The URL can be used to link to this page

SR-9-A (65)~~:`, . ~ ~~% - G3 ~ CRC:LC19;dvm:crcrec~ City Counei~ ~itg. Ju~y 7. ~.392 T~: Mayor and C~ty Cauncil FROM: City Staff i ~ JUt n r' Pr'^^• Santa Monica, cazi.foznia SUBJ~CT: Charter Review Commission R~commendatians Introductian This report presents the finai repoxt and recom~nenda~ions flf the Charter Re,criew Commisszan for Ca~.nciZ review and cansidera'~iQn. Backgrvund The 15-member Charter Review CqmmiSSian wa~ appainted by th~ City Counci~. to review savera]. speci~ic issues reZating to the cuxrent City Charter. The accampanyzng repart presents a summary af the Commission discusszons and recommenda'~ions on these matt~~rs. An Exeautive summary zs provided at the ~ront o~ the dacument fo~ ease of r~f'~rance. Cammissian and Staff inembers w~.ll be present at the J'ul.y 7 m~eting to make a brze~ presentation and to answer any questions the Caun~zZ may have. It shauld furthe~ be no~ed ~hat a 1et~er from '~he Rent Contral B~ard is providsd with these docum~n~s requestinq Council consideration of a change relating to electian of Rent CantroZ Coznmissioners to fi11 vacant, unexpi.red terms. The Ch~rter Review Cam~nissian r2ceived the ?~tter at th~ir Ju~.y 1, Y992 -i- ~U~- 0 7 1992 maeting and asked that it be forwarded ta Cauncil for consideratian at this time. Recammendation ~t is recommended that th~ Cauncil receive the report o£ th~ Charter Rev~ew Commission for d~scuss~on and provide direction to Staff as desired. Prepared b~: Lynne C.Barrette, Assistant City Manager _ 2 _ ~~~ ~~ Fientai Control Board Cocnrnrssianers SL?Z~~ti£ A$RESCIA I.IS~ ~1~I~K BORRI'ti0 JAY 30H'tiS0'~ R48ERT 1i~E?~~iA~+i\ Do~ox~s PR~ss Charter Revi~w Commiss~on C~ty of Santa Mon~ca 1685 Ma~n Street Santa Monica, CA 9040~ .~ur~e ~5, i 992 ~~~ ~';~~ ; ~a ` 'k i~ ~~~ _ - .~ v Santa Monica r + s '16851~ia~n Street P 4 Box 22Q0 CA 9~407-2200 {213) 458-875i Re Reqvested Amendment, Charter Sectior~ 18~3(m) Vacancies on #he Rer~t Cor~tro! Board Charter Rev~ew Commissioners The Santa Monica Rent Controi Board, at ~ts meet~~g of J~t~e 25, ~ 992, ~vted to req~est the Charter Re~~ew Gomm~ss~on to ~ncfude m rts recamm~ndations o# charter rev~s~ans to the Ccty Cacancii, an amendment ta se~t~on 1803~m} of the Charter Th~s sec#~on re~ates to the etecttan af Rent Controi Camm~ssianers ta fiil ~acant, unex~~red #erms Currentiy> ~ 803(m} requ~res that any person setected ta fiii an unexpired term on the Boar~ serves unfEi ". . the fo~Iowin~ mun4c~pai election wh~n a qualif~ed persan shajE be e~ected to serve for #t~e remairrder af the term " This langt~a~e ~s ~r~cons:ster~t witt~ Sect+on 603 ot the Ci~y Charter re~at~r~t~ to the ~acar~c~es on #he Crty Counctl Th~s sect:on calls #or the elect~on to f~ll vacar~t, ur~exp~red terms on tne Ca~nc~! "(A~t the next general mun~apal elect~on #oilow~ng ar~y ~acancy " ~Emphas~s ac~ded~ in arder to make the twa sectians consrstent, and ava~d canductmg elections for Rent Board Commissioners at other than genera~ murnccpat efecf~ans, the Board requests thaf tt~e Charter Revi~w Commiss~on recommend to th~ C~fy Council that Sect~on 1803(m} be amended as fiofiows. if a vacancy s~afl occur on the Board, the Board shal( w~tnin thir~y ~30) days appo~rtt a qua~~fi:ed persor~ to f~~l such a ~acar~cy ur~t~l the follow~ng g e n e r a 1 ~ J1~ ~7 ~~ Gnarter Rev~ew Camm,ss~on JUne 25, 1992 Page 2 murnci~a~ elect~on when a quaicfied p~rsan shat~ #~e elected to serve for the remainder of #he term. ~ Your cc~~rtesy ar~d coopera#ion,~ this matter ts grea~~_ appreciated ~. ~'`~ ~~-~ ~ i ~I ~ ~~ ~ V ry tru~ your~,, ~- - ~-!.~~rf, f ~ ~ '~-j' Doiores Press Cha~rpersan ac Mary Ar~r~ Yurkon+s, Adm~r~+stratar l.ynr~e Barrette, As~~stant C~ty Manager R E C O M M S N D A T I O N S O F CITY OF SANTA MONICA CHARTER REVIEW CQMMISSION JUNE 1992 June 29, 1992 Mayor and City Council: ~n Ju~y Z1, 1990 the City Council directed the City Attorney ta prepare an ordinance creating a Charter Review Commission. This ordinance was introduced and passed by the City Counci3 at its mee~ing of october 2, 199Q. Nancy Greenstein was appointed as Chair of the Commisszon and stephen Alpert, Abby Arno~d, Russell Barnard, Tim~ Hallem, Christaphe~ Harding, George Hickey, Patricia Htiffman, Ilona Katz, Tom Larm~re, P~ggy Lyans, Herman Rosenstein, Tom Soto, Wil~iam Spurgin, Peter Tigler were appointed as members by the city GounciZ at its meeting of February 19, ~991. We were sworn in at our first meeting on April 3rd, the first o~ twelve sessions that year. In the course o~ aur discussions, we drew on the resaurces of community members, City Cvuncil members from ather locai municipa~ities, academic experts, City staFf, and extensive reading and research in governmental affairs and xelevant political science books and jaurnals. In 1992, with Commissioner M. Dougias Willis (after attending several meetings) replacinq Commissioner Sato, the Cammisaion he~d seven further meetings and one pubZic forum, extensively publicized through leaflets, P~N, and the media. As the snabling ordinance for this Commission expired on March 3~, we s~bmit herewith ~he results of our rssearch and deliberations. We feel that the majority of the tasks set before us have been braught ta a satisfactary closure. At the same tims, there remain questians on ~he subjects referred ta us by Caunci~ an which we wou~d have pre~erred to de3~berate at fur~her length, In additio~, there were same addztiona~ fssues, outside of our charge Wh1Ch we wish to put forward far Council consideration. They are as follows: Charter-r~Zated ~} We recommend that th~ language in the Ch~rter be revised ta be gender neu~ra~. 2) We recommend that the mathod of appointm~nt ta vacancies on the City Cauncil and Rent Cantrol Baard be reviewed for possible modification. 3) Depending an the autcome of the Cauncil eZectora2 syste~ discussion, w~ recommend that the method af selectian of Rent Control Board members be reviewed. - i - 4) We propase addition o~ an Environmental Commission to the Charter. 5r WE recommend that praviszons be added ~o the Charter requ~rzng periodic review of the various Charter provisions and amendments as deemed necessary. City Councz~ Po~icy Issues 1) Depending on the outcome of the Council electoral s~st~m ~ss~e, ths Commission suggests that the Santa Monica Malibu Unified Schoal District Board and Santa Monica College Trustees be encourag~d to review their electoral systams. 2) If the Council should dscide to pxoceed wi~h a recominendati~n ta change the City's e~ectora~ system, the Commission recommends that the Council aiso examine campaign finance reform, ethics and the ~stablishment af a Fair Political Practicas Cammissian with gr~ater a~thority than th~ previous City Fa~r PoliticaZ Practices Commi,ssion. 3) The Commission further recommends that the Counci~ consxder hiring support staff. We are happy to discuss, with members of the Council, our work and our conclusions, and ramain ready ta assist in whatever next steps the Counc~~ may feeJ. are appropriate in cancluding the process of Charter revieur. Respectfully sul~mitted, Nancy Greenstein, Chairpersan Stephen Alpert, Member Abby Arnold, Member Russell Barnard, Member Timi Hallem, Member Chxistapher Harding, Member George Hickey, Nie~.ber Fatricia Haffman, Member Ilana Jo Katz, Member Tom Larmore, Member Pegg}r Lyons ~ Me~ber Herman Rosenstein, Member William Spurgin, Member Peter Tigler, Member Doug Wi].lis, Member Assisted by: Lynne C. Barrette, Assistant City Manager Jae Lawrence, Assistant City Attarney Clarice Dy]chouse, City Clerk John Seeley, Sr. Nlanagem~nt Analyst (crintro) - ~.i - Table of C~ntents EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .......................................... Za M~THOD DF SELECTIQN OF MEMBERS OF CITY COUNCIL AND MAYOR... 1 FOREWARD ................................................ 1 PROCESS ................................................. 2 CONCLUSIONS ............................................. 4 RECOMMENDAT~QNS FOR ~URTHER RESEARCH .................... 7 OBJECTIVES AND VALUES ................................... 9 Accountability and AccessibiZity ..................... ~Q Ethnic Diversit~ ..................................... 12 Neighborhood Empowerment and Voter Participation..... I3 Reducing Sl~te Dominance ............................. 14 AT-LARGE ELECTIONS ...................................... ~5 Mechanics and Usage .................................. Z5 Appraisal ............................................ 18 DISTRTCTS ............................................... 22 Mechanics an~ Us~ge .................................. 22 Appra~sal ............................................ 24 MIXED SYSTEMS ........................................... 28 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION ............................. 2~ Phi~osophy ........................................... 29 SINGLE TRANSFERABLE VOTE ................................ 31 Mec~anics and Usage .................................. 31 Appraisai ............................................ 32 CUMULATIVE VOTING ....................................... 36 Mechanics and Usage .................................. 35 Appraisal ............................................ 39 _ i ~ VOTING RzGHTS QUESTTONS ................................. 41 CQMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR CITY CdUNCIL ................. 48 Discussion and Recommendation ........................... 48 ~IMITATION bN TERMS OFF~CE OF CITY COUNCIL ................. 53 Discussion and Recommendation ........................... 53 SELECTION OF CITY ATTORNEY AND CITY CLERK ................. 56 Discussion and Recommendatian .......................... 56 ESTABLISHMENT OF S4ARDS AND COMMISSIONS ................... 58 Discussion and Recommendation .......................... 58 METHOD QF SELECTION QF PLANNING COMMISSIQN ................ 59 Discussion and Recammendation .......................... 59 C~UNCIL MEETINGS .......................................... 66 Discussion and Recommendation .......................... 67 CITY HEALTH OFFICER ....................................... 71 Discussion and Recvmmendation .......................... 71 CLAIMS AGAINST THE CZTY .................................. 74 Discussion and Recommendation .......................... 74 COMPETITIVE BIDDING ON PUBLIC WORKS PROJECTS .............. 76 Discussion and Recommendatian .......................... 77 OFFICIAL BQNDS ............................................ 81 Discussion and Recommendati~n .......................... 81 CASH BASIS FUND AND CAPITAL DUTLAYS FUND .................. 83 D~scussion and Recommendation .......................... 84 PR~SENTATION OF DEMANDS ................................... 86 Discussion and Recommendation .......................... 85 (crcontnt) _ 2 _ ~XECUTIVE SUMMARY The following is provided as a brie~ summary of the Commission's recommendations on the issues requested by City Cauncil: 1. Question: The mathod of selection of inembers, a~ ~he City Councii and Mayor? Recommendatian: That the methad of selection be changed with first preference for a form a~ proportion~~ representation and second preference far a form of district ~lectians. 2. Questian: Whether or not City ~harter S~ction 542 should be amanded ta provide compensation and benefits fQr members o~ the City CaunciZ and if sor what compensa~ian and henefzts should be provid~d? ~ Re~oit~mendatian: That the Charter set compensation ceilings in accordance with the population - based farmula used far genera~ la~ cities and that voters be asked as a separat~ question to extend the same insuranc~ bene~its (with ~he exceptian of participatian in the retir~ment system~ to CounciZmembers as are available to the top administrative bargaining un~t o~ Santa Mo~ica City emp~a~ees. 3. Question: Whethex or not any limitation shou~d be p~aced on ~he terms of office~of inembers of ~he City Cauncil? Recommendation: That there be a l~m~t of three conse~utive ~-year terms far Counci~members. ~. Questian: The method of selection of the City Attorney and City Cl~rk? Recommsndation: That the c~rrent method of selection remain unchanged. 5. Quest~on: Review Artic~e X of the Czty Charter to determine whether or not the Baards and Cammissions estabYished thereby should cantinue ta be mandated by the City Charter and review the method a~ selection oF the Pl,anning Co~m3ssion? ~ Recommendation: That the Boards and Commissians currently ],isted in th~ Charter re~nain with a mQdification in tit].a of the Recreation Commission ta ~tecreation and Parks Commission. That the methad of selection of the Planning Cammission remain unchanged but that there be some _~~_ ~ modifications in certain other Charter provisions related to the PZanning Cvmmfssion. 6&7 Question: Whether City Charter Section 612 relating to sp~cial meetings should be amended to conform to the Brown Act and whe~her Section ~13 should be amended to pravide more flexibility ta holding Council meetings within the City? Recommendativn: That Section 612 and 613 of the Charter be amended to specify that the Councii can hold special or emergency meetings in accordance with procedures established by law; that me~tings shall be held in the Cauncil Chambers or ather lacations; meetings shall be open and accessible to the public; and that the Cauncil shal~ adopt by ordinance, rules insuring adequate public notice of and input at its meetings. 8. Quast~on: Whether City Charter Section 717 relating to a City Hea~th Officer should be deleted? Recommendation: The Cammission has recommended deleta.an of this section. 9. Questian: Whether City Charter Section 1515 reiating to c3.ai~ts against the City shouid b~ revised to conform to State law? Recommendation: That the City Charter refer tq the California Government Cade as being the procedural standard for City action and that Sectian 1515 be amended to confnrm to State law. 10. Questian: Whether City Charter Sectian 608 should be amended ta increase the dollar amount requiring competitive bidding on public works pra~~cts? Recommendatian: That specific dollar limits for competitiva bidding af public warks projects be removed from the Charter and adopted instead by ardinance. Revised Charter warding has been suggested which states the intent to preserve the integrity a~ the bidding process; encauragss par~icipatian by disadvantaged or mi.nority persans ar businesses in the bidding pracess; and includes requirements that eonsultant contracts over $50,000 be subject to competitive reqe,z~rements . - 2 a - I~. Question: Whether City Gharter Section 1300 relat~ng to official bonds should be amended or d~leted? Recommendatian: That provisions reZating to officiaZ performance bonds be retained in tha Charter but be updated to remove unnecessary gender specific language and identification of specific City positions. 12. Questian: Whe~her City Charter Section 1501 relating to Cash $asis Fund and City Charter Section 1511 relating to Capital Outlays Fund shauld be am~nded or deleted? Recommendat~an: That a modification be made to these sections which preserves the existing powers of the City Council while simplifying and mod~rnizing charter language in light of the passage of Proposition 13 and the reduced reliance of the City on pxoperty tax revenues. 13. Question: Whether City Charter Section 1513 relatzng to the presentation of demands shauld be amended or dElet~d? Recommendation: Delet~on of this section as it is duplicative of ather provisions 3n the Charter which address financial managemQnt controls and responsibilit~es, crexcsum - 3 a-- 1) Question: Whether or not the City Charter should be amended reqardinq the method af seZec~ion af inembers af the City Council and Mayor? FOREWaRD winston Churchill, irritated at some ~rror of his constituents' ways, once proclaimed that '~democracy is the worst imaginable farm af gavernment - except ~or any other system that has ~een thaught vf". As his statement implies, no forxn of government is without its drawhacks. Even within an agreed-upan goal of democracy, a varie~y of vaZt~es -- not a~.ways compa'~ib].e -- are bundZed. Democratic values embrace exercise of the will of the majarity, ~rhile at the same tim~ protecting the rights of the rainarity. Responsivaness ta changes in public opinion is a goa~, but so is policy continuity and s~ability. In th~ issue of applied damacracy the Can~mission dea~s with here - the questian vf electoral systems - we ar~ likewise faced with the task of clarifying ou~ values and objactives; and wei.ghing carefully e~ch system in terms o~ its ability to express those vaiues. We have tried, through our deliberations, and in this report, ta assess the assets and ~iabilit~.es af various electoral options and draw a balanced judgment, realizing throughout that there is no perfect machinery for the trans].ation of the popular will, na ultimately "right answer" ta this problem. we hope, however, that the followang is helpful in indicating why some systems are - 1 - mora i~perfect than o~hers, and why we decided f~na~~y, to recozamend the option that we chose. PROCESs The Camm~ssion began its deliberativ~ process on the ~iectoral system question in Ju~y with a panel including Rick CoZe, Councilmemb~r e~ected from a district in Pasadena; Santa Manica's Counci~member Herb Katz, an apponent of districting; Peter Morrison, RAND demographer; and Pau~ de Santis, a laca~ attorney and distric~ advoca~e. A fur~her evening of discussion ~~atured Ri~hard Fa~ardv, a s~aff at~orney for the Mexican-America~ Lega7 Defense and Educatian Fund (MALDEF) wha has been acti~e in many voting right~ cases, ~including the Garza case, which brought about adoptian of a Latina seat on the Los Ang~Zes Caunty Board of S~xpervisors}. Also appearing were members of CURE. santa Moni.ca's electzon refarm advocacy group, inc],uding Irene Z~vi; Commission members ~~eve A~per~ and Herman Rosenstein; Pico resident Doug Wil.lis {wha later joined the Cammissian~, and Narm Curry a~ th2 Santa Monica NAACP. Durxng this same perzod, the Commzssion spent several sesszons iden~ifying the virtue~ and ].