of the 7 SMO fleet mix aircraft that they analyzed. Two out of seven! The FOSP Board rejects this sub-standard EMAS proposal as offering little protection to nearby residents. EMAS is not effective for "veeroffs," which are involved in over 50% of runway excursions in the landing phase, according to the Flight Safety Foundation and the International Federation of Air Line Pilots' Associations. Neither is it effective for undershoots and overshoots. Nor is it effective for landings beyond the threshold with landing gear off the paved runway. The FOSP Board feels that installing anon-standard EMAS bed, or even a standard one, will do nothing to protect the kids playing on the "Tot Lot," the baseball fields, or the soccer fields in Clover Park, the toddlers at Hill `n' Dale Pre-School at 25th and Ashland, or the children and adults at other SMO-adjacent facilities and homes from large, fast Class C and D aircraft that might veer off the runway. And, it will do nothing to protect residents from a large, heavy plane that manages to take off but then develops mechanical problems, loses speed and altitude, and then crashes into homes while trying to return to SMO for an emergency landing. 4. The FAA's March 7`h proposal is not much better than what they have proposed in the past - par- tial protection at 70 knots, as opposed to partial protection at 40 knots, when Class D aircraft can land at speeds up to 165 knots. The March 7`h "safety" proposal further supports the FOSP Board's conclusion that negotiating with the FAA since 2002 for improved safety at SMO has proven to be an exercise in futility. Here is a partial list of some of the runway excursions that have occurred during this period: Bangladesh - an overrun in 2004 that injured 80 people and destroyed a Fokker 28 Indonesia - an overrun in 2004 that killed 26 people and destroyed a MD-82 Germany - an overrun in 2005 that destroyed a Boeing 747 . Teterboro, New Jersey - 2 overruns in 2005, one of them causing 20 injuries Toronto, Canada - in 2005, an Air France Airbus with 297 passengers and 12 crew slid off the runway, burst into flames and was destroyed Chicago, Illinois - in 2005, a Southwest Boeing ran off the end of the runway, rolled through a blast fence, an airport perimeter fence, and onto an adjacent roadway, where it struck an automobile, killing a 6-year-old passenger Sault Ste. Marie, Michigan - a veer-off in 2007 Traverse City, Michigan - an overrun in 2007 Sao Paulo, Brazil - a TAM Airlines Airbus overran the runway and exploded, killing 199 people, includ- ing 13 on the ground Des Moines, Iowa - an overrun in 2007 Jackson Hole, Wyoming - a veer-off in 2008 Indonesia - an overrun in March 2008 At any time during those 6 years, we could have had a similar accident at SMO because we had no Runway Safety Areas. "The National Transportation Safety Board has investigated 12 runway overruns since 2001....Most involved smaller private planes, not airliners. Pilot error, including misjudging needed stopping distance and aircraft speed, was responsible for most of the runway overruns, the safety board said." -Chicago Tribune "Since 1990, there have been no less than 807 overruns resulting in significant airframe damage." - IFALPA News (International Federation of Air Line Pilots Associations) "In the first seven months of 2006, the cumulative death toll resulting from runway overruns was over 200....According to incident and accident statistics, these events [runway excursions/overruns] occur on average, at a rate of around one aweek." - IFALPA Position Statement In 2007, a Falcon 900 experienced a malfunction that caused the pilot to abort taking off. After he ap- plied the brakes, it took 2,000 feet before the plane stopped, ending up 400 feet off the runway at the airport in Santa Barbara, California. Also in 2007, the pilot of a Citation jet evidently tried to abort a landing at the airport in Conway, Arkan- sas and skidded into a home near the west end of the runway. The pilot and a 71-year-old woman who lived in the house were both killed. A similar accident had occurred at Conway in 1990. On December 7, 2007, the GAO reported that the FAA had not prepared a national runway safety plan since 2002, despite agency policy that it be updated every 2 or 3 years. "FAA also lacks data on runway overruns that could be used to analyze the causes and circumstances of such incidents." (reported on the web site of the Professional Aviation Maintenance Association) "The International Federation of Air Line Pilots Association (IFALPA) has been warning of the dangers of insufficient runway overrun areas for more than 20 years." (Runway Overrun Report) 5. For the current SMO fleet mix, according to FAA safety guidelines, there should be 1,000-foot runway safety areas at both ends of the runway. However, SMO has NO runway safety areas. Furthermore, homes on the west side of the airport are located only about 300 feet from the end of the runway. The FAA seems reluctant to propose any runway safety options that might shorten the usable runway and limit the fleet mix at SMO. With the March 7th proposal, the EMAS bed would seemingly extend the west end of the runway to less than 200 feet from homes. (The last time the SMO runway was extended was during World War II.) Homes and the gas station on the east side of the airport, which would receive no such protection under the latest FAA proposal, are already less than 200 feet from that end of runway. The FOSP Board feels that the convenience of a small number of people who like to travel by private jet should not outweigh the safety of thousands of residents who live near SMO. Santa Monica residents were willing to make sacrifices during World War 77, when 13,000 war planes were manufactured over a period of four years at the McDonnell Douglas plant at SMO. But the war in the Pacific ended in 1945. There is no good reason to extend the SMO runway closer to homes in 2008. 