~abilzties a~ the current a~~~arge ~ystem as we1~ as key objectives ~.o be met by any eventual r~cammended electoral sysfi~am. we delved into numerous article~ an~I baak chapters from public affairs mag~zines and politica7. sczence research that vffered a~rari~ty of perspectives on the pro~edures involved in, and the impact af al~ types of elec~taral - 2 - systems. A substantiai part of this material focussed on ethnic representatian questions. Dr. Bernara Grofman of U. C. Irvine, noted exper~ and editor of severaZ boaks an eZectoral systems joined us in October. While introd~cing us to the fundamentals of more uncommon proportional repras~ntatian options, he advised us to avaid an abstra~t search far the theoreticaliy perfect systQm. Instead, he suggest~d we facus on determining what changes are desirab~e in Santa Monica's politZCal culture, and then select a system to facilitate these goals, A vis~~ from long-t~,me Long Beach Ci~y CounciZmemb~r Tom CZark, who served in both at-large and district systems, added anothe~ Zook at the pros and cons o~ these alternatives. In a pulalic hearing at the beginning af February rae brie~ly o~tlined the mechani.cs af and rationale for the variaus electoral options, and received a number af use~ul opinions from community members. A presentation }ay UCLA Urban Planning Pro~essar Leo Estrada an his demographa.c research gave us a concrete model of districting for minority representation. The March report of CaZ Tech historian Morgan Kousser contended that the current at-large system had been no aZly of minority empawerment. We decided c~n a twQ-s~age pr~cess far making our final decisian, the first ma~ter at issue being whether to recammend a change from the status quo. The Commi.ssian al~ost unanimously (24 ta Z) - 3 - recammended doing so. The Commission then undertaok an exarcise to determine preferenc~s among various electaral syste~ aptians. caxcLVSZO~s In our near-consensus for recommending a shift from the at-large pZurali~y system currently in use, we were guided in Zarge part by a desire to distribute empower~ent more broadly i~ San~a Monica, particularly ta ethnic groups but to neighbarhoods and iss~e groups as wel~. A mova away from the current system, we be~ieve, should enhance the responsiveness of representatives and make th~ el~ctaral process more open to new ideas and new participants. In s~iecting a substitute for the present pracess, th~ Cammission was drawn ta aspec~s af both the proportiona3 methad and to district elsctions. After several sessions devoted primarily to a thoraugh discussion o~ their relative merits, eight Commissioners selected the proportional approach as their first preference. Five Commissioners s~Zected distriats as first prefer~nce. Districts were sel~cted as second pref~rence by fo~r Com~issioners as was a mixed district/at-Iarg~ system. Proportional was selected as a second chaice by two Commissioners, Retaining the currsnt at-iarge system was the first preference of on~ Commissioner and the second choice o~ ane other Co~nmissioner. At the end of its deiiberations, the Commission voted to rQCamme~d that if City Counci~ decides not ta propose a praportional method to the votersr then both the district system _ ~ _ and a hybrid district/at-large system should be seriously consid~rsd. It was further rec~mmended by a majority of Co~ission~rs that if a district form were adopted, there shouZd only be ane election, rather than a primarx followed by a run-af ~ . The districting approach has many at~rac~ive aspects: the restoration of face-to-face campaigni.ng involved promises to dispel some of the ali~nation of contemporary political discourse, and diminish the corrupting influence of special i.ntersst campaign funding. Districting undoubtedl~ has ampowering aspects as weZl. What weighed heavily against its se~eral virtues, in many of the Commissioners' minds, was its single disempowering side: that every voter would lose mu~h influence over six of seven cauncil members. The majority of the Commission beZieved this was an unacceptable trade-of~ fQr whatevar enhanced influence and acc~untalaility would be produced over one member. Also reducing the voters' power, some Commissioners thaught, was that in this system, one couZd vate on3y every four years, Districts certainly help geographically concentrated communities of interest; but for many Santa Monicansf the group with which we identify ~.s na~ geographica~ly def,~ned. We nated, for exampZe, th~ g~nder imbalance on Ci.ty Counci~, and suggest that if women wantad ta aggreqate their support for a candidate, it would be difficult for them to do so through a district forn~at. - 5 - Most memb~rs of tha Commission see, in a proportional voting systam (particularly th~ s~ngle transferable vote method), a solution that affers the empowerment opportunit~es of the district method without its major liability. While it may not qo as far in reducing the impact of campaign contributions, it offers many af the ather dividends of districting. In aur view, p~oportional representation~s primary virtue is its flexibility, an aid to accurately reflecting popular priorities. If ne~ghbarhood issuea are at the top of the public mind, district-based candidacies wiil be strong; if feminist Qr development 155~~5 rise to pro~inence, feminist or developmQnt-oriented candidacies can flourish; when ethnic groups have an urg2nt agenda, athnic candidacies will no doubt do we~l. By lowerinq the threshald of votes needed for e3ectoraZ success, adoptian of a prapartional method wil~ open the system to m4re pluralistic rapresentatian; by its flexibility, it will alZow the public to determine from time ta time, as priarities change, the specific content of that pluralism. The downs~de of a proportional system is its complexity, which would necessitate a thorough public education campaign prior to be~ng put farward as an option for vater consideration. - 6 - VQTES NEEDED TO ELECT UNDER VARIQUB SYSTEMS THEORETICAL MINIMUM M~NIMUM VOTE SHARE SHARE TO ELECT UNDER REQUIRED TO ELECT BEST CASE ASSUMPTIONS BASED ON EMPIRICAL EXPERIENCE AT~LARGE no theoretical {1~ Plurality minimum 34~ - 41~ (current (depends on # of candidates) system~ DISTRICTS none ~2~ with (depends on # of candidates 5~ - 6~ of city Plurality voters STV 25~ when 3 seats up with sa~e staggered 20~ when 4 seats up terms STV with a11 12 1/2~ (7 seats ta fill) same eiected at once CUMLTLATIVE 13 - 14$ when 3 seats up (3) about 33~ if 3 seats(~) VOTE up staggered 10~ when 4 seats up 25-27~ i£ 4 seats up terms (assum~ng each voter has 3 and 4 votes~ respectivaly} CUMEJLATIVE 6~ if each voter has 7 no data an which to VOTE votes(4} base estimate all elected at once _ NOTES: 1} based on Santa Monica City Council elections 1986~ '88, F90 Z) assuming 7 districts, and similar vate distributian as in at-large system; i.e. 34 - 41~ af electorate within district 3) highly thearetical assumption that only one c~ndidate qet multiple vates while nane of apponents get any 4) assumes {on data from A~amogar~.o, N. M.) that a minority-backed candidate gets approximately 2 votes fram avarage supporter, while other candidates get appraximately 1 1/2 votes per supporter REC~MMEI~DATT~NS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH Most mambers af the Commission felt that we were making our decision with less information than we would have liked to have had befora us, and several Commissioners would have prefarr~d to - 7 - investigat~ several questions before making aur recommendation, but the time frame in which we were charged with comp~eting our repozt made that impossible. We strongly suggest that City Cauncil take steps to determine se~eral unsettled issuss befoze making its final decision, utilizing experts in this area as needed. These matters include: o While our limited investigatian of proportional vat~ counting systems led us to believe that a fair and reliable proc~dure can be designed (which prevents elec~ion outcomes fram being skewed by the arder of bailot caunting) further development ~f its application and exploration of p~ssible pitfalls is still ne~ded. The so-called "Boulder system" af transferring surplus bal~ots avoids the theoretical possibility of clase elections being determined by the order ot ballot count, but we know of no ~urisdictions where this system is in actual use. The casts of propartional election tabulation, both camputer conversion and ongaing expense, require more thorough investigation, although our cursary research suggested neither cost would be prohibitive. A computer program for the counting of transferred vates according ta the Boulder system could no doubt be devised fairly easily. Whether another unbiased methad could be develaped is a question th~t could be explored further. o Latina voting strength in Santa Manica: wha~ praportion af voters in the propnsed minority-influence district are - 8 - actual~y members af minorities? And what proportzon of the unregister~d population can we estimate ta be nan-citizens? Resolving this question is important to assessing whether we have been correct in our tentative canclusian that a proportional system will work as wez~ for Latino influence on City CounciZ as a dis~rict wouid. o Palitical culture under a pr~portianal system: is it empir~caZly the case that independent candidacies have a qreater rate of success than ~hey da in dzstricts; ar~ slates an impartant presence in proportional electians? o Further research on the rale of campaign spending under proportional and distrzc~ systems: are top spenders, in fact, less likely to win under those systems than under at-Zarge systems? OBJECTIV~S AND VALUES In c~nsidering various aptions f~r Santa Manica's City Cauncil electarai system, the objectives considered by the Commi.ssion to be primary were: o ta guarantee accountabiiity, so that over the Iong terin Counci~ me~bers faithfulZy reflect popular preferences in their policy--making. a to p~eserve accessibiZzty, so tha'~ over the short run Caunci~ members are responsive to day--to-day needs af their cansti~uents. o to ensure that governing bodies reflect the ethnic diversity o~ Santa Manica so that na qroup is deprived o~ an - 9 - oppartunity ta make its voice heard and its choices known. a to faciZ~tate ~he repxesen~ation of th~ diverse curren~s af opinian ~n Santa Monica, and assure a place on the pubZi~ ag~nda far the var~ed przorities of many o~ganizations and al~ neighbvrhoods. o to maintain, whize broadening the issue agenda to an array of individual and group concerns, the centrality of common concerns, and assure that Council members approach problems with the interest of the whol~ City foremast in their minds. o to encourage the widest possible vater participation. o to equaiize, as far as possible, the influence of al~ re~idents, as articulated in the principle 'ane person, one vote' by minimizing the distorting influencs of campaign money Qn the democratic pracess. a and to provide every resident no~ anly ~qual representation, bu~ an equal right to be a representative by maximizing th~ oppartunity for independent ca~didates to compete realistically for election. Accountability and Access~bility In democratic theory, accountability is the key issue and tha main purpose of having ~lactians of any kind. It is the quid pr~ quo of delegation af power ta an elected body and the insurance against that power's misuse. In practice, accountabil~ty is not pr~sent/absent but is a matter of degree. How accountable representatives f~el v~ri~s according to ind~vid~aZ philosaphy and conscience but depends ultimately on -io- their sensa of how easy it would be for discontanted constituents ta replace them. The C~mmission therefore wished ta avoid a system which would tend toward undue entrenchment of offiae-holders. It is also a matter of direction; accountability to whom? The accountability to all contemp~ated by political theorist~ necessitates approximately equal influence an outcomes by all citizens. To the Commission, th~s is linked to the issue of campaign finance reform, and also to the issue of maximal voter participation. Voter participation in turn is discouraged by a narrow agenda of public issues and by a Council membership that excludes ethnic groups or lea~es neighborhoods withaut representatian. A final dimension of accauntability the Commission considered was how often perfox~mance was reviewed. Many Commissianers felt that biennial elections were desirable beca~se they allow the voters to signaZ for change in policy courses before those caurses become irreversible. In many cities, but not necessar~ly Santa Monica, much af a resident's cancern with municipal government is service-oriented rather than issue ariented. PDth0~25, streetlights, traffic, crime-- matters on which a resident wants prompt action and a simple way ta get it. Many City Councilmembers may not see themselvas primarily in the role of ambudspersons ar service repxesentatives, but it is a facet af the role and in some residents' eyes, the central one. The issue of accessibility can be viewed se~era~ ways. Does the voter with their own local Councilmember get mare attention and better service? Wil~ he/she - 11 - have a better sense of a~ocal prab~em and be mare concerned about it? Or is it preferab~e td have a number af representatives, ~nd muitipZy the poznts af access far in~luance? On baianc~ th~ Commission leaned to~ard the Iatt~r point of vie~, in part because the geographical proximi~y of a Councilmember was not a guarantee of either shared concerns or persanaZ compatibi~~ty. Ethnic Di~ersity Demagraphic trends, r~sing cultural sensitivity to multicu~turaiism, maturing m~nority political consciousness and federal voting rights legislation are all impelli~g more serious consideration of the need far multi-ethnic representation ~n America's governing bodies. In santa Monica's particu3ar case, the size and distrxbutzon af ethnic graups in the City dties not make the best raute to this goal obvious. While it wauld be possible to form one district w~th a voting age major~ty of (multiple) minorities, it is not clear whether they would be a ma~ority af ac~ual voters. Nor ~s it clear~y the ~os~ empawering option to znsure minority infZuence zn Sa~ta Mon~ca's politi~aZ ~ife. Since multiple minorities are involved, wauld one group's gain be anather's Iass? ar wauld camman interests facilitat~ coalition? Would minarities residing outszde such a distzict be empawersd ar dis~mpowered (gain or lase influence) by its creation? We wera nat able ~o come to a conc~usion on these questions. _ 12. .. Neighborhood Empowerment And Voter Participation For man~ c~ty dwellers, c~nditions in ~heir immediate area are perhaps the foremast aancern in thinking abaut politics, and the quali~y of n~ighborhaod li~e is the yardstick by which ~hey avaluate Iocal gove~nment. Neighbarhood activism is aliva and we~l ~n Santa Monica and we wish to encouraga zt t~ thrive, for the saZuti~ns tn many problems, ev~n thase affecting the whaZe Cit~, may ~irst be developed in the incubatar of intense neighborhood interactzons. But not a~l af Santa Monica neighborhaads sesm to feel equally treat~d, or equa~ly empowered. There are considerable diFferences between various districts in their voter turnauts. ~t is no coincidence that the a~ea af lowest turnaut (Pica neiqhbarhood} is alsa the area fseiinq most disenfranchised and Zeast listened to ~n City affairs. One cannat point ta cause and a~fect her~, but a cycle: ~hose who participate less may ge~ 1~ss cansideratfan when decisions are made; those who feel they and their neighbors have no anfluence will in turn be disinclined to bother participating. In the Com~issian's Oplrilori~ neighborhood activism is a vital eZement in civic Zife, and we believe the City's e~ectara~ system should be one that reinforces it where it is healthy and stimu~ates zt where it is ~rail. A system that gives a~l neighborhoods reasan ta feel their concerns wi13 ge~ a~~~ntion should encourage voter participation _ ~3 _ in all areas, particularly those low turnout areas that have seen themselves as neglected neighborhoods. Reducing Siate Daminance Far some Commission members, ane important objecti~e in election reform would be to reduce the central role of slate palitics in Santa Monica's ciVic Iif~. The influence of slates was not seen as lacking positive aspects. The slating process itself provides a sifting procedure in which scrutiny by a group of politically interested citizens puts forward what are presumably the more capable af possible advocates af that group's point of view. Far a variety of people - supporters and oppanents of the endorsing graup - such endorsements can be an economic way of making choices without investing time in extensive research of candidate records and positions, a real service to many busy people. Slates were also given credi~ far drawing into the political process groups and individua~s who had previously been excluded. Finally, it must be said that s3ating arganizations with continuing post-election ~ife can, and perhaps do, by their ongoing interaction with candidates they spansored, provide a farm of public accountabi~ity between elections. However, these benafits, in many Cammissioners' apinian, are autweighed by s~rious liabil~tzes. The pre-eminent place of slates in Santa Monica's political pracess reduces the praspects for independent candidates ta get the public's attention, regardless of their individual merits. - ~4 - It is in the nature of slate campaigns~ many Cammissioners be~ieve, to revolve around a very fe~ issues. This is, to so~~ exte~~, an af~liction af aIl contemporary medi~-oriented electo~al campaigns, but is exacerbated in the case of siates becausa of the need to pl~y dawn issues on which endorsed candidates do not agree. The narrowzng of the issue agenda in the campaign, we believe, has a carry-over effect into week-to-Week city government; with attention focussed so brightly on the "main issues" over which the vote pQlarized, ather equally important ~.ssues tend to be eclipsed. For many residents, the principal campaign themes may be matters of relativ2 indifference, eompared to other issues they feel strongly abaut. The Commission feels that slate campaigns are in part responsible for the difficulty af develaping angaing civic d~aZogue on a broader range af top.~cs. No system we considered wauZd eli~inate slate influence, nor would we consider that a des~rable goal. We would, however, hope to se~ the adoption of a system in which slate endarsem~nt was t~ere].y on~ factor, and no~ the key considera~ion~ in a candidate's prospeets for success. AT-LARGE ELECTIONS Mechanics and Usage: The at-large system af City Councii election has been in farc~ in Santa Monica since the present Charter was adopted, and the three City C~mmissioners (for public ~aorks, public s~fety and financ~) were elected at-large befaxe that. As members af the presen~ C~ty Caunci~ were Elected under - 15 - this system, we need not expound here on its mechanics, but only note that within the genre, thEre a~e variations such as ma~ority vote requirements (with primary and run-off if needed), and the numbered seat system. Tn California cities, use of the at-large option is the norm, and has be~n for mast cities since their inception. Of 220 California cities surveyed by the League of California Cities in 1989, 205 empZoyed it in contrast to 15 choosing mambers by district. Districts tend to be predo~inant in the State's Iargast c~ties - Los Angeles, San Francisco, San Diega, Long Beach -- a~though districts can be found in a number of cities of Santa Monica's approximate size -- Redondo Beach, Downey and Pasadena. Across the natian, too, at-Iarge electi~ns prevail, except in metropolitan centers. Yet, this was not always true. At the end of tha 19th century, district (or ward) election was the ruZe in United States cities, only to be swept away as part of the municipa~ reform movEment package of changes, which aZso entailed non-partisan ~lections and the city manager form af gove~nment. The upheaval in municipal governance brought about by the reform movement was prompted in part, by, and aimed in part at, wide-spread graft and corrupt~on in city politics. However, the reforms introduced (especia~ly the abolition of district elec~ion}, whatever they accomplished in expunging political - 16 - rackets, had the consequenc~ of disempowering ethnic minorities and the residents of poorer neighborhoods. Ta what extent this was a goal of some reformars, or merely a by-praduct, remain5 a lively debate among historians, one we need not explore here. The disempowering effect, none~heless, has been a recurring issue since the institution of at-large syste~s, here and elsewhere. As late as ~941, the National Municipal League advacated at-large electians in its Model City Charter~ explaining: "It ~s d~ffic~lt to find capable leaders distributed throughout the city by wards. +' ~1} As our cansulting historian, Profeasar J. Morgan Kousser, r~ported to us, the adoptian of Santa Monica's current Charter involved a spirited controvex'sy betweer~ district prapanents (including African American leaders and residents of Ocean Park) and advocates of at-large, led by the almast a11 Narth-of-Montana "fr~eho].ders" who designed the Charter. Complaints from the Pico and Ocean Park areas were rebuffed by the Baard of Freeholders, who first agreed and then declined to put a district option on the ballat, and dismissed by the Santa Monica Outloak, which editorialized that the "interest of minorities is always best protected by a system which favors the electian of Iiberal-minded persons who are nnt compelled to play peanut politics." Dissenters raised the prospect of a North-of-Montana "dictatorship" with little concern for "the resident of Ocean Park, Douglas district, or Lincoln-Pico" and asked "Where wil~ - 17 - the Jewish, colared ar Mexican go for aid in his sp~cial problems?" ~Z~ But the Charterites prevailed at the polls (though more narrowly in the abave-mentianed areas), and the controversy did not resurface unti]. 1974, when Ocean Park residents spearheaded an * initiative for a 7-district plan, collecting Zb,000 signatures. Again oppnsed by the Outlook, incumbent office-halders and the Chamber of Commerce, the pro-district forces - backed by the League of Women Vaters and Dem~c~atic Clubs (according to Out~oak records) - last the April ].975 vote carrying Ocean Park precincts but I.ittle else in a two-to-ane defeat. The issue of minority empowermen~ (generally in the cantext of ethnzcity rather than ciass or neighborhoads as such) has been raised repeatedly thraughaut our state and natian in the 1970's and 1980's and opposition to the at-large method on those grounds has weaker~ed its sway. Under Voting Rights Act litigation, or the threat thereof, many sauthern cities were pressed to abandon the at-large system, usual~y a.n favor of district elections ar a hybrid arrangement cambining districts with same members at-large. Some California cities, usualZy without legal pressure, made the saiae changes in response to both ethnic and neighbarhaod pressures to choose their awn spokespersons. Appraisai: One major advantage of an at-large Council, the Commission feZt, was accessibility. With responsibility to all vaters comes an openness to the needs of a17. 5anta Monicans and some incentive to be informed an issues and developments all over - Z8 - the City. We feel that Santa Monica's siz~ makes this a reali5tic expectation. Some members of the Commission feared that without at-large constituencies, Council members would have little rnotivatian to meet the needs and concerns of people outside their imm~diate geographic areas. The Commissian evaluated the at-large system as least desirable on the criterion of accountability. Two facets of the system diminish a council member's vulnerability to removal. The only ~ay to bring about the defeat ot one member who has been unresponsive is by ensuring that three (or faur) other candidates get more votes. This was felt to bE an indirect, diFficult and ineffici~nt route ta removing the unaccountable. Exacerbating the problem is the expense af at-large elections n~cessarily associated with reachi~g the nu~bers of voters needed to win in this system. That sizable amounts of funds genEral~y flow to incumbents just by virtu~ of their incumbency is one problem. That the dapendence on large contributivns tends ta make a Councilmember accountable to their donors, rather than the electorate as a whole, is another and more seriaus flaw. (It should be noted that subsequent to the Commission's deliberations, revisions were made t~ tha Municipal Code ralating to campaign contributions, which may impact this issue in the f~ture.) For reasons touched on in the above historical review, and to which we will return in discussion of districts, the at-Zarge - 19 - system is generally considered an obstacle ta ethnic empowerment. Santa Monica's City Council gained its first minority member when an African-American police offiGer, Nathaniel Triv~s, was elected in 1971, and a secand African-American, Hilliard Lawson, was named by the Council two years ~ater to fill a vacancy opened by a death in office. Between 1979 and th~ 1990 election of the first Latino Cauncilmember, Antonio Vazquez~ minorities had no presence an tha Ca~ncil. Santa Monica is fortunate in being r~lativeiy free in recent years of ethnically polarized voting -- as the approval of minority me~aers by an electorate over 85~ white tends to show. However, the Commission is concerned with a more subtle question - whether it should be the role of a white electorate to make th~ ultimate choice between minority candidates, or far that matter, between a minority representative and a white competitor. A minority, elected to office primarily by a white electorate does not, by th~t process, become a representative of the minority community or necessarily a proponent af its agenda. The central issue, in the Commission's view, is not ane af having Cauncil members wha are ethnic, but of empowering ethnic communities to choose Council members, and on this crit~rion, the at--large system is felt to be inadequate. It shauld be nated that there was concurrent Commission discussion which addressed the rale and responsibility of slates in promoting (or not promoting) ethnic minority candidates under the current system. - 20 - In this approach to weighing ethn~c representation, the Commission is in accord with the Voting Rights Act and judicial elabaration therean, which emphasizes the ability of protected groups to elect "reprssentatives of ~heir chaice", as the paramount test, above and beyond th~ ethnic backgraund as such of the representative. A second facet of the question of diversity Qr representativeness is the idealogical dimens~on. Sy its nature, the at-large election tends toward homogeneity o~' views, rather than diversity. With a single electorate weighing competing sets of aligned candidates at the same time, those sharing the same base and viewpoint would likely all win, or a11 lose. Only in a clase overall contest would sZight variation in individual appeal produce a mixed result. A variety of viewpoints on the Council, the Cammission believes, serves not only the popular sense af being represented, but a decision-making process that avoids error by incorporatinq critical perspectives beforehand. The dis~mpowerment of some neighborhoods is a third dimensian of the da.versity issue that concerned the Commi.ssion. As noted in the previous section, there was over-representation from th~ North Qf Montana area --- perceived as "daminatiQn" by some -- in the years fol~owing adaption af the present Charter. While contemporary Councils have been more geagraphic~lly diverse, some areas - notably the Pico neighborhaod - have never been represented on City Council. Scame residants af that community -~ 21 _ expressed ta the Commission feelings af neglect and a sense of disenfranchisement. The at-lar~e systam is not particularly helpfu~ t~ the plaeement of neighborhood issues an the Givic agenda since a candidate oriented mainly to such an issue would have limited appeal running city-wide. However, should an issue arouse intenae concern in one neigh~orhood or considerable concern in two or more, under the at-Iarge system all CounciZ members would have to listen. The at-larqe Council focuses its atten~ion predom~nantly on city-wide issues and (if its camposi~ion is not skewed by class, geography, race or some other factar) is designed to make decisions from the viewpoint of the city's interests as a wha~e. That the membership is often skewed, however, can bias the definition of what the city's interests are. The simplicity and familiarity af the system makes participatian easy. pn~y insofar as it may neglect to address the concerns of some groups for reasans cited above, might it Iead to lower voter inte~e~t and hence participation. DISTRICTS Mechanics And usnge; Under this syste~, the City would ~e d~vided int4 a number of d"is~ricts of equal population with a single representive from each district. If the Council were tQ remain the same si~e, Santa Monica would have ~even districts, and one Cauncil member wauld be elected as Mayor by the Council. - 22 - A~ternatively, if the mayor were to be elected by the people city-wide (an option not af particular interest to the Commission), we might wish to change the number of districts ~o s~x or eight, in order to maintain an add number (7 or 9} of votes on Council. A reduction to six districts, however, wauld dilute minority influence, perhaps to the point where there was no '~multi-minority majorityn district. Unless the City were to adopt a two-stage alection (with a primary and run-off between top finishers) the district candidates wauld be elected by plurality vote. District baundaries would require revisiQn after each decennial census. The reapportionment process usually generates friction among the potential victims or beneficiaries and can be abused to entrench incumbents through gerrymandering. This task cauld be delegated to another body without personal stak~ in the autcome, if the Council wishes to reduce controversy and the possibility of abuse. It is customary that CouncilmeYnbers are required to reside in the districts they represent, and in practice it wauld be unusual for a district ta elect a nQn-resident. Some argue, however, that th~ purpose of district elections is ~a increase neighbarhoad empawerment, and that restricting voters' ChOICQ$ ta immediate neighbors is not a necessary part of that process. We discussed in the previaus section th~ declina and recent revival of the district method of election and the reasons for those changes. Districts were in fact brzefly used in the first - 23 - few years of Santa Monica's civiC existence, befor~ the ~hree Commissioner arrangement wa~ adopted. Di~trict advocacy in Santa Monica has mast recently been taken up by CURE (Citizens United to Ref~rm Elections) which proposed seven districts, mQSt of them congruent with planning areas ar otherwise historically accepted neighborhoods. The CURE proposal would mandate that represen~a- tives reside in their districts. This particular praposal was aZso supported by members af loca~ chapters of MALDEF (Mexican-American Legal Defense and Educatioh Fund) and the NAACP (National Association far the Advancement af Calarad People}. Appraisal: Accountabil~ty, tha Cammission concluded, was optimized xn a districtad city -- in a certain sense. Each Council mamber has a smaller eiectorate which wi11 be fairly aware of his/her perfarmance in office - at least as it pertain~ to issues of interest to that neighborhood. Both lagic and anecdotal reparts lead to the conclusion that it wauld be easier to replace a district representati~e than ta aust ane elected at~large. The limited range of a district campaign enables new candidates to get adequate expasure ~ore quickly; similarly, the ~ewer hauseholds one would need to reach could make campaign funds a lesser factor; human resources - neighborhood activists - can be substituted. Since in this miZieu the incumbent's funding advantage is less meaningful, office-holders have more incentive ta be attentive to constituent preferences, - 24 - In another sense, accountability is distinctly limited by the d~strict sy~tem; six of seven Councilmembers are beyond the reach af every individual's vote. While nathing stops anyone from working for or cantributing t~ an alternative candidate zn anather district, the limited number of people likely to do so makes accountability in this system a parochial one. A similar trade-off is apparent in accessibility under the district sy~tem. Ona's local member is likely burdened by fewer inquiries and requests for services and so has more time for a constituent's needs but if he/she is inefficient or inattantive~ ane has to turn to representatives from ather districts who may be inclined to help, but have no part~.cular incentive to do sa. The information put before the Commission by our consultinq demographer, Prafessor Leo Estrada of UCLA, sugges~s a strong probability, but nat clear evidence, that Latinas couZd determine the selectian of one Council member under a seven-district plan. Latino inf~uence would be even stronqer under a nine-district far~tat; the Latino voting age population in one district therein being 44.6~ as compared with 39.6~ when there are 7 districts. It was noted that the potential impact of non-citizen Latinos on vating patterns in Santa Monica is a question that needs to be determined. If they do, di.stricts may not be the optimum method of Latino empawerment in this city, because voting Latinos in the district might be too few to prevail, and Latinos outside the district would have less influence on the outcame than they do now. - 25 - A further concern ta some Commission members was that in the proposed districts the preponderance of Santa Monica's African-American populat~on is ~nc~uded to build a multi-minority majority. But the district sends only one representative to City Hall, patentially satting the two ethnic groups in head-ta-head competition. Moreover, were competing candidacies to de~elop, a third non-minority oandidate could well e~erge the winner, given the distribution o~ ethnic groups. The district system, for obvious reasons, should guarantee a place on the public agenda for neighborhand concerns and problems. Some neighborhoods, we were told ~y lacal spokespersons, feel particularly disenfranchised. One PiCo resident, for example, complained that their area is host to over three-quar~ers of hameless and drug-treatment facilities, and is a"dumping ground" for }'all activ~ties incompatible with residentia~ life." No resident af this district has ever been elected to City Council. As interest in, and viewpoints on, such current topics of contraversy as d~velopm~nt or rent control vary between neighborhoods, we believe that a district-based Council wou~d be more ideologically diverse. The priorities of organizations might be advanced in such a system if their bases are localized, but for many groups o~ganized city-wide its adoption wauld make no particu~ar differenc~. The Commission discussed a point that in maintaining the gaal of a central role for city-wide concerns, the district system could _ 2 6 -- be counter-productive. Though we want to ~ee neiqhborhaod needs br~ught forward, we da not wish to pay a high price in weakening attention to city-wide perspec~ives. Some Commissioners feared a parochialism generating cycle in which representatives wauld find i~ electoral~y useful to focus on puxely local issues, gi~ing short-shrift ta lang range city planning, the city's business clima~e, ar ather community-wide considerations. A district system, in our view, would be among the be5t choices in stimulating high voter participation. It maximizes the likelihood that a candidate - perhaps a friend or neighbar - will parsanally be known to ths voter; the campa~gn methods encouraged by the system facilita~e face-to-face contact in any case. Each vQter, in the smaller pond af a district, is ~ore entitled to fea~ that his/her Croak will make a difference. The re~ative ease of reach~ng the voter base door-to-door has anothe~ positive consequence -- reducing the reliance of candidates on expensive means af campaign cammunication, and thus weaning the political process trom donar dependEncy. {As mentioned earlier, recently appraved changes in local campaign f inancing laws may lessen th~ relative influence of large campaign contributions in Santa Monica.) Of all the systems we examined, districts are clearly the op~~mal approach to this goa~, The same changes in campaigning styles led us to conclude that district e~ection would go far toward opening opportunity far independent candidates. While the reduced budgets needed makes - 27 - proportian of th~ local vote. Given the substantial influence of slates, the Coznmissian was nat canfident that independent candidacies would succeed mora often under districts than under a propartianal representatian format, but it is assuredly a more open system than at-large. We do not suggest, and have na reason to b~lieve, that slate politics couzd not adapt comfortably ta the d~strict format; centralizad fund-raising and other c4-ordinatidn might well continue, and slat~-endorsed candidates might emerge victorious in all districts. We do believe, hawever, that independent challenges would be more seriaus than under the present system. MIXED SYSTEMS A number of cities have responded to pr~ssures for district representatio~ by devxsing a variety af hybrid or mixed district/ at-large combinations. To some obs~rvers, such compromises off~r the benefits of bath at-large and district methods, while avoiding the drawbacks of either pure system, i.e., neither areas deprived of representation nor parochialism. Furthermor~, all citizens under a mixed system have several representatives~ incZuding one who is particularly accessible and accountable to them. Hybrid systems are in use in over 1,000 cities nation-wide, including a majority of those over 250,000 populatian and a third of those in Santa Monica's range ~f 50 to 100 thousand residents.~3~ However, these mixed system~ da not enjay much acceptance in the .. 2g _ Pacific Coast regi~n, where prevalent. Several Califarnia 5tockton and Dawney utilize combination. at-large electians are most cities, including Oakland, some at-large and district The Commissian did not pursue at length an evaluation of the merits of this appraach, in part because it had no strong advocates in the community. However, the Commission believes that if Council rejects proportional representatian systems, this option shauld be given serious consideration as an alternative. PR~PORTIONAL REPRESENTATION Philosophy: Surprising as it may seem to Americans, our method af electing rapresentatives, by a simple plurality of votes in a geographical area, is no longer the standard brand of democratic practice. Indeed, the Eng~ish-speaking world is among the minarity of the wor~d's democracies in its employment of the p~urality, or "first-past-the-past" system. For over a century, critics have suggested that this method is flawed as a way of selecting a governing body. It allows the largest faction of the population to exclude small~r factions from any role in governance, creati.ng a deliberativs body that may greatly misrepresent the distribt~tion of views and opinions among the electorate, In the warst case, 49~ of the voters may eraerge from the process with no elected representatives. The alternatives praposed by these critics are generically tarmed "proportional representation", and rest an the philosophical ~ _ ~g ~ principle that the compositian of governing bodies should closely mirror the co~positian (i.e., comm~nities of interest) of the electing popuZation. The standard against which electoral schemes are to be judged is one af correspandence between the propartion of voting support and the proportion af legislat~rs elected by those supporters. Underlyi~g this principle and this standard are not only int~itive nQtions of "fairness", but pragmatic considerations -- first, that broad popular respect for a governmental process (its '~legitimacy") is enhanced by the widest possible feeling that one has an advocate for one's views in that pracess; secondly, that the opportunity to incorporate some minority perspectives in the legislative process minimizes the chance o~ making decisions that will be ultimately rebuffed by electorate (along with the decision-makers) come next voting day. Critics of propartional representation laok with alarm a~ the system's capacity to spawn numerous small parties or factians, arguing tha~ this undercuts gave~nment's capacity to govern. That the decision-making process might be s~owed by inva~ving more players can hardly be d~sputed; whether speedy decision-making is to be equated with wise decisions is another matter. A nation at war might be hamstrung by painstaking coalition-building; it is hard to envision camparable damag~ to a caty gov~rnmant. Concerns have also been expressed over the relatively small percentage of votes needed for election to a seat. - 30 - Although there are no examples of proportional representation ~lectoral systems among California municipalities, there are models of this approach elsewhere in the United States. SINGLE TRANSFERABLE VQTE Mechani.cs and Usaqe: Among the many method~logies proposed to al~aw a gradati.an of voter preferences among candidates, the singie transferab~e vote (STV) is ong of mostly widely known, and one suited to municipal non-partisan elections. (Many ather methads p~esume the existence of poli'tical parties, or a legislative bndy of flexible size.} In STV, the voter marks ha.s/her ballat ranking all (or some) candidates by preference (first choice F~1Ff~ second chozce "2", etc.), and a candidate is elected upon attaining a threshold ! (called "quata") of n+ 1+ 1 votes, where n is the n~xmber of seats to be filled -- if four sea~s are open, one-fifth of the votes plus one suffices; with seven cauncil members to be elected, one-eighth plus one. A fir5t count looks anly at each ballot's first preferences, and this round usually produces some winners, sometimes all of them. Where seats remain to be filled after the first count, transfers -- af secand preferences -- coma into play. These are taken fram two classes o~ ballots that would otherwise be "wasted" votes -- those with a f~.rst preference for the candidate with the least votes, and the extra or "surplus" votes of a candidate (if any) already elected in the first round. - 31 - Under the normal rules of plurality election both kinds of ballats would be "dead" or ineffectual. In STV, the voters who cast them are re-enfranchised by bringing their second prefarences to bear on the choice between the remaining contenders. STV systems enjoyed some popu~arity in municipal voting early in ~his century, in numerous Eastern cities including Cleveland and Cincinnati. Most jurisdictions have since abandoned them, but commentators have attributed this to the pressure af partisan politicians, rather than to grass-roots dissatisfaction~4~Used briefly for selecting New York City's Council, its abandonment in 1947 gave Democrats 24 of 25 counciZ seats in the fo~lowing election, though that party's vote was just 52.5 percent. Cambridge, Massachusetts continues to use STV to selecti its City Council and School Committee. New York City employs it far selecting its numeraus community school boards, though a State Senate committee recentiy proposed reverting to a plurality systam. Appraisalc While we believe that the STV system, when utilized by an infor3med electorate, can be the most effective method af appraaching the gaals we identified as desirable in an electoral system, ~any Commissianers nonetheless harb~r serious doubts about its practicality. The complexity of the counting pracedure as well as po~sible (und~r some methodologies) inf~uenee of the order of caunting makes it difficu~t for most ~oters to understand the effects nf - 32 ~ their second and iater ballot preferences. While it ~s fairly straightforward to choase ane's three or more favored candidates, strategic decisions about how to rank them if some are considered mvre likely to win than others would be difficult to calculate. The rationa~e far the counting system, like its mechanics, is not easily explained. Many Commissioners beZieve that with a thorough infortnational campaign, Santa Monica voters will readily see the system's benefits and embrace it, despite its unfami~iar character.The Commission's expasure to public response (at flur February forum) suggested, however, that public education and acceptance might be morE af a cha~lenge than we had imagined. The abjectives af ethnic group empowerment and ideological diversity shauld be greatly advanced by a change to th~ single transferable vote m~thad of Council Election, provided that a11 Council mambers were elected at the same time. The joint effect of these adjustments would be to reduce the proportion a~ voter support needed to win ta about ane-third of its present level. In the 1990 election, 37~ support {about three-eighths) produced a victory; und~r STV with 7 seats open, one-eighth suppart would be "quata", a sufficient number ta win. One can imaqine a number af issue~ around which an eighth of Santa Manica's electorate might be ra~lied. ~ne cou~d ~lso faresee campaigns aris~ng around neighborhood bases, espacially ir~ any area that has hitherto felt a lack af representation. - 33 - Santa Manica's Latino populatian, e~timated to comprise about one-seventh of the city's voting age papulation, probably makes up a larg~ enough base for a successful candidacy -- even allo~ing far a substantial number of non-~itizens -- when the winner needs only 12 ~/2 percent of the vote. were staggered terms to be maintained, on the ather hand, the expected benefit to ethnic ar issue-oriented groups dwindles significantly. The threshald of representation becomes 25~ when three seats are open, 20$ when four seats are up. The hurdle would unquestionably be lowered From its current 37~ level, but it may yet remain i~practically high for many groups. Whether STV is more group-empowering than the cumulative vote ~di5cussed in the next section), or mare so than a district sys~em, revalves in large part then around the question of how many Councilmembers are chosen at the same time. As the 5TV system, wou~d, we assume, be used in the context of a city-wide electarate, no absolute reduction in campaign spending can be expected. However, to the degree that the siz~ of the voter base needed becomes smaller, the amount of mon~y ne~ded to mount a serious campaign may shrink accordingly, as long as the base af candidate support can be identified effectively. An increase in independent candidacies af ~11 kinds would be a lagical eansequence o~ STV, as would-be Co~ncilmembers contemplate the lower hurdle to elective affice. The ~irst proportional represantation vote in Worcester, Mass. in 1949 bra~ght out 152 candidates for 9 seats. - 34 - Whether independents meet with succass, thsreby weakeninq the central role of slate pali~ics, is not so predictable, although we may sa£ely say the probab~lzty is greater than under the current voting structure. A host of independent candidates, without agreemants ta support one another with second preferences, might da as much ta undermine each other as to weaken slates. Slating groups cauld survive in this electoral regime, but would need to Zower their abjectives in terms af the number of seats controlled. Attempts to spread the group's support between many candidates cauld produce defeat far all of them. New aZectoral coalitions would be likely to develop on an ad hoc basis as public i~terest rose around emerging issues. A City CounciZmember elected under STV couid look at any voter in the city as a potential saurce of support - or opposition. In thi~ sense, 5TV can make for a responsive and accountable Counc~l. At the same time, a broad base of support is not essentia~ to success under this system; cansequently, there is somewhat less incentive to respand to all constituents, especially if Coun~ilmembers see their election as resting on a specific geographic, ~thnic ar issue base. Whi~e we have emphasized the bene€its of 5TV in facilitating representation far minorities af a1I types, we recognize that the Council may need to weigh against it the philosaphical counter-arguments ('majority ru~e') central ta democratic - 3~ - traditian, and a~so the palicy consideration of stimulating and reward~ng single-issue candidacies. STV, like the cumulative vote, affords the possibility of informai d~strict representation for any large area where residents' cammon concerns are high an their political agendas. pf aIl systems we cansidered, STV, despite its camplexity, may do the most to stimulata voter participation. The relative ease, compared to the current system, of gaining a spokesperson on City Council, under this method, brings rewards within reach af grass-roQts groups of many persuasions who may gresently feel political participation to be a fruitless effort. CUMULATIVE VOTING Mechanics and Usaqe: An option sometimes described as a semi-proportional voting methad is the cumulative vote. While not truly proportianal in its outcome, it tends to produce more prdportional results than do plurality systems. The cumulative system may be used in any contest where more than vne representative is to be elected. It gives the ~oter as many votes as there are winners but allows them to be cast in a number of ways, depending on whether the voter wishes to facus, or to distribute, hisjher support. Where, for examp~.e~ three Councilmembers are to be ~lected, a voter may cast one vote for each of three candidates, ar all three votes for a single choice. - 36 - The latter c~urse wauld be taken when there is an intense interest in getting one particular person e~ected; or perhaps just indifference or indecisian abaut the relative mer~ts o€ the other candidates. Between that strategy and the traditional one vote each for three candidates, lies st~1Z another optian; two votes for a first choica and one vote far a second. Sometimes, ha~f-votes are employed to permit an equal weighting (1 1/2 votes) for two preferred choices. The method allows voters to express th~ strength of their desire €er the election of one candidate (or two-les~ intensely), rather than restricting them to simple choice af "far" or "against'~. Voters who see nti reasan to prefer candidates B or C over p or E c~n put votes to use under this sys~em that wauld atherwise be "wasted". The purpose af such a system is to ensure some representation to a substantial minority bloc who migh~ otherwise be "shut out". It is in common use in American corporate life for electing boards of directors, enabling minarity stackholders to have a voice on tha board. In American politics, it has played a marginal ro~e. The State of Illinois, sectionally po~arized by conf~icting Civil War layalties, instituted cumu~ative vating for members of its House of Representatives in i870, with three-member districts. In practice, this process usually allowed tha ~-inority party in the area to gain ane-th~rd representation, since it would take 75~ or - 37 - more support to sweep aIl three seats. Despite the technically campliCated ballot, the system remained in place for a full century, being abolished in 1980 by referendum in canjunction with greatly reducing the size of the Illinois House. Opinions are divid~d as to whether the vote was primarily against the voting system, ar against a pay raise the Legislature had just voted for itself. fihe cumulative system was revived for use in ~987 through a court-appraved settlement of a voting rights lawsuit in Alamogord~, New Mexico. This city af about ~5,a00 subsequentZy elected a Latino ta its City Council. It had been z9 years sznce Latinos, ~ho cansti~ute just und~r 25~ of the population, had b~en able ta elect one of their number to the ~ity Council, Field research by political scientists Richard Cole, Delbert Taebel and Richard Engstram, emplaying exit polls on Electi~n Day, established that the multiple ~ates o~ Latinos did indeed pravide the margin af victory for the Latina winner. Although fourth in the number o~ voters who s~pported her, she was third in number of votes. The exit poZ3, also indicated that 95~ of the ~oters understovd the system, and that over two-th.