6. The fleet mix at Santa Monica Airport has gone from 1,176 jet operations (landings and takeoffs) in 1983 to 18,575 jet operations in 2007. That translates to an average of 50 jet flights per day passing only a few hundred feet over people's homes. The residential neighborhoods, which were developed in the 1930s, 40s, and 30s, have remained the same. It's neither the residents nor their homes which are causing a safety problem at SMO, it's the steadily rising number of larger, faster jets (for which the airport was never designed) flying into our neighborhood which is causing the problem. The FAA should not be asking residents to risk their families' safety because a few business executives and others who can afford fractional ownership don't want to be bothered going through security at LAX. 7. Airplane crashes connected with SMO are not uncommon. Here is a partial list 1978-1987 -Eleven "landing off the runway" incidents involving airplanes that used SMO occurred from 1978 to 1987. 1987 (Cessna 182 crashed on Rose Ave. in Mar Vista), 1989 (Cessna 150 crashed on Rose Ave. in Venice; Cessna 210 crashed at Hillcrest Country Club in Rancho Park; P-51 Mustang crashed into a home on Wade St. in Mar Vista; and a Wheeler Express crashed into 3 homes on Greenfield Ave. in West Los Angeles), 1990 (home-built Long Eze crashed into the ocean near Santa Monica Pier; the pilot died), 1991 (Piper Malibu crashed into a home in West Los Angeles), 1992 (Mooney Ranger M-20 clipped a utility pole, burst into flames, and crashed in the front yard of a home at Dewey and Walgrove; the pilot and passenger died), 1993 (Piper Comanche crashed into the ocean off Malibu; Marchetti crashed into an apartment building on 4th St. near Bay; the pilot and 2 passengers died ), 1994 (Piper Cherokee crashed into a home on Barrington; the pilot was injured and the passenger died; another plane crashed in the backyard of one of our FOSP members who lived on Ashland Ave.; the pilot died), 1995 (a homemade experimental aircraft crashed into a home in Mar Vista), 2001 (Cessna overran the end of runway and burned on the west embankment next to 23rd St.; the pilot and passenger both died), 2002 (Beechcraft took off from SMO and crashed near the High Desert Airport in Joshua Tree), 2003 (Beechcraft took off from SMO and crashed into an apartment building near Fairfax High School; there were 5 fatalities (pilot, passenger, 3 residents) and 10 people injured (5 of them critically), 2004 (Mooney M20 crashed into a Mar Vista home; the pilot and his wife died). Another plane on approach to SMO crashed onto the play field at Webster Middle School on Sawtelle Blvd. in West Los Angeles. On January 13, 2008, a small single-engine plane overran the west end of the SMO runway. Luckily, no one was hurt. On March 11, 2008, asingle-engine Cessna experienced a malfunction with the landing gear mechanism which prevented the left main landing gear from extending to the full down and locked position. It was almost forced to "crash land" at SMO. Luckily, the pilot was able to maneuver the aircraft to correct the situation. EMAS would not have prevented any of these crashes, And, "luckily," none of these crashes involved large jets. But equipment sometimes fails, and pi- lots sometimes make errors in judgement. We cannot count on "luck" to always keep us safe. Therefore, with houses just across the street from the runway ends, residents need more than the "partial" protection from the large, fast, heavy C and D airplanes that the FAA is currently offer- ing. 8. The FAA has a statutory mandate to promote safety. Residents expect that the City will keep them safe. Whatever the FAA's missions and goals may be, and no matter how it goes about implementing them, the City must protect its residents. 4 The Board of Directors of Friends of Sunset Park strongly supports immediate implementation of the city's proposed ordinance to ban Class C and D aircraft from using Santa Monica Airport. Furthermore, we urge our Congressional representatives to pass legislation to protect us from a federal agency which seems to have lost sight of its safety mandate. FOSP Board of Directors: Brian Bland, Phyllis Chavez, Tom Cleys, Charles R. Donaldson, Susan J. Hartley, Emmalie Hodgin, Zina Josephs, Gail Myers, John Reynolds, Lorraine Sanchez FOSP Airport Steering Committee: Cathy Larson, Ping Ho, Stephen Mark, Diane Moss Friends of Sunset Park (FOSP) is a city-recognized neighborhood organization in Santa Monica represent- ing approximately 7,000 households near Santa Monica Airport. This position statement is also supported by: North of Montana Association, Pico Neighborhood Association, Santa Monica Coalition for a Livable City, UenMar Neighborhood Association, and the Wilshire-Montana Neighborhood Coalition Cc: Rep. Henry Waxman Rep. Jane Harman Rep. James Oberstar Rep. John Mica Rep. Jerry Costello Rep. Thomas Petri Santa Monica officials: City Manager P. Lamont Ewell Assistant to the City Manager Kathryn Uernez City Attorney Marsha Moutrie Deputy City Attorney Martin Tachiki Airport Director Robert Trimborn City Clerk Maria Stewart Additional documents available in the City Clerk's Office.