~rds had cast mul~ip].e votes for a candidate. The City sp~nt about $4,~00 on pragrams to publicize the system, thraugh meetings and explan~tory ~iterature. No voting strategy aim~d at bl4cking a minority candidate was apparent in the voting results. - 38 - Appraisal: With regard to the goals of empowering ethnic ~inorities and contribu~ing to ideo~ogical diversity, the Commiss~on believes this methad would be a substantial step farward. The ability to aggregate severa~ votes for a candidate permits a s~al~er grflup to reach the threshold of representation. Based on Santa Monica's mo~t recent elect~on~ that threshold, the proportion of voters needed to elect the lowest-tal~ying winner, is approximately three-eighths (37~). Had cumulative ~ating b~en utilized to its maximum patential by an ethnic or an issue-oriented group comprising a~e-eiqhth af the voters, that group could theoretically have elected one candidate of its choice. This model assu~es that no multiple vates are cast for the other candidates and so, like the assumption that all supporters cast all their votes one way, indicates only its theoretical potential. But in practice, cumulative vating should give a committed base of ~nder 20~ a fair chance to elect a spakesperson in a 3-opening r~ce, and a very good chance in a faur-person race. ~'~ Since no ethnic minority approaches 20~ o~ Santa Monica's e~ectorate, this method, whiZe an impravement over the at-large system, presents less appartunity for a minority to elect its choice of candidate than would a district aystem. The minority-~mpawering impact of this method would be greatly enhanced if it w~re combined with an end to staggered terms. In a se~en-way race, allowing each voter seven votes, a united committed base af as little as 6~ af the electorate would be - 39 - thearetically sufficient ta elect, assuming (as abova) na multiple votes far ather candidates - an unrea~istic assumption. But~ in practice, a base of about twice that size shouZd be enough to place one candidate in office. Insofar as the voter bas~ of a candidacy could be geographica~, rather than ethnic or issue-oriented, cumulative voting migh~ enhance neighborhoad empowerme~t as we11. Because the number of voters requir~d far a successful race is considerabZy reduced, the campaign spending per candidate may be propQrtionately diminished, even thaugh the un~t of election cantinues to be the city as a whole. A campaign focussed an a geographic area ar an ethnic group can be mounted at a much Zower cost than an appeal to the whole electorate. In the case of issue-oriented graups the cost reduction is mare c~xestionable; if the issue in question is linked to an organization, or the cause has ather ways af identifying its supporters amongst the ranks of the electorate, the same economies apply. For a new issue, ar one without organizational Zinkage, savings might be more marginal. Under this syst~m, with a small~r base of supparters needed to gain election, the independent candidate's praspects improve, and to that degree the power of s~ating graups is eroded. However, slates aiming at f~lling fewer pasts than were open could under this system coordinate their supporters to cast multiple votes for twa or more candidates. Since all voters continue to be eligible to vote for all candidates, a Councilmember haping for re-eZection would be wise -4a- ta be accessible to all Santa Monicans, but to the degree that a narrower electoral base is sufficisnt ~nder this system, it provides somewhat less incentive to accessibility than the at-large system. For the same reason, it is possiblE that neighborhood issues might be emphasized aver city-wide problems, since one electoral strategy might be mobilization against city neglect of a neighborhood. In this sense, cumulative voting could (as cauld the single transferabie ~ote) resu~t in district representation without district el~ctions. The impact on voter participation, we conjecture, should ba positive, as graups of variaus kinds unable to contend for control of City Council can, with this device af ~ultiple votes, realistically contemplate representation. There is no indication that the novel aspects of the ballot pose complexities that confuse the vat~rs or reduce participatian. VdTING RIGHTS QUESTIONS As an initial step in considering various el~ctaral options, the Commission wished to inquire into whether a legitimate claim of violation of the ~ederal Voting Rights Act cauld b2 made against the City. Ultimately, two consultants were engaged to investigate asp~cts of this question. Professor J. Morgan Kousser vf tha Califarnia lnst~tute of Techr~ology, Fasadena examin~d portians af Santa Monicats history to determine whether there is evidence that the current City Charter was adopted or maintained so as ta disenfranchise minority residents. UCLA - 4I. - Frofessor Leo Estrada s~ud~ed the eity~s m~nority population distribation ta determine wheth~r it was possible to create a district that couid elect a minority City Councilmember. As a result of time canstraints, Dr. Kausser's research was Zimited and was ~argely based on newspaper caverage of circumstances surrounding the adoption of the 1946 Charter and a 1975 praposal to create districts. In addition, he canducted a statistical analysis to determine whether 1946 voting records revealed racially polarized voting between supporters and opponents of the Charter. In Dr. Kousser's uiew, the initial evidence af discrimination is sufficiently strong sv that the City would have to defend ~tself vigorously in order to Qvercome a claimed violation of the ~otinq Rights Act. Dr. Kousser added that the evidence of discriminatory intent in the adoption af the 1946 Charter was at least as strong as in successful voting rights cases in which he has served as the principal expert witness. However, the scope of Dr. Kousser~s research was limited to approximately 70 hours, he was not asked tv explare cantrary evidenc~, and he ch~ract~rized his conclusions as "quite tentative . ~~ For his part, Professor Est~ada de~erm~ned that it was pc~ssible to create a minority dis~ric~ within the framewark Qf a seven- da.s~rict City Counc~Z . Such a dis~rict wou~.d ~.arge].~ encompass - 42 _ what is generally regarded as the Pica Neighborhood with a near majority of vaters being Latino. Combined Latino and African Americans would constitute a majority of voters in this district. Professor Estrada concluded that this district was sufficiently compact to satis~y Voting Rights Act crite~ia. The City Attorney~s office noted that the evidence presented must be viewed in cantext, must be cansidered as tentative, and does not compel a particu~ar result. Ev~n if th~ Cammission were to make the worst case assumption on the intent iss~e, the City Attorney's office explained, several oth~r preconditions would need to be met in order far a voting discrimination suit to be seriausly considered. Specifically, any plaintiff would a~so need to estabZish: (1) the existence of a minority group sufficiently larqe and geographically compact to constitnte a majority in a single member dis~rict; (2) that the minarity group is political~y cohesive, and (3) that its preferred candidates are usually defeated by votes of the white ma~ority. On thes~ paints, alI of which need to be answered affirmatively for an ad~erse vating discrimination judgment ta accur, ~e have at this point na clear affirmative answers (though it has been established by Pro~essor Estrada's work that combined ethnic minorities cons~itute a majority af a compact distra.ct). The Commissian did not pursue answers to the secand and th~rd points. For th~ Cax~mission's deci~ion-making process, it was unnecessary to d~termine these answers }aecause the Commission was already commi~ted to recammending a~ystem that would increase ethnic - 43 - empowerment. Since the Commission was nearing consensus on propasing abandonment of the at-large system for that and other policy reasons, the legal consequences of re~aining at-large were ~eca~inq ~oot pQi~ts, fQr our deliberative process. In the ~urther choice between districts and a proportianal representation plan (such as STV), both of which ara large steps toward greater ethnic group electaral influence, the relevance of the answers is marginal. The degree of group cohesivene~s will bear on a minority group's success rate under both systems, and~ short of virtual unanimity, pravides no iron-clad guarantee of success under either on~. A mathematica~ly sophisticated examination comparing the probabie success rates undar districts ar STV af ethnic-backed candidates is a project that could be done, and perhaps should be done before a final decisian is made. It was not a projeet, however, that could be done within the time frame and budget of this r~port. Similarly, racially polarized vating by the white majority cauld impinge on ethnic choices succeeding under either system. zf there is any significant degree af such vating it might be more effective in districts than under STV. This is also a matter that could well be pursued furtherr but not one we were able ta pursue within our ~ime, ski~l and budget constraints. What is clear, in contrast to all these unanswered questions~ is that proportianal methods, like districts, bring Latinos much closer to piacing their cho~ce on City Council. Unlike districts, they avoid a possible forced choice between a Latino - 44 - and African-American candidate, and enable al~ members of each graup, regardless of place of residence, to unify behind a candidate of it~ praference - or far that ~atter, to join together. As such, it is hard to foresee a basis under wh~ch such syst~ms cauld be attacked as minority vote dilution. Likewise, should the Counci~ choose to fallow our secand preferenee and ins~itute districts, the City would likely, provided it drew a district that near~y maximized minority voter strength, be immune to vating rights litigation. As the CQmmission on policy grounds recommends discantinuance of the at-large plurality system, we hesitate to step into the shoes af ~he City Attarney ta advise Council on its voting rights law risk exposure should it not abolish at-larg~ e~ections. There is no pending voting discrimination ~1~1gatlOn~ nar ~hreat of litigation, nor even rumor of a threat at this ti~e. However, we have heard enough discussion and read enough material related to the question that we can say as a matter of prudent management, that it wauld be unfartunate and unwise to maintain in place a sy~tem the City might need to defend at great expense, notwithstanding the likelihoad that the City might ultimately prevail. By cantrast, a move to a system that offered increased opportunity far minority representation would be a defense ta any such suit. This, in our view, is yet one more reason - not the most impartant one, but a significant one - for choosing one of - 45 - the electoral options we have recommended in the body af this repart. - 46 - 1,) pg. 17 Welch & Bledsae, "Urban Refarm and Its Consequences", P. 8, 2) pg. 18 Kousser Repnrt, P. 14. 3) pg. 28 Saseline Data Report (International City Manage~ent A~s'n.) VOl. 19~ #6~ P, 3. 4) pg. 32 Petrie and Tuchfarber, '~Praportional Representation", P. 37. 5) pg. 39 we assume here that there is no concerted caunter-strategy by the remaining four-fifths aimed at exclusion of this group's candidate. The Commission has not analyzed the likely outcomes of such a hypothetical situa~ion, - 47 - 2) Question: Whether or not City Charter Section 602 should b~ amended to provide compensation and benefits for members af the City Cauncil and if sor what compensation and benefits shauld be pra~ided? Existing City Char~er; SECTIDN 502. Campensa~ion. The members of the City Council shall receive no compensation far their services as such, but shall receive reimbursement ~or necessary travel and other expens~s whan on official duty out of the City on order of the City Council and, in additiQn, the Mayor shall recea.ve the sum of One Hundred and Fifty (5150.00) Dollars per month, which amount shall be deemed reimburse~aent aut-of-pocket expenditures and costs i~nposed upan him in serving as Mayar, and a11 other members af the City Council shall r~ceiv~ the sum of Fifty ($50.40) Dvllars per month, which amount shall be deemed to be reimbursement for out-of-pocket expenditures and casts imposed upara them in serving as City Councilmen. Disaussion and Recom~endation: The current Charter sect~on, while providing no compensatian as such to Council members, offers them $50 monthly "deemed to be reimbursement," in part, for "costs imposad upon them in serving." Since Santa Manica's Charter, with its "reimbursement" limit of $50 per manth, was adopted in 1946~ the purchasing power of the dollar has shrunk to less than one-sixth its magnitude of that year, and median family income has multiplied more than eleven-fold. Depending on what formula is chosen as a basis far cast-of-living adjustment, the 1945 stipend wauld amount to at ~east $330 par manth or as much as $570 a manth in taday's dollars. It is no longer reasonab~e, we believe, to regard the sum specified in the 1946 Charter as appropriate "reimbursement" far the time and en~rgy required of Councilmembers. - 48 - The responsibilities of C~ty Council service, as reported in interviews with 13 past and present members, are the approximate equivalent of a ha~f-time job, averaging abou~ 23 hours per week. Council meetings alone consumE almQSt 5 hours in the average week, and preparation time-study of documents and consultation with City employees ~ consumed another 4 hours. While these Councilmembers reported wide variation in the amaunt of time spent on dealing with constitu~nt requests and complaints, on the average, this activity absorbed more than 5 hours each week. Ad hac meetings, with City staff, with community groups, and Ziaison duties with C~ty commissions~ took up another 5 to 5 1/2 hours, and miscelZaneous tasks including correspondence, travel time and member-initiated projects, was estimated at a further 2 1/2 to 3 hours per week. The lowest amo~nt of total weekly time reported was 11 to 15 ho~rs and some Councilmembers customarily spent upwards of 30 hours. Time commitments af this scopa make City Counci~ service difficult, if not impossible, to reconci~e with full-time employment elsewhere. As a result, in the view of the Commissian, the appnrtunity ta sertte on City Council is limited, under the non-compansation provisions of the current Charter, ta retirees, dependents, the self-employed, or other persons ~illing and able to make cQnsiderable financial sacrifices. Such constraints on Council membership unreasonably exclude many Santa Monicans who might render the Czty valuable time and talent. G~neral law cities in Californaa specify formulae for ~ity cvuncil compensation based on the population of the municigality - 49 - concerned. For cities of Santa Monica's size, Council salaries could be set at any figure up to $600 per month, and the Califarnia State Gavernm~nt Code allows for cost-of-living adjustment~ of up ta 5~ per annum far subsequent years. Many charter cities in the metropolitan Los Angeles area appear to have utilized the general law formula for czties of their size as a guideline in adapting their own Cauncil pay scales, although the largest cities, where council serv~ce is deemed more burdensome, pay higher salaries. We asked 15 present and former Council members for their views on appropriate remuneration levels. Those who were now retired from office and thus able to speak with no p~ospect of personal gain wera almost all agreed on a range af $500 to $500 monthly. Several pointed out that Santa Mon~ca's intense and active polit~cal culture demanded mare time than would service in the average city of the same size. Among the 11 mid-sized Southern California cities we examined in studying compensation and benefit levels, the base monthly salary ranged from $100 to $1,62~, with a median figure of $483 and average of $543 per month. Because of the obsolescence af th~ current Charter's figure (enacted a~most half a century ago~, because we want ta open Council service to all, because San~a Monica's practice of no Council compensation is out of step with almost all jurisdictions, and becauae the time demands of Council serv~ce in - 50 - Santa Monica are equivalent to a part-tim~ job, the Commission recommends remova2 af s~ction 602 of tha Charte~. In lieu of tha curr~nt Charter provisions, tha Commission xecommends that the Charter set comp~nsation ceilings according to the population-based formula for general law cities (i.e. up to $600/manth), thus allowing the Cauncil to set an initial figure within that speaified range. ~hould the Council wish to create differentia~ remuneration for the Mayar, it would have discretion to do so within the rang~ limit set forth above. Ths Commission further recammends that the Council give consideration to developing a method by which there would be same elQCtaral controls over appra~ing or disapproving of any subsequent increases in campensation above the figure initially set. Although State law provides for City Councils ta increase their compensation based on CPI factors~ w~ advise against a system in which the Council proposes its own pay raises. Such procedures, while not unco~uaon, tend to generate public antipathy and acrimonious debate. Alternatively, an independent cammission could review remuneration, or recommand guidelines, (such as CPI-based increases). Further, sinc~ in ouz judgment, adequate performance in electiv~ office is often incompatible with a~ull-time job elsewheref past and praspective snembers of City Council have found it and may find it difficult to raceive or maintain hea~th insurance and related benefits. - 51 -- It is in tha City's intarest to see that City Gouncilmember~, like any City emplayae, are afforded ad~quate access to health and dental care, in arder that their performance not be interrupted or curtailed by illness. We nate that both the Santa Manica - Malibu Unified School Board members and the Santa Monica Cammunity Ca~leg~ Trustees have medical insurance coverag~. The Commission requested a survey be made of benefits offered C~uncil members in 11 SQUthern CaZifornia citi~s, ranging in size from E1 Segundo to Long Beach. All cities provided city-paid health insuranCe contributions ranging from approximately $200 up to $558 a month (except far an $837 maximum for combined health, dental, psychologica~ and life insurance caverage offered by one cityJ. ~ental coverage with a city contribution was availab~e in aIl 11 cities. With one exception, life insurance was alsa offared, with banefits rising, in three cities, to $100,000. In addition to these benefits, about half of these cities provided their Conncils with auto allowances - from $125 ta $450 month~y - or with use of city ~ehicl~s. In determining the benefits avai~ab~e, the city administrators interviewed explained the benefits extended ta city depart~ent heads i~ often used as a basis. We recommend that Counci~members ~e extended the same insu~ance benefits as the top administrative bargaining unit af Santa Monica City ~mployees, with the exception of participation in the Public Employees Ret~rement System. Due to difFerences in perspectives related to the issues of benefits and pay, as - 52 - represented by the opinions of the Commissioners, and the lika~ihoad that the electorate may have different positions on these two issues, we racommend that they be separate ballot measures if submitted ta the electorate. 3) Question: Whether or nat any limitation should be placed on the t~rms of office of inembers af the City Council. DisCUSSion and Recommendation: The Commission was closely divided on the questian of term limits for City Council members. A majority (7 af 13) of Commission members supported limiting City Council members to three cansecutive 4-year terras. A smaller group would have left the tenure of inembers to the discretion of the electorate on a case-by-case basis. Both supporters and opponents of the policy justified their positions as being in line with various tenets of d~mocratic theory and tradition. Proponents sugg~sted that the oppartunity for more people ta serve on Council would encourage citizens to participate in civic life and to serve on boards and commissions as training grounds for Council. This conjecture is supported by the experience of at least one city - Kansas City, Missouri - where the elECtian following the ins~itution af term ~imits praduced a record r~umber of Council candidates. ~t was also st~ggested that greater turnaver af Council members wou~.d stimulate voter interest in Santa Monica's political life. Some limit advocates believe ~chat lengthy servicB permits a Council member to become removed fr~m the experience of everyday residents. This was countered by the suggestion that ~ong tenure - 53 - in office aZlows independence from b~ocs and pressure groups, in part because the und2rstand~~g of civic affairs deveZoped over ye~rs af service provides an indepe~dent check on the self-interested arguments of speci~l interests. Advocates af ~imits suggested that frequent infusion of new bZaod into the Council would be benef~cia~ in creating an vpenness to new ideas. Veteran office-holders, some suggested, are sometimes toa concerned with maintaining established routines and justi~ying past performances, rather than Zaaking at cu~ren~ problems ~ith a fr~sh eye. Finally, some misgivings were held regarding the long-term incumbent~s electoral advantages. A level playing field, same feZt, was impossibZe zn a contest agains~ a veteran whose langevity made his~her name a household word. A substantial minarity of Commission~rs rejected any limitation, largely for two reasons. Some felt Iong service was a valuable thing in itself, in so far as experience cantributed to efficiency in decision making, added to the CO~lECt1V~ storahouse of civic knowledge and was a resource for novices on the council. It was pointed out that government has many technical aspects, which cannat be Iearned overnight~ so ~h~ eonstituents may suffer from the inexperience of elected officials. others, while nat necessarily advacates af lang servic~, felt that a prohibitian ~n it would be an unwarranted impositian an the pub~ic's right ta choase their representatives, ~nd a cu~tailment of the democratia process. As the California Supre~e - 54 - Court said in the context af striking down a candidate rasidency requirement: "...in judging the validity of a r~straint upon eZigibility for elective Office, we must be mindful that the restraint is upon the right to vote as wel.l . . . " (Zeilinga v. Nelson, 4 Cal 3d at 721) Term limits have recently been imposed for state legis7.ators in Colorado and Ok~ahoma, and in California, by a narrow3y approved 1990 initiative. It was argued that gerrymandering and incumbents' massive campaign war chests combined to make legislators virtually immune to electara~ competition. It was a faet that in recent years iess than one incumbent in ten was successfully challenged. However, some Commissioners questioned whether the case made for term limits in the California Legislature can be fairly applied ta Santa Monica's City Council. San~a Monica, not subject to gerrymandering cantinues to have campetitive elections. Nox is Iong tenure on City Council pervasive. Among the 57 individuals who have served on Council since the current Charter was adopted, only 10 se~red more than eight cansecutive years. A single term was the most cammon experience, and the average ~eng~h af se~-vice for the 50 who have completed their t~rn~s was just over six years. Among neighboring jurisdictions, only Redando Beach was fo~nd ta have a locally adopt~d term lim~t, that being two conseeutive terms. - 55 - In the minarity's v~ew, nat only are there points of principle against term limits, but the persuasive theoretical arguments for them do not apply compelling~y to Santa Monica's concrete circumstances. Ultimately, the prevailing view on the Commission was to recQmmend the adoption of a Charter section limiting continuous service on council to thres four-year terms. After a periad of absence from office, a person who had served three terms would be again eligible for election. 4) Question: The method af selection of the City Attorney and City Clerk Exis~ing City Charter: SECTION 700. Officers to be Appoint- ed by ths City Cauncil. The City Council shall appoint the City Manager, City Attorney and HEalth Officer, which positions shall not be in the Classified Service and who may be removed by moti~n of the City Council adapted by ~t least fiv~ affirmative ~ates. It shall also appoint the City Clerk, which positian shall be in the Classified Service. Disoussian and Recommendation: The Commission examined seZec~ian practices for Czty CZerks and City At~arneys in a number of r~eighboring jurisdictions. We also reviewed a recent survey by the 3nternationaZ Institute of Municipal Clerks, covering 241 Galifarnia c~ties. The Iatt~r study indicated a two-to-one preference ~or appointed (1G0 cities) over elected (81) City Clerks. Previous data gathered in 1983 suggests a trend away fro~a ~he election aption may well have taken place in the past decade. Tn general, it is the smaller cities where election of Clerks accurs, which may - 56 - reflect unwillingness on the part of larger jurisdictions to accept the criteria used in the electoral proce~s as appropriate ta filling a professional pasition. Appointment of the Clerk is usually made by City Counczl in charter cities, although in same smaller cities the City Manager makes the appointment. This practice often evoZ~ed because, at an earlier time, the City Manager served in a dual capacity as City Clerk. A survey af 29 cities in Southern California revealed only four instances of appointment by City Managers, one of these requiring Cauncil approval. Santa Manica's selection process is consis~ent with the practice of mast jurisdictians, and the Commission saw na persuasive reasan far amending it. City Attorneys in California are overwhelmingly appointed; there are appraximately lo elected City Attorneys among over 400 in the stata. Sn view of the above infarmation, and af recant voter action an the question of an el~cted City Attorney, the Commission did not see a need ta change the existing appointive proc~dure. We recommend retentian of Section 700 with its current pravisions for appointmen~ of City Clerk and City Attnrney. For a discussion of the Health ~fficer, please see Questian 8. ~- 57 - 5a) Question: Should Boards and Commissions established by Charter remain so mandated? Discussion and Recommendation: The City's sixteen baards and commissions are estab~ished in two ways - eleven by ardinance and five by Charter ~andate. Charter Municipal Code Airport Commission Accessibility Appeals Board Library Board Personnel Soard Planning Commiss~an Recreatian Commissian Architectural Review Board Arts Commission Building and Safety Commission Commission on Older Americans Comm~ssion on Status of Wamen El~ctrical Board af Appeals Housing Commission Landmarks Commission Plumbing & Mechanical Board of Appeals Social Services Commission Those advisary bodies created by the Charter tend to relate ta activities/functions that will always be under the purview of the City. Those created by ordinance re~lect responsiveness over time to changing conditions and issues in the City. The advantages of the ab~lity to create boards and commissions by ardinance include timeliness and ~lexilaility in establishing advisory governing structures which best meet the current needs of the community. - 58 - The Commission recommends no substantive changes be made in the Charter's form~la for establishment autharity of City boards and commis~ions. Howe~er, to canform with currently used nomenclature, the Charter's reference to the Racreation Cammission should be redesignated the Recreation and Parks Commission. 5b) Question: Should th~ currant method of selection of Pianning Commzs'sianers be retained? Existing City Charter: SECTTON I007. Planning Cammission, There sha11 be a Gity Planning Cam~nission appoi.nted by the City Councii, one membar to be elected from its own membership to pravide active liaison with the Commission, but who shall neither have a vote nor be eligible ta be chairman thereof, and seven members from the qualified electors af the City, nona of whom sha11 hold any paid affice or employment in the City gov~rnment. Th~ City Engineer and City Attorney, or their assistants, shall be in attendance at all regular meetings of ~he Com~ission. Discusaion and Recon~.mendation: At the Commission's request, the Planning Division contacted 20 Ca].ifornia cities af various sizes throughout California ta inquire about the pracess used ta select planning commissianers. And attempt was made to include cities with a reputation for innovation. As well as ascertaining the mechanics of the se~.ecti~n process, this survey inquired into the views of seniar planning staff about the inerits of that city's system. In each city we sought to find out: whether planning commissioners are appointed or el~cted; whether selected at-large or hy district; who actually selects the - 59 - commissioners; whether there are any minimum requirements or qualificatians for the positian; how vacancies are advertised; whether commissioners receive any compensatian; wheth~r there are term limits; and how af~en the commission meets. The survey findinga, and camments made by city staff persans about various aspects of the selection process can be summarized as follows: Appointment vs. Election: Ail af tha citias contacted utilized appointments as oppased to elections. Many interviswees felt ~hat elections would further politicize a process that was already political enough. Pracedures for Appointment; The 20 cities polled rely upon three basic models far appointing commissioners: by the mayor, by individual cauncilmem}aers, and by majority council vote. Appointment by the mayor occurs in just under half the cities examined. In most cases, hawever, the mayor's appoint~ent is subject to City Council approval. Likewise, in the ane-third of the cities in which each Councilmember appoints a commissioner, these are usuall~ sulaject to approval by the entire Council. Some staff considered the latter system ta be likely to constrain independent thinking by commissioners. - 60 - Other Issues: o Compensation and term li~its were not regarded as major issues in mast cities. o Same staff believed that professional knowiedge or experi~nce reqt~irements would be beneficial to the commission in areas such as architecture, plan~ing and real estate develapment. o ~nly two of the 2D cities appaint conunissioners by district--Inglewaod and Pomana. Santa Monica Planning Commission's Views To deepen our u~derstanding of these issues as they have confrontad Santa Monica, we alsa asked that the Planning Division discuss them with our own Commissianers. They interviewed faur current and three past members of the Planning Coiamission. In short, they support the current method of Planning Commission selection. Their reasons for thzs are summarized belaw: Ad~antages of the Existing Selection Process o open Process: Several commissioners comm~nted that the current practice of noticing Planning Cammissian vacancies to the genera~ pub~zc rep~asents a fair, open apprvach which~-in theary, at least--permits diverse backgrounds and ideas on the commission. o Independenae: Many felt that appointing cammissioners at-large and aubject ta City Council approval lends greater independence to the Cammission than wauld individual Council appointments and/ar appointments by district. - 61 ~ Disadvantages of the Existing Selection Process o Theory vs. Practice: Several commissioners commented that the current selection process is open and democratic in theory but in practice is subject to back room deal-making and generaliy reserved for the politically "connected." o Noticing: Some felt that an inadequate public noticing of Commission vacancies cantribu~es to the ~~political" nature in Planning Commission appointm~nts. Th~y suggested that more effort should go into noticing vacancies widely to the general public. o Insnfficient Cri~eria/Raquiremen~s; It was the view of several comniissioners that the existing appiication/screeninq process for Commissioners was too arbitrary and should b~ strengthened by incorporating c~rtain criteria for background, skills, and experience in such areas as develapment, architecture, planning, business, and/or community organizing. Commissioners generally felt that a mare rigorous screening would bzing more relevant e~ertise to the commissian, and make the process less "palitical" and mflre object~.ve. Dverall Rating of System/Alternata.ves The general sentiment of the cam~nissioners can be summari.zed as fa~lows: that the requirement far a majority council vote ta appoint commissioners is gaad; ~hat making applications for Planning Commissian ~seats avail~ble ta the general public is good; b~t that the public noticing and screening proc~sses for Caramission appointments are inadequate. - 62 - Alternatives to a majority vote by Council--such as appointments by mayor, subject to mayoral appraval, or by district--were consid~red too prone to "politics". Some C~mmissioners added that the staggering of Cammission and Council terms Iends greater independence to commissio~ers. Terms and Term Limits Almost all Commissioners felt that the exis~ing term limit~ of two four-year terms were adequate. Several cammented that it takes at least one year just to becorcte acq~ainted with the issues and procadures. One Commissianer no~ted that most Commissioners "burn out" befare ever reaching the end of their eighth year. Compensation Most Commissioners considerad the current compensation leve~ of $25 per meeting adequate and found the real reward to be in cammunity service. At the same time, some of the same commissioners feJ,t there should be greater r~cognition by the city for th2ir work. Several commissioners felt the current stipend was not enough, suggesting alternatives from $50 ar $100 - up to a professi~nal salary. In additian to giving the Charter Revzew Commission its v~.ews on selection and campensatian, the Flanning Commissian also recommenc3ed changes with respect to other ramifications of th~.s Charter section. Among the recammended chanqes are the foilowing: o City Council Liaison: Section 1007 of the City Charter s~ates that the City Council shall appQint ane af its - 63 - own members to be a nan-votinq member of the Planning Commission ta "provide active liaison with the Cammission". While a majority of the Planning Commission supports tha liaison role, it opposes the 3.iaison being a merr-ber of th~ P~anning Commmission. Commissioners felt that the City Counci~ already exercises amp~e veto authority over Planning Co~n~nission actions, and tha~ the Ziaison as Planning Commission membez tends to undermine th~ independence af the Commissi~n. Accordingly, the Planning Coaumission's first prefarence wou~d be that any reference to City Council liaisan be removed entirely from City Charter, and that the Council continue to assign a liaison informally; or, if the City Council wishes to maintain the reference to the liaisan in the City Charter, that at least the reference to the iiaison as member of the Pianning Commission be removed. The Charter Review Commissian adopted the latter proposaZ and incorpora~es such language in its proposed revisian. o ~~Quali.fied Elector~~: Section 1007 of the City Charter requires the ~nembers of the Planning Cammission be "qualiPa.ed e].ectors" of ~he City. The Piat~ning Commission recommended that the Charter Review Commission and City Council care£ully recansider this requirement. Several commissioners felt strongly that while membars should be required ta be residents of the - 64 - City, it is in their opinion not necessary that they b~ citizens of th~ country. The Charter Review cammission concurred and have incorporated this concept in the proposed re~ision. o AttendanCe by City Engineer at Mee~ings: Section 10a7 o€ the City Charter stipulates that the City Engineer or his assistant shall attend all Planning Commission meetings. The Commission recommended that this language be removed, as ~he City ~ngineer typically attends meetings only when his expertise is required. In our propased re~ision, we incorporate this recommendation. Two other items go beyond the parameters set by the City Council in its direct~an to the Charter Review Commissian, but as the Planning Commissian felt them to be sufficiently important to forward to the City Council, the Charter Review Commission daes so below, without recommendation. o Terni Expiration: Section ~002 of the City Charter stipuZates the PZanning Commissioner's term shall expire an July lst, Because the city Council is us~ally occupied with the City budget at that time of year, the Flanni~ng Commission recommended maving the expiration dat~ up to M$rch or April. o Annual Adjustment ta l+ionetary Compensation: Section I005 af the City Charter stipulates that compensation far Planning Commissioners may be increased by an amount eq~al ta the increase in the Consumer Price Index (CPI) - 65 - for each calendar year. The Commission requested that this be changed ta say that the amount of compensati~n will be automatically adjusted each ye~r by ~n a~ount equal to the increase in the CPI. On the basis of the data learned fram the two studies, the Charter Review Commissian cancludes that the manner of se~.ecting Planning Commissioners now in force should be retained, with the minor madifications specified above. Propased wording SECTION 1007. Planning Commission. There shall be a City Planning Carn~missian appointed by the City Council~ and composed of seven m~mbers chosen from the residents of the City, none of whom shall hold any paid o~fice or employment in the City governruent. The City Council may select ane of its members to provi.de active liaison with the Commission, but the Councilmember chosen shall neither have a vate on the Commission nor be eligible to b~ i.ts chairpersan. The C~.ty Attorney~ ar his or her designee, shall be in attendance at all regu~ar meatings of the Comma.ssion. 6 & 7~ Question: Whether special the Bro~ amended Counc3l city charter Section 612 relating to meetings shauld be amended to canform to an Act and whather Section 6~3 should be to provi.de more flexil~ility in holding meet~.ngs wi~hin the C~ty? Existing City Charter: SECTZON &22. Special Meetings. Special meetings may be called at any time by the Mayor, or by four members af the _ 6g - City Cauncil, by written notice deii- versd personally to each m~mber at ~east three hours befare the time specified for the proposed meetinq. A special meeting shall also be validly cal~ed, without the gi~ing of such written notice, if all members shall give their cansent, in writing, to the holding of such meeting and such consent is on file in the nffice af the City Clerk at the tirne of holding such meeting. A tele- graphic coinmunication from a member consenting to the holding of a maeting shal~ be considared a consent in writing. At any speci~l meeting only such matters may be acted upon as are referred to in such written notice or consent. SECTION 613. P1ace of Meetings. A~1 meetings sha~l be held in the Council Ghambers of the Gity Hall and shall be open to the public. If, by reason of fire, flood or other emergency, it shall be unsafe ~a meet in th~ p~ace designated, the meetings may be h~ld for the duration of the emergency at such place as is desig- nated by the Mayor or, if he should fail to act, by four members of the City Council. Discussian and Recommendation: The Brown Act, found in Government Cade S~ction 54950 et ~., is the core o£ the state's cominitment ta maks public most of the official business at government. This law applies to all cities incZuding Santa Manica. Among the law's feat~res are the requirement that aqendas be published in advance of pubiic meet~ngs, restrictions on closed or executi~e s~ssions, and mandated apportuniti~s for members af the public to speak. In 1990, the state deieted from its budget any obligation to fund cities ~or their ~xpenses related ta the Brawn Aet. This had the effect af making th~ Citiy's compliance with same provisians af the Act voluntary. In response to this - 67 - change, the City Cauncil adopted Ordinance #1556 mandating that the City comply with the Brown Act. ordinance ~556 governs notice procedur~ for regular meetings of City CouncilR or any City board or commissian, and also for special or em~rgency meetings of any of these bodies. For regular meetings, 72-hour prior posting of time, place, and agenda itams is required; the body's action is restricted to posted agenda items, except in unusual circu~stanc~s: i) by majority declaration of a public health or safety emergency; 2) if by a two-thirds or more ~ajority vote the body agrees that the need for action arase a~ter the agenda was posted; 3) in the case of an item continued from a meeting in the five days before the meeting in question. Ordinance 1556 also addresses notice procedure for specia~ and emergency meetings, requiring postinq of time, place and agenda of special meetings 24 hours prior to their occurrence; restricting the agenda to posted items (barring a health or safety emergency); and prascribes notice to the body's memb~rs as in Government Code Section 54956. Final~y, this section mandates emergency mee~ings of City bodias ta be called and conducted in accordance with Government Code Section 54956.5. Charter Section 612 sets forth various pravisions ~ar call~ng special meetings which vary from, or aonf~ict wi~.h, the provisions of the Brown Act and terms of ~rdinance 1556. - 68 - Xt permits, among other things ~pecial meetings to be called on thr~e hours advance notice while Ordinance 155b, in conformity with the Brown Act, suggests 24 hours notice. The Com~issian concZuded that this section should be revised to prescribe that the calls for such meetings conform with State 1aw, The Commission considered the inclusian in the Charte~ of ather specific requirements for public notice and public input covered by the Brawn Act but, nating that there were few if any cities inserting such pr~visions in thair charters, recommends instead 'that the Charter simp~.y enunciata the principles of timely and a~equate pubZic notice, and o~ sufficient provisions far pubZic input, leaving the City council to articu].ate from time ~o ~ime by ordinance, the exact definitions of thesa terms. It should be nated that neither original nor prapased texts of Sectian 5i2 or 613 regulates the aperation of City boards or co~missions as ~rdinance ~556 does, Regarding the matter af ineeting location, we reviewed the regulations af a number of jurisdictions in the Los Angeies metropolitan area. In all cases, charter provisions or ordinanc~s designate Council Chambers as the place of regular meetings. Hawever, a majority provide for flexibility by specifying alternate locations, provid~ng for adjournment to anath~r place, or allowing change af ineeting place by ordinance. - 69 - Under the rewr~tten section, Council would be ab~e to hald meetings in larger quarters, when the level of public interest warrants it, or to take meetings to neighborhoods when the issues to be dealt with m~ght be of primary interest to residents of one area. We propose the following substitutes for Sections 612 and 613, which, we believe, will adequa~ely protect the public right to access and input while allowing flexibility with regard to meeting locations. Propased Wording SECTION 612. Special and Emergency Meetings. The City Councii may call special or emergency meetings at locatians, upon notice, and in accordance with procedures as permitted by ~aw. SECTIDN 613. Open Meetings. Unless otherwise permitted by federal or state law, City Council meetings shall be open and accessible to all members of the public. The City Councii may hold its meetings in the City Council Chambers of the City Hall or at such ather locations as the City Council may by ordinance or resolution designate. The City Council shall by ordinance establish procedures for informing the public of its meetings. The ordinance shall ensure that, to the maximum extent feasible, the public is - 70 - provided with timely and adequate natice of City Council agenda and that the public is prov~ded with the apportunity to comment an proposed City Council act~ons. 8) Question: Whather City Charter Sectian 717 relating to a City Health Officer should be deleted? Existing City Charter: SECTI~N 717. Health OEficer. Powers and Duties. To b~ eligible for appoint- ment to the position of Hea~th officer, the appointee sha11 be licensed to practice medicine in the State of California and shall be selected an the basis of his qualifications or experience in pubZic health wozk. Th~ Health Officer shall have pawex and be required to: {a) Exereise qenera2 supervision over conditions of health and cleanli-- ness in the City and take all necessary ~easur~s far the preservatian and pro- motion thereof; and (b) Enforce all laws, ordinances and raqu~ations relative to the preser- vation and improvement of public health, including thase provided for the preven- tion af dis~ase, the maintenance of sanitary conditions and the insp~ction and supervision af the production, transportation, storagE and sale of €oodstuffs. The City Cauncii may contract with the County of Las Angeles, or an~ other public health organization, for the perfozmance of any or alI function~ in connection ~rith public health matters. Discus~ion an~ RecQmmendatfon: Currently, City Charter Sactian 7~.7 provides the option far a Health Officer. The s~ction also allows the City Council. ta contract with the County of Los Angeles, or any other public health - 71 - organization, for the performance of any or all public health funct~ans. We recommend deletian of this Charter section. At least since the 1950's there has not been a City Health Officer, the City opting instead to contract with the Caunty of Los Angeles for aIl public health functians. A number of City departments utilize the services of the County of Los Ange~es Health Depar~ment. The City Building Division looks to County health inspectors for c~rti~ication of restaurant occupancy requirements; as does the Fire Department for licensing of large day car~ centers and retirement or nursing homes. The City Business Licenszng Off~ce similarly relies an Health Depart~ent certification af food vendors. The City's environmental officers use County Health services far labaratory analysis and investigations of same hazardous or toxic materials. These various City departments have cit~d no problems with services provided by the County. Bath the Fire Department and the Environmental Frograms Division view County respanse to hazardous materia2s spills, in particular, as excellent. Because of this cooperative and satisfactory arrang~ment between Santa Monica and the County, there appears to be no need for the appaintment of a Health Officer nor €or establishment of a City health department. Three California cities (Long Beach, Berkeley and Pasadena), currently operate their awn health departments, _ ~~ _ administering public health clinics and disease prevention and mental health programs, as wel~ as environmental health and hazardous materials services. While the majarity of the funding of these programs comes from the State, cities are increasingly required to rely on their own resources to continue programs which ara being cut back by the State. The cammission daes not believe it wou~d be prudent ta take over the health functian, nor does it believe the appointment of a heaith officer is necessary to oversee the Caunty of Las Angeles. The city would not be ab1e, within the current allocated resources, to perform all functions current~y carried out by the County. Tn consideration of the County's performance record, we recommend the health officer section be deleted from the Charter. Reference to the Health Officer positi~n also occurs in Section 704, where it should, for the sake of consistency, be deleted as well. It i~ important to note that deletion of this position from the Charter would in no way preclude the City Council from future creation of such a position by ordinance or in the annuaZ budget pracess, if this wer~ warranted by changed condit~ons or desire ta undertake expanded hea~th-related responsibilities. .. 7 3 .. 9) Questian: WhethEr City Charter S~ction 1515 relating to clai~s against the City should be required to con~arm to State law? Existing City Charter: SECTION i515. Aations Against ~ity. No suit shall be brought an any claim for money or damages against th~ City ar any board ar commission tihereof unt3l a demand far the same has been presentad as herein provided and rejected in whole ar in part. If rejected in part, suit may be brought to recover the whol~. Exc~pt in those cases where a shorter tz~e is ath~rwise provided by law, aZl claims for damages against the City must ~e presented within six (6) months after the occurrence, event ar transact~on from which the damages all~qedly arase, and alI other claims or demands shall be presented within six (6} months after the last item of the account or claim ~ccrued. Every claim for money or damages against the City or any board or commission thereot shall be €iled with the City Clerk, who shall thereupon presant the same to the City Cauncil, officer, board or commission authorized by this Charter to incur or pay the expenditure or a~leged indebtedness or liability repre- sen~ed thexeby. In all cases such claims shall be appro~ed or rejected in writing and the dat~ thereof given. Failure ta act upon any claim or demand within sixty (60j days from the date the same is filed with ths City CZerk, sha21 be deemed a rejection thereof, Discussion and Recommendat~an: Charter Section 1515 provides a procedure for th~ presentation of cla~ms against the City which at one time mirxored in large part the requiremen~s of Califarnia State law. However, over the years, the government tort iiability acts hava been modified whi~e the Charter provisions have remained frozen. _ 74 _ Under recent caurt deciaians it is unclear to what extent a charter city's tart cZaims provisians may differ from state law obligations. An argum~nt could be made that these procedural prerequisites to the filing of lawsuits ars a matter af local concern and therefore a city need not comply with ~tate law. The C~ty does, however, comp~y with State law. Claims made against the City are administered by the City's Risk Management Divisian, This divisi~n adheres to the detailed procedures listed in the California Government Code. While the Risk Management Division is currently in conformance with the procedures in ~he Santa Monica Charter, it eo~plies with an even mare rigorous methodology as outlined in the Califarnia Government Code. This procedure is the standard of most municipalities, Th~ Commission recommends that the Chart~r be mQdifiad to make c~ear that the relevant CaZifornia Gavarnment Code sections shall be the proceduxal standard for the filing af claims against the City, and ensuing action thereupon. In addition, the Commission considered zt reaso~able to include in this section a statement that any decision by C~ty staff to deny a claim may be appealed to Cit~ Council. The Commissian preposes the faZlowing draft as a rep~ace~ent for Sect~on 1515 as currently written: ~ ~~ _ Proposed Wording Section 1515. Actions Agains~ City. No suit shal~ be brouqht on any demand for money or damages against the City unless a c~aim has baen filed with the City Clerk in accordance with the procedures established by state law, The City Council may establish addi~ianal claims procedures by ordinance. In addition to other procedures as may be established by law, any person aggrieved by a City decisian that rejects or denies, in whale or in part, any demand or claim for money or damages may request the City Council to approve the demand or claim. 10) Question: Whether City Char~~r S~ctiQn 608 should be amended to increase the dolZar amaunt requiring campetitive bidding on public works projects? Existing City Charter: SECTION 608. Contraats on Public Aorks. Every contract invvlving an expenditure of mare than Five Thousand ($5,000.00) Dollars for the con~truction or improvement (excluding maintenance and repair) af public buildings, works, streets, drains, sewers, utilities, parks and playgro~nds, and each separate purchase of ~aterials ar supplies for the same, where the expenditure required for such purchase shall exce~d the sum of Five Thausand ($5,000,00) Dollars, shall be ~et to the lowes~ respansible bidder after notice by publication ~n the official newspaper by two ar mare ins~rtions, the first of which shall be at least ten days b~~oze the time far opening bids. The City Council may reject any and a11 bids presented and may re~advertise in it~ discretion. - 7S - After rejecting bids, or if no bids are received, the City Council may declare and determine that in xts opinion, the work in question may be performed better or mare economically by tha City with its own employe~s, or that the materials or supplies ~ay be purchased at a lower price in the open market, and after the adaption of a resa~ution to this effect by at least five affirmative votes, it may proceed to have said work don~ ar such materials or supplies purchased in the manner stated, without f~rther observance of the provisions of this section. Such contract may be let and such purchases made without advertising for bids, if such work ar the purchase of such materials or supplies shall be deemed by the City Cauncil to be of urgent necessity for the preservation of lifa~ health or property, and sha11 be authorized by at least five affirmative votes. niscuss~on and Recammendation: Section 6os of the City Charter ~equires competitive bidding for every public works expenditure greater than Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00). Cities vary widely in their bid threshold amounts. For instance, tha charters of Torrance, Inglewaad, Long Beach and Glendale mereZy indicate that their respective City Cauncils may by ardinance estab~ish limits beyond which bids are required. Burbank and Redondo Beach establish the limits in their charters at Thirty Thousand Dallars ($30,000.00) and Fifty Thousand Dollars ($50,000.0~) respectively. State iaw does not cantrol the amount where a bid is necessary. Santa Monica's present $5,000.00 bid threshold has not been changed in 40 years, and is unusually ' low in today's contract envir~nment and as compared ta other cities. _ q~ _ City Forma~ Type Limit Bid Limit ~overnmen t Set By Burba~k $3D,OD0 Chaxter Charter Giendale $15,000 Charter Charter Inglewoqd $44,D00 Charter Ordinance Long Beach $50,000 Charter ordinance Pasadena $25,OOD Charter *ordinance Redondo Beach $54,Ob0 Charter Charter Torrance $24,999 Charter Ordinance Bav. Hills, E1 Segundo Hawthorne, Manhattan B~ach, Genera~ State West Hoilywood $10,000 Law Law * Charter sets the formal bid limit at an amount not to exceed $75,000. The Ca~ncil has set the limit at $25,000. The Commission recommends ~odification of the Charter by deleting the dollar amount for the formal bid limit. The City Cauncil wou~d then be given the responsib~lity to establish by ordinance an expenditura limit above ~hich competitive biddfng wouZd be required. This 3imit cauZd be revised when necessary by ordinance of the City Council and wduld abide by State limits. This modification to the Charte~ would a~~ow the City to conduc~ business in a more effici~nt and cost-effective manner. Allowing the Council to s~t the limits wou~d save the resources required to conduct a public vote over an issue which is basically technical and administrative zn nature, and which wilZ need to be adjusted from time to tims withaut a substantive change in policy mere~y because af monetary inflation. - 78 - The City's Finance Director has currently determined that raising the City's f~rmal bid threshold from $5,000.00 will require no change in the City~s accaunting procedures to satisfy StatE law. While favoring a reduction in the scope of this Charter Section by raising the dollar threshold at which it comes into forca, the Commission felt this Section's applicatian should be broadened to cover personal and profess~onal services contracts, an area not mentianed in the currant Section 608. The Cammission feels that explicit inclusion of such contracts in this Section wauld bolster public confidence in the integrity of the City's expenditure procedures. The Commission also felt that different threshold dollar limits are appropriate for different types of expenditures. Finally, the Commission felt that Santa Monica's cammitment to opportunity for minorities and ather disadvantaged groups should be expressed here in a clause mandating that bidding p~ocadures be tailored toward this goal. To meet the objectivas discussed above ~he Commission propases that Section 608 be revised as follows; Proposed Wording Section b08. Public Con~racts. The City Council shall, by ardina~ce, adopt procedures and requirements for the purchase of supplies and equipment; for the prvvisian of -- 7 9 - personal services, including without limitation, pro~essional consultant agreements in excess of $5o,bo0; and fax the award af bids for public warks projects. Such an ordinance should preserve public con~idence in the integrity and openness of the City contracting pracess, protect public #unds, and insure that the City obtains materials or services af appropriate quality. To the extent permitted by law, the City Cauncil shall adapt procedures which encaurage the award of City c~ntracts to disad~antaged or minorit~ persans. Pursuant to an ordinance duly adopted by the City Cauncil, the persanal services agreements subject ta the dollar requirements of this Section may be adjusted by an amount no greater than the cumulative percentage incr~ase in the Consumer Price Index as measured from th~ operative dat~ of the last such adjustment, provided that such adjustments shall occur only once in any five year period. The Consumer Price Index (CPI) shall be the CPI for A~l Urban Consumers for the Los Angeles, Long Beach, Anaheim Metropalitan Area (All Items}, provided by the United 5tates Bureau af Labor Sta~istics or other comparable index determined ta be appropriate by the City Council. - 80 - 11} ~uestion: Whether City ch~rter Sectian 130o relating ta o~ficial bonds should be ame~ded or deleted? Existing City Charter: SECTION 1300. Official Sonds. The City Council shall tix by ordinanca the amounts and terms of the official bonds of all afficials or emplayees who are required by this Char~er or by ardinance to give such bonds. All bonds shall be appr~ved as to form by the City Attorney, and, with the axception of the bond af the City Controller, shall be fi~ed with the City Controller. The Cnntroller's bond shall be filed with the City Clerk. Premiums on official bonds shall be paid by the City. In all cases wherein an employee of tha City is required to furnish a faithful perfarmance band, there shall be no personal liability upan, or any right to recover against, his superior officer ar other officer or emplayee, ar the bond of the ~atter, unZess such superior officer, or ather ~fficer or employee is a pa~ty to, or has conspired in, ~he wrongful act causing directly or indirectly such loss. Disaussion and Recommendatian: Section 1300 of the City Chaxter is a broad pravision autharizing the City Cauncil to establish by ordinance the terms and amaunts of any bonds that city e~ployees shall b~ required to furnish. Official Bonds Many cities (far example, Burbank, Redando Beach, Inglewoad, Tarrance and Glendale}, include a si~ilar performance bond provision in their ch~rters. The various city charter provisions either identify specific afficials and emp~oyees - 81 - who will be subject to performance bonds or delegata this responsibility to the City Council. Section 2612b - Faithful Perforrnance Bonds, of th~ Santa Manica Municipal Code lists those officials for whom bonds must be posted to the City, and includes all department direc~ars, the Assistant City Manager and the City Manager. The Commission believes perfor;uance bonds are in the best interests of th~ City, Tha bonds pravida protection in the event of an afficial's or employee's fail~re, which could be intentiona~, such as embez2lement, or unintentianal, such as an incorrect payment. Abave aZl, the faithful performance bond protects the City and ultimately the taxpayer fram loss of public money or property. The Commission believes this provision shauld remain in the City's charter, though with the removal of gender-specific language and deletion of specific farmulae governing the approval and posting of bonds, matters which, in the Cammission's view, may be better left to City Council to set from time to time as circumstances warrant. We propose the f~llowing language as a substitute far Section 1300 as now written: Proposed Wordinq Section ~300. Official and Employee BQnds. The City Council sha~l establish by ordinance the amounts, terms and conditions af any official bonds required of afficia~s or employees, ~ g2 _ Premiums on official bonds shall be paid by the City. 12) Questian: Whether City Charter Section ~509 relating to Cash Basis Fund and City Charter S~ctian ].511 relating to Capi~al Outlays Fund shou~d be amended or deleted? Existing City Charter: SECTION 1509. Cash Basis F~nd. The City Cauncil shall maintain a revolving fund, to be known as the "Cash Basis Fund", for the purpose of placing the payment af the running expensea of the City on a cash basis. A sufficient reserve sha1Z be bui].t up in this fund frvm any available sources with which ta meet all Iawful demands against the City for the fir~.t five months, or other necessary period, of the succeeding fiscal year prior to the receipt af ad va].orem tax revenues. Transfers may be made by the City Counci]. from ~uch fund to any other fund or funds of such sum ar sums as may be required for the pur- pose of placing such funds, as nearly as possible, on a cash basis. AlI moneys so transferred from the Cash Basis Fund shall be returned thereto before the end of the fiscal year. SECTION 1511. Gapital Outlays Fund. A fund for capital outlays, generally~ is hereby created, to be known a~ the "Capita~. Outlays Fund." The City Council by ordinance may create a special fund or funds for a special capital outlay purpose. The City Council may Ievy and colle~t taxes for aapital outlays and may include in the annual tax Ievy a levy for such purpases in which ev~nt it must apportic~n and appropriate ta any such fund o~ funds the moneys de- rived from such levy. Tt may not, in makir~g such levy, exceed the maximum tax rate prova.ded for in this Charter, unless authorized ]ay the af~irmative vates ~f a majority of the electors voting on the proposition at any elec~ion at which such question is submittad. The City C~uncil may transf~r to any such fund any unen- _ g3 _ cumbered surp~us funds remaining an hand in the City at any time. Once created, such fund sha11 remain invio~ate for the purposes for which ~t was created; if, for capital outlays, generally, then for any such purposes and if for a special capital, outlay, then far such purpose an1y, unless the assent of the voters is expressed to the use of such fund for some other purpose by majority vote of the el~ctors voting in favor there- af at ~ general or special e~ection at which such propasition is submitted. Disaussion and Recommendation: Both sections currently contain pre-Praposit~on 13 language wh~ch assumes that the City'~ primary revenue source is the Property Tax and that the City Council still has the ability ta directly revise the annual Property Tax levy. Neither assumption holds trt~e today since: 1) The City has other major local tax sources of revenue (e.g, the Sales Tax, Utility Users Tax, Real Property Transfer Tax, Transient Occupancy Tax and Business License Taxj, rece~pts from which are received monthly rather than having ta wait five months inta the fiscaZ year to receive th~ first distributions of the Property Tax; and 2) Any increase in the Property Tax abave Propasition 13 limits must be voter approved. Because substantial city income naw f1Qws Qn a monthly rather than annual basis, the Commissa.on reaammends the deletion of language in Section ~.549 tying cash reserve size to specific tim~ periads. Much af Section 2511 must be - 84 - deleted to bring its provisions into conform~ty with Prop. 13's restrictions on property tax levies. To preserve existing powers of City Council while simplifying and madernizing Charter language, the COIYl~i15510ri recommends adoption of the following madifications in these sections. Propased Wording Section 1509. Cash Liquidity Resarv~. The City Council shall maintain a Cash Liquidity Reserve Accaunt in the General Fund for the purpose of assuring the payment of the operating expenses of the City on a cash basis. A sufficient reserve shall be bu~lt up in this account fram any available sources. Transfers may be made by the City Council from this account ta any other fund of such suzns as may be required for the purpose of placing such funds, as nearly as possible, on a cash basis. All ~onies so transferred fro~t the Cash Liquidity Reserve Account shall be returned thereto before the end of the fiscal year. S~ct~.an 1511. Capital Expenditures Fund. The City Council by ordinance may create capital expenditure funds. The City Cauncil may transfer to any such ~und any unencumbered surplus funds remaining on hand in the City at any time, or any - s5 - other funds which the City Council may lawfully raise. There was a suggestion ta add language to Section 1511 which would give voters the right to vote on capital expenditure funds in the event that Propositian 13 were to be r~vised or repealed. The Commission conc~uded such a revision should be submitted to the vaters as a separate charter amendment, if and when such circumstances arise. 13) Question: Whether the por~ion of City Charter Section 1513 relating to the presentation of demands should be amended or deleted? Existing City Charter: SECTION 1513. Presen~ation af Demands. Al1 demands agaa.nst the City for which appropriations have been made, before being paid, shall be presented to and appraved by the City Manager. De~nands far which no appropriations have been made shall be presented to the City Councii for approval. Any person dissatisfied with the refusa~ of the City Manager to approve any demand, in whole or in part, may present the same ta the City Cauncil,which, after examin- a.ng into the matter, may approve ar disapprave the demand, in whole or in part. Discussian and Recommendation: Charter Section 1513's first section is concerned with the payznent af demands whether from funds previously appropriated by the City Council or fram unappropriated reserves. The Section provides that the City Manager is ta approve all demands from appropriations while any demands for which there is no appropriation must be approved by the City Counci~. - 86 - In practice, once an appropriation has be~n made by the City Cauncil and an account established, payment of demands against the account must be approved by the individual department concerned with the payment and then the Financa Department. The City Manager rarely becomes directly involved in this appra~al process. Under accounting controls established by the City Manager, the Finance Department m~st give fina2 approval for all appropriated funds. Thus, the financial control and accounting system is self-executing without the specific approval of the City Manager. With respect to demands against unappropriated funds, this situation does require City Cauncil approval. City Council approval of claims is either individual and specific or ganeral and delegated ta staff, depending on the amount involved. This Charter Section's prescription for the involvement of the City Manager is not a practical one, given the voZume of clsims made against the City arising from the vast~y expanded range of government activity. From a practical point of view, there appears to be ~ittle need for the specific language of this part of Section 1513. Under Section 704 of the Charter, the City Manager is already responsible for the finances of the City and for the administration of budgetary matters. These generaZ duties would ~eem ta encompass the particular tasks e~umerated in - 87 - S~ction 1513. Further, Charter Seetions 15~3 - 15~6 discuss budget appropriation requirements. The Commission, therefore, recommends deletian of paragraph one af Section 1513 as duplicative of other Charter pra~isions which adequately address the matter of financial management cantrols and responsibilities. {voting) (process) - 